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Theorizing Post-Washington Consensus LIDC Reform

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

This chapter first formally reviews IMF literature and summarizes the variables that it has identified as influencing contemporary IMF policy choices. Chapter  3 then develops how three theoretical frameworks explain IMF LIDC change. Rationalist inspired approaches draw from PA modeling and focus primarily on how the dynamics that exist between powerful states and the IMF management and staff produce conditions within the institution that facilitate or undermine policy reform. Constructivist approaches focus on how changing economic ideas, notions of legitimacy, and shifting development norms influence policy choices in the IMF. Historical structural approaches drawing from Gramscian theory conceptualize IMF LIDC reform as being interrelated with global structural changes and crisis points in the contemporary globalizing social order.

Keywords

Civil Society Executive Director Policy Choice Capital Control Author Interview 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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