Abstract
The chapter aims to establish that, given the conditions of deliberative democracy and the institutions of modern democracies, citizens can reasonably regard each other as equal epistemic authorities on justice, that is, as prima facie equally reliable judges of the rightness of political decisions according to a procedure-independent criterion of rightness. The conditions of deliberative democracy are widespread decentered deliberation about complex issues. Of primary importance among the institutions of modern democracy are political parties who translate abstract value judgments into sufficiently coherent and sufficiently specific conceptions of justice, thus lowering the epistemic burden on citizens. The chapter also develops the important argument that political disagreement is both a reasonable and rational outcome of public deliberation. In addition, an interlude on the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill shows the inherent incongruities of his epistemic political elitism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I shall introduce an expanded conception of reasonableness suitable to the conciliatory conception of democracy (see Chap. 4; The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society and an Expanded Conception of Reasonableness).
- 2.
Estlund (2008): p. 31.
- 3.
Estlund (2008): p. 30.
- 4.
This argument from multidimensional expertise expands on arguments offered in Ebeling (2016).
- 5.
Another aspect of the complexity of justice is conceptual. Conceptions of justice can be described as embedded in political theories, which themselves can be seen as interpretations of a complex conceptual web including a host of other concepts and conceptions thereof that inform each other. Political theorizing can be helpfully analyzed as attempts in producing a coherent cluster of conceptions of such concepts as liberty, equality, authority, legitimacy, power, and so on. Justifying a contested conception of justice, one thus quickly enters a terrain of interrelated conceptions, appeal to which only reveals more disagreement and complexity; cf. Gaus (2000): pp. 26–46.
- 6.
To give the idea an intuitive plausibility, consider if our specimen alive a century ago could have predicted the scientific and social developments that occurred.
- 7.
Consider, for instance, the animal rights and liberation movement.
- 8.
See Landemore (2014) for an argument that cites our ignorance about future developments in support for an epistemic political egalitarianism.
- 9.
This argument draws on Hayek’s criticism of centralized economies based on their insufficient ability to gain and process information about the dispersed preferences of the members of large and complex societies. Cf. Hayek (1991). My version of the argument was inspired by my reading of Gaus (2008).
- 10.
I use the validity status of an argument to refer to its current status in an ongoing process of deliberation. The argument counts as valid as long as no defeating argument has been offered.
- 11.
- 12.
This is so presuming that all reasoners are sufficiently competent so that it would be unreasonable to blame the disagreement on the incompetence of others alone. The fact that disagreement remains after participants have engaged in deliberation is partly explained by the incompleteness of evidence due to the complexity of the subject matter. See the argument from multidimensional complexity above.
- 13.
Yet another consideration, which I do not elaborate here, invokes a moral reason to treat others as equal epistemic authorities based on the claim that we owe opacity respect to others once they pass a certain threshold of moral competence; cf. Carter (2011). My arguments to establish the small differences in expected reliability can be seen as laying the epistemic foundation for such an argument.
- 14.
This does not imply that the educational effects of participation are what ultimately justify participatory procedures. For this position see, for example, Pateman (1970); for the critique of similar approaches as self-defeating, see Elster (1985). The educative function is an important side effect of participation, however.
- 15.
Cf. Mill ([1859] 1977); henceforth T.
- 16.
Cf. Mill ([1861] 1977); henceforth C.
- 17.
The details of the voting scheme need not interest us here. Mill conveniently assumed that the attainment of a higher level of education correlates positively with a higher level of moral sophistication.
- 18.
T, p. 400f.
- 19.
T, p. 412.
- 20.
C, p. 493.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Mill makes all of these points in his argument for the public mode of voting. See C, Chap. X, pp. 488ff.
- 23.
Cf. C, p. 501.
- 24.
C, p. 474; my emphasis throughout.
- 25.
Mill thinks that the intuitive idea that the opinion of one’s intellectual superiors should count more even in governing one’s own life suffices to show that it is prudent to defer to their opinion. However, this rationale does not establish the justice of the arrangement.
- 26.
C, p. 474.
- 27.
C, p. 469.
- 28.
Further testimony to this emphasis is Mill’s remark that even the rare occasion of jury duty or to serve in parish offices has an effect on members of the lower classes which “must make them […] very different beings, in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter” (T, p. 411). Admittedly, this statement is also testimony to his low regard of the general intellectual capacities and moral competence of the lower classes.
- 29.
C, p. 405; my emphasis.
- 30.
C, p. 412.
- 31.
In this context, it is interesting to consider that participation could be broadened to include, for example, workplace democracy and other decentralized participatory designs.
- 32.
Fuerstein (2008): p. 81.
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
Cf. Richter (2011): p. 172 (my translation).
- 35.
Fuerstein (2008): p. 76.
- 36.
It is assumed that the issue at stake is sufficiently complex in the rough sense that the deliberation cannot produce a consensus between participants in the time available to them. Actual, observed disagreement on political questions is an indicator that public deliberation on political issues is sufficiently complex in this sense.
- 37.
Mill (1991): Chap. 2, para. 7.
- 38.
However, persistent disagreement gives us all the more reason to acknowledge our own fallibility.
- 39.
Mill (1991): Chap. 2, para. 3.
References
Benhabib, S. (1996). Toward a Deliberative Model of Legitimacy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carter, I. (2011). Respect and the Basis of Equality. Ethics, 121(3), 538–571.
Ebeling, M. (2016). Epistemic Political Egalitarianism, the Role of Political Parties, and Conciliatory Conception of Democracy. Political Theory, 44(5), 629–656.
Elster, J. (1985). Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Estlund, D. M. (2008). Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fuerstein, M. (2008). Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 5(1), 74–93.
Gaus, G. F. (2000). Political Concepts and Political Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Gaus, G. F. (2008). The (Severe) Limits of Deliberative Democracy as the Basis for Political Choice. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 117, 26–53.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (W. Rehg, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. This work originally appeared in German under the title Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1992.
Hayek, F. A. (1991). The Use of Knowledge in Society. In R. M. Ebeling (Ed.), Austrian Economics. Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press.
Landemore, H. (2014). Democracy as Heuristic: The Ecological Rationality of Political Equality. The Good Society, 23(2), 160–178.
Mill, J. S. ([1859] 1977). Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. In J. S. Robson (Ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX: Essays on Politics and Society. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Mill, J. S. ([1861] 1977). Considerations on Representative Government. In J. S. Robson (Ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX: Essays on Politics and Society. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Mill, J. S. (1991). On Liberty. In J. Gray (Ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richter, E. (2011). Was ist politische Kompetenz? Politiker und engagierte Bürger in der Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ebeling, M. (2017). The Epistemic Authority of Citizens. In: Conciliatory Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57743-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57743-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-57742-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-57743-6
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)