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The HIPC and HIPC II Initiatives

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

This chapter first traces how the breakdown of the Bretton Woods hegemony and the IMF’s response to the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 set the stage for the 1996 HIPC and 1999 HIPC II reforms. The chapter then examines the dynamics within the IMF that led to the HIPC and HIPC II between 1995 and 1999. In the HIPC case, a division of preferences concerning limited IMF debt forgiveness between two blocs of powerful states reinforced the leverage of the managing director and IMF staff at two junctures resistant to reform. In contrast, the HIPC II case saw broad-based support for reform. Both cases highlight the importance of NGOs and the managing director in enacting LIDC reform and how shifting dynamics in the global economy impact IMF policy choices and change.

Keywords

Executive Director Poverty Reduction Structural Reform Executive Board Debt Relief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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