Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


The concluding chapter summarizes results, offers a critique of the research design used, and discusses the next stage of IMF LIDC reform. Two tiers of actors—primary and secondary—influence LIDC outcomes. A coalition between two primary actors (MD-staff, MD-powerful states, powerful states-staff), or a primary actor and a secondary actor (LIDCs, NGOs, the US Congress, and the World Bank president), appears necessary to produce significant policy change. As predicted by PA models, a lack of consensus among powerful state principals provided openings for management and staff to initiate or resist policy reform. The managing director also is a key player who drives LIDC policy agendas and reform. As seen in the fallout following the Asian crisis and the global financial crisis, systemic crises play a central role in changing ideas around what is deemed legitimate in IMF policy choices and helping drive policy reform.


Policy Reform Reform Effort Policy Position Sustainable Development Goal Asian Crisis 
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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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