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‘Pro-Poor’ Concessionary Lending: The PRGF

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

The formal adoption of the PRGF in 1999 committed the IMF to a ‘pro-poor’ model of concessionary lending. This chapter first explores how the broad-based conservative shift in economic thinking in the 1980s manifested itself within the IMF, particularly around how Fund staff framed the need to aggressively eliminate ‘market distortive’ laws and institutional structures in LIDCs. The chapter then examines how IMF management and staff initially dismissed growing critiques of its LIDC policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Growing popular resistance from the mid-1990s to 1999 to the IMF and other liberalizing multilateral initiatives, combined with the fallout from the Asian crisis, provided an opening within the Fund to question the effectiveness of the Washington Consensus model. The chapter then traces the micro-dynamics, from 1997 to 1999, within the IMF that led to the PRGF.

Keywords

World Trade Organization Poverty Reduction Structural Adjustment Structural Reform North American Free Trade Agreement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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