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The IMF and LIDCs

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

Effective analysis of post-Washington Consensus IMF LIDC policy reform requires institutional literacy in three areas: the IMF’s formal operations; the informal dynamics of its operational culture, specifically LIDC staff; and the historical role of the IMF in LIDCs. This chapter summarizes the Fund’s formal operations and institutional structure with an overview of the IMF and its contemporary role in member surveillance, technical support, and lending. It then focuses on the informal characteristics of the institution’s operational culture. The chapter concludes with an overview of the evolution of the Fund’s relationship with LIDCs from its birth nearly seven decades ago to the end of the Washington Consensus period. Evidence from the chapter demonstrates that the IMF wields both direct and indirect forms of power in its relationship with LIDCs.

Keywords

Member State Executive Board Bretton Wood System Author Interview Payment Deficit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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