Abstract
The second part of the book is concerned with discovering what went wrong in the political economy of the Italian experience inside the European monetary arrangements. To this aim, this chapter assesses the origins of the Italian commitment to the process of monetary integration, identifying the roots of its credibility in the consensus of the leading Italian socio-economic coalition. In turn, such a consensus was predicated around the political economy strategy of the Italian business elites to reduce the power of organised labour by shifting the level of governance from the national to the supranational context. At the same time, and in line with a similar strategy adopted by other leading European elites (Chapter 3), the Italian manufacturing sector had hoped to resolve its problem of competitiveness by enacting labour market reforms, which would become far more viable in a strict anti-inflationary environment such as the one established with the ERM of the EMS. These two issues were very salient in underpinning the credibility of the Italian commitment to the process of European monetary integration and were to influence profoundly its future.
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Notes
- 1.
First of all Italy was characterised by the lowest income pro capita within the European Community apart from Ireland, and by the widest gap in regional development with the highest unemployment rate and the weakest industrial structures. Consequently, it had to realise a growth, and, mainly, investment rate much higher than that of the other European countries.Moreover, to avoid relying on protectionist measures, given Italian import propensity, its export growth rate would have had to be higher than that of the other nations in order to purchase the goods necessary for its homogeneous economic growth. See Spaventa, L. (1978c).
- 2.
See Monti, M. (1978a),‘Arduo con la nostra inflazione assumere vincoli di cambio’, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 Dicembre 1978; Monti, M. (1978b), ‘Proseguire la lotta all’ inflazione’, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 6 Dicembre 1978.See Modigliani, F. (1978a), ‘Operazione Europa: quante cose da cambiare per prendere quel treno…’, la Repubblica, 1 Agosto 1978; See Modigliani, F. (1978b), ‘I pro ed i contro per l’Italia’, Corriere della Sera, 1 Dicembre 1978. Spaventa, L. (1978b), ‘Qualcuno vuole punire l’ Italia’, in L’ Europeo, 22 Dicembre 1978; Spaventa L. (1978c), ‘Queste ragioni sconsigliavano un ingresso affrettato’, in Rinascita, 15 Dicembre 1978.
- 3.
This statement is based on the analysis of the position of the Bank of Italy towards the issue of capital accumulation carried out by Balducci and Marconi. See Balducci, R., and Marconi, M. (1981), ‘L’ accumulazione del capitale nella visione del governo, della Banca d’Italia e della Confederazione Generale dell’ Industria’, in Lunghini, G. (1981), Scelte politiche e teorie economiche in Italia, 1945–1978, Torino: Einaudi, p. 79Moreover, in the final remarks to the General Assembly of the Bank of Italy in 1980, Ciampi underlined the Bank of Italy’s tendency to support public investments in the course of the ‘50. See Bank of Italy (1980), Assemblea Generale Ordinaria dei Partecipanti Anno 1979, Roma: Banca d’Italia.
- 4.
The number of members of the CGIL and CISL grew of 20% between 1969 and 1970.
- 5.
The Italian Communist Party reached its historical electoral peak in 1976 with 34.3% of the votes.
- 6.
Both these measures were taken in 1975.
- 7.
The first two measures strengthening market mechanisms were taken in February–March 1975. In February compulsory reserves quotas were set for all credit institutions at 15% of the deposits increase from the previous year. In March, and this is the measure recalled in the text aforementioned, there was the reform of the Treasury Bills monthly auctions allowing also ordinary banks to participate. It is worth noting that in this period Carli was still Governor of the Bank of Italy since Baffi succeeded him only in August 1975.
- 8.
As an example, in the first semester of 1979, Treasury securities were sold worth about 16.600 bn Lire, half of which were taken from the Bank of Italy portfolio. See Bank of Italy (1980), p. 381.
- 9.
Indeed, even if Italian law did not oblige the Bank of Italy to buy all unsold Treasury Bills, it was always interpreted as a commitment by the Central Bank to do it.
- 10.
Payments made by the public sector to productive units in order to lower selling prices or to permit an adequate remuneration of the factors of production. Monti, M., and Siracusano, B. (1979), ‘The public sector financial intermediation: The composition of credit and the allocation of resources’, Review of Economic Conditions in Italy, year 1979, No. 2, p. 224.
- 11.
Grants for the financing of investment, restructuring and conversion. Monti, M., and Siracusano, B. (1979).
- 12.
New capital contributions, net of repayments, granted by the State to increase the own funds of the recipients. Monti, M., and Siracusano, B. (1979).
- 13.
For a more detailed analysis of this problem see Arcelli, M., and Valiani., R. (1979), ‘Crowding out: some reflection on economic policy’, in Review of Economic Conditions in Italy, year 1979, No. 2; see also Monti, M., and Siracusano, B. (1979).
- 14.
Both the banks and the Special Credit Institutions are included in the credit system. It is worth noting here the existence of the phenomenon of double-intermediation consisting in the lending of family savings by the Banks to the Special Credit Institutions which, in turn, lent them to the private corporate sector. It has been calculated that between 1972 an 1981 Banks supplied about 70% of the Special Credit Institutions funds. See Cotula (1984), ‘Financial Innovation and monetary control in Italy’, in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 37, N. 150, September 1984, p. 224.
- 15.
See Monti, M., and Siracusano, B. (1979). pp. 223–253; see also Nardozzi, G. and Onado, M. (1980), ‘The relations between banks and enterprises and the public sector as financial intermediary’, Review of economic conditions in Italy, No. 2, pp. 355–372; Nardozzi, G. (1980), I difficili anni 70, Milano: ETAS Libri.
- 16.
At the end of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, on 13 December 1978, were presented five resolutions over the issue of Italy and the EMS. The first resolution, stating the need for Italy to join immediately the ERM, was proposed by the liberal group and, after being accepted by the Government, was withdrawn by the same group which decided to vote in favour of the Galloni’s resolution. The latter was constituted by three sections: The first part stating a general commitment to the process of European integration, the second one soliciting immediate Italian entry in the ERM and the last section defining the lines of action for the implementation of the agreement on the ERM. Two other resolutions, one by the radical party, the other by the MSI, supporting Italian early participation to the new European Monetary arrangements, were not recognised by the government. Finally, an extreme left group led by Magri and Mrs Castellina proposed a resolution rejecting completely the ability for Italy to join the EMS. See Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978b), p. 25022.
- 17.
Christian Democratic support to an early Italian entry in the EMS was based by Andreatta, a Christian Democrat senator and economist, on the ground that the costs in terms of the growth of inflation of competitive devaluations of the Lira vis-à-vis the other European currencies were no longer sustainable by the Italian economy. Andreatta himself was the protagonist of the DC pressure on Andreotti for the immediate Italian entry in the EMS after the strategic Italian delay. On 7 December 1978 Andreatta claimed, in his speech to the Italian Senate that having the Italian delegation succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of 90% of its requirements to join, there was no reason for the government to delay its immediate entry in the system. During the morning of the same day there had been a private meeting of some DC senators and deputies with the Treasury Minister, Pandolfi, to adopt a common position on the EMS while some members of the DC executive Committee, Rende, Segni and others, solicited an immediate meeting of the executive to reaffirm DC support to the EMS. In the evening, finally, Andreotti met with the whole DC delegation led by Zaccagnini which further uttered the DC political will to join immediately the ERM. The only Christian Democratic politician to underline the contradictory behaviour of Andreotti’s government was Senator Lombardini. See Andreatta, N. (1978a), ‘Aspettando lo scudo’, Corriere della Sera, 9 Settembre 1978; see also Andreatta, N. (1978b), ‘Ragioni di una scelta’, Il Popolo, 19 Novembre 1978; Andreatta, N. (1978c), ‘Mantenere fermo il cambio della Lira’, Il Popolo, 7 Dicembre 1978; Andreatta, N. (1978d), ‘Ecco perche’ ci conviene aderire allo SME’, Discussione, 18 Dicembre 1978; Alo’, C. (1978), ‘Insieme a repubblicani e socialdemocratici, la DC preme per lo SME: due alternative proposte da Andreatta’, il Sole 24 ore, 8 Dicembre 1978; Lombardini, S. (1978a), ‘Lo scudo e’ una trappola?’, Il Giorno, 20 Ottobre 1978; Lombardini, S. (1978b), ‘Un serpente dalla linea molto dura’, Il Giorno, 17 Dicembre 1978; Turani G. (1978), ‘Lombardini critica il si’ di Andreotti: C’e’ dietro qualcosa?’, la Repubblica, 17 Dicembre 1978.
- 18.
The EMU represented for the Italian Liberal Party a vital objective both politically and economically and had been supported by it from the beginning. See Malagodi, G. (1978), ‘Riusciremo ad arrivare all’ appuntamento con lo scudo Europeo?’, Il Tempo, 4 Novembre 1978; Alo’, C. (1978), ‘Ventaglio di opinioni’, il Sole 24 ore, 7 Dicembre 1978. See also Malagodi’s declarations to the Chamber of Deputies on 12 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978a).
- 19.
The Political Bureau of the right wing party ‘Costituente di destra-democrazia nazionale’ had approved on 6 December 1978, in the immediate aftermath of the Brussels Council, a document criticising the Andreotti’s government delay in the acceptance of the ERM. This was regarded as, on one hand, a betrayal of the European ideals of Alcide De Gaspari and Gaetano Martino, leaders of the process of Europan integration during the late 1950s, and, on the other hand, an unacceptable concession to the Italian Communist Party. See Delfino’s declarations during the debate over the Government Communication of the Italian entry in the EMS on 12 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978a).
- 20.
- 21.
The Italian Republican Party had immediately greeted with great enthusiasm the project proposed at the Bremen Council and had supported it throughout the whole process of international negotiations. Indeed, the PRI had even threatened to withdraw from the majority supporting the government if Italy had not entered the ERM from the beginning. See La Malfa, G. (1978a), ‘Dopo il vertice di Brema: l’ America e la sfida dell’ Europa’, La Stampa, 5 Agosto 1978; La Malfa G. (1978b), ‘Difficile Convivenza’, La Stampa, 16 Novembre 1978; La Malfa, U. (1978), ‘Un meccanismo che da garanzie’, La Stampa, 29 Novembre 1978; ‘Non perdere l’ estremo aggancio’, La Voce Repubblicana, 7 Dicembre 1978; ‘La scelta’, La Voce Repubblicana, 12 Dicembre 1978; La Malfa, G. (1979), ‘Non mi pento per lo SME’, la Republica, 2 Gennaio 1979; La Malfa, U. and Biasini O. (1978), ‘Circolare inviata dal Presidente e dal Segretario del PRI a tutte le organizzazioni del partito: Il PRI e l’adesione allo SME’, la Voce Repubblicana, 20 Dicembre 1978
- 22.
See the declarations of Pannella to the Chamber of Deputies on 13 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978b).
- 23.
In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, Napolitano, economic speaker for the Communist Party, reiterated the PCI’s favourable position to a regime of stability for the European exchange rates given the acceptance of those ‘minimal requirements’ so many times stressed also by the Italian government. However, in the lack of any explicit commitment by the other European partners to the adoption of symmetrical intervention obligations in the monetary field, and to the transfer of real resources to the weakest economy, as well as, to the reform of some community policies, in the economic field, the only decision to take was to vote against early Italian entry in the system. See the declarations of Napolitano to the Chamber of Deputies on 13 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978b).
- 24.
The initial position of the ‘new’ Italian Socialist Party of Bettino Craxi was in line with the official one of the Italian government as expressed by Minister Pandolfi in his speech of the 10th of October and broadly accepted by the whole governmental majority, including the Italian Communist Party. (See Cicchitto, F. (1978a), ‘Via libera al serpente se sposta risorse nelle aree deboli’, Avanti, 12 Novembre 1978.)However, as the negotiations proceeded and the divergencies within the majority increased, the PSI tended to assume a more positive attitude towards the results obtained by the Italian delegations in the discussions over the EMS than the one assumed by the PCI (See Cicchitto, F. (1978b), ‘Per evitare nello SME una lira come piuma al vento’, Avanti, 29 Novembre 1978).At the eve of the Brussels meeting the gap between the position of the PCI and that of the other constituents of the governmental majority, particularly the DC and the PRI, appeared unbridgeable, to the extent that Luciano Barca, PCI speaker on economic policy, overtly criticised the configuration of the EMS scheme (see Barca, L., (1978), ‘Il serpente non e’ l’ Europa ed e’ tutto da trattare’, l’Unita’, 3 Dicembre 1978).In this context, the PSI, whose divergencies with the communist party were not limited to the issue of the EMS (see Garimberti, P. (1978), ‘Intervista con Craxi su Eurosocialismo ed Eurocomunismo: Unita’ tra le sinistre? con questo PCI no’, La Stampa, 1 Dicembre 1978) assumed the role of mediator within the governmental majority proposing even a gradual approach to Italian entry in the ERM.In the late proposal of the PSI, presented after the Brussels summit, Italy had to join the basket currency, to accept the constraints imposed by the enlargement of the European Monetary Fund and, eventually, to enter the wider fluctuation bands, from the very beginning of the establishment of the new monetary arrangements, but, before entering the ERM, it was necessary to implement deflationary domestic politics (see Lopez, B. (1978), ‘Intervista con Cicchitto (PSI) su Europa e governo: SME ecco la via d’uscita, ma che fara’ poi Andreotti?’, la Repubblica, 9 Dicembre 1978; Cicchitto, F. (1978c), ‘Non attestarsi su opposte intransigenze’, Avanti!, 10 Dicembre 1978).Finally, however, Andreotti’s announcement of the immediate Italian entry in the ERM, provoked the resentment of the socialist party and its eventual decision not to vote in the Chamber of Deputies on the resolution over Italian entry in the ERM even if its speaker, Cicchitto, openly recognised the need for Italy to join the system (see Cicchito’s declarations to the Chamber of Deputies on 13 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978b)).
- 25.
See the declarations of Magri to the Chamber of Deputies on 13 December 1978, Italian Chamber of Deputies (1978b).
- 26.
See ‘German and Dutch banks: Pounds in with EMS’, The Times, 14 November 1978
- 27.
The document was called: ‘Piano di risanamento monetario da parte del Presidente della Confindustria Guido Carli’.
- 28.
Associazione Piccole Imprese.
- 29.
Confederazione delle Associazioni delle Piccole Imprese.
- 30.
Broadly speaking, it was possible, in 1978, to distinguish between two different categories of public companies.On one hand, there were single companies specialised, in the sector of energy (cool, gas, electric energy), in the sector of transports (railways, highways or flight companies), or in the mail and telecommunication sector, or, in some countries, in the main manufacturing sectors, like steel, aereonautic or ship-building industry.The second category of public industries was a multi-sectorial one including companies operating in differentiated sectors, like the IRI in Italy, the INI in Spain or the National Enterprise Board in the UK. For further details, see Ezra, D. and Sette, P. (1978), ‘Impresa pubblica e cooperazione economica internazionale’, in Industria e Sindacato: settimanale dell’associazione sindacale INTERSIND, anno XX, No. 24, 16 Giugno 1978, p. 6
- 31.
‘Associazione Sindacale Aziende Pubbliche’ which was constituted by the public companies of the ENI group.
- 32.
Rivista della Associazione Nazionale Aziende Ordinarie di Credito e dell’ Istituto Centrale di Banche e Banchieri.
- 33.
See ‘L’ Europa monetaria e la congiuntura italiana’, in Bancaria, anno XXXIV, No. 6, Giugno 1978, p. 611.
- 34.
See ‘Sistema monetario europeo e competitivita’ con l’estero’, in Bancaria, anno XXXIV, No. 11, Novembre 1978.
- 35.
‘Finanziaria Meridionale’ (Southern Financial Company).
- 36.
‘Associazione dei Cambisti’ (Exchange Rates Agents Association).
- 37.
See Confederazione Europea dei Sindacati (1978), ‘Dichiarazioni della CES sulla preparazione del Consiglio europeo di Brema del 5–6 luglio ‘78. Bruxelles, 20 Maggio 1978’, in Rassegna Sindacale: settimanale della CGIL, anno XXIV, No. 27, 6 luglio 1978.
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Talani, L.S. (2017). Consensus and Credibility: Italy and the Process of European Monetary Integration: A Closer Look at the ERM of the EMS. In: The Political Economy of Italy in the Euro. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57755-9_5
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