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The IMF, LIDC Reform, and the Post-Washington Consensus

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

‘Poor States, Power, and the Politics of IMF Reform: Drivers of Change in the Post-Washington Consensus’ by Mark Hibben addresses a critical gap in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) literature. Chapter  1 highlights that despite the growing policy footprint of the IMF in the world’s poorest states, the literature has not elucidated what factors drive successful cases of IMF Low Income Developing Country (LIDC) reform in the post-Washington Consensus period. The chapter provides a brief overview of LIDCs and develops why the post-2008 period is crucial for policy insiders and activists interested in macroeconomic and development outcomes in the global South. The chapter then introduces the four cases studied and the book’s research design. It concludes with a summary of major findings.

Keywords

International Monetary Fund Executive Board Washington Consensus Multilateral Institution Import Substitution Industrialization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Assistant Professor of Political ScienceSaint Joseph’s College of MainePortlandUSA

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