Abstract
Frustrated in his efforts, Varvaressos submitted his resignation as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Supply on 1 September, charging he had been “ganged upon” by industrialists, who were later joined by the Left in an opportunistic tactical alliance. This act has been recorded as an admission of failure. However it is doubtful whether Varvaressos intended his resignation to be seen as such. It rather seems his intention was to bring ultimate pressure upon the decision-makers in Greece. To MacVeagh Varvaressos confided that he expected his resignation to be “a severe shock resulting in economic chaos and the subsequent recall of his services”. Varvaressos apparently expected that in the absence of alternatives, the Government would make the concessions necessary for his stabilization to be given a new impetus and succeed.
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Notes
- 1.
Daphnis (1969) p. 200.
- 2.
FRUS;1945/VIII/235.
- 3.
FRUS;1945/VIII/238.
- 4.
FRUS;1945/VIII/238–240.
- 5.
The issue had already arisen and been opposed in previous instances, for example, in the Joint Policy Committee, an Anglo-Greek body; FRUS;1945/VIII/202–203, 207–208, 216–217, 224–226. MacVeagh’s point was that “the meetings of the Joint Policy Committee are, therefore, simply the outward manifestation of a continuous process by which UNRRA and the Greek Government activities are directed to a considerable extent by a group of able British officials”. (FRUS;1945/VIII/224–226). As he emphasized, “In the formal advisory committees set up by the Greek Government with both UNRRA and British Embassy membership … this Embassy is not participating.” FRUS;1945/VIII/218–219.
- 6.
FRUS;1945/VIII/242.
- 7.
He transmitted this message from Athens in a long telegram consisting of parts A, B, and C on 27 and 28 October 1945; FRUS;1945/VIII/246–251. Jackson also explored with Greek officials the idea of using the aid program as a lever for providing Greece with a stable Government; Seferis (1985) p. 58.
- 8.
FRUS;1945/VIII/246–247.
- 9.
FRUS;1945/VIII/247–250.
- 10.
FRUS;1945/VIII/250–251. MacVeagh, requested by the Secretary of State to state his views in this connection, again objected to a formal advisory mission and suggested that advice should continue to be provided through normal diplomatic channels, though he agreed that the economy was deteriorating; FRUS;1945/VIII/257–258.
- 11.
Aware of Jackson ’s reports and of MacVeagh’s own views about the deteriorating economic situation in Greece.
- 12.
FRUS;1945/VIII/252–253.
- 13.
He stayed in London until May 1946, when Zolotas succeeded him. Varvaressos then left for Washington, where he was elected an Executive Director (member of the Board) of the World Bank.
- 14.
Seferis (1985) p. 63.
- 15.
Seferis (1985) p. 64.
- 16.
Seferis (1985) p. 63.
- 17.
E. Tsouderos , part of his Archive preserved at the Bank of Greece [hereafter referred to as T.A.] F. 147/64g. HABoG_A3S1Y2F194T4.
- 18.
FRUS;1945/VIII/267–268.
- 19.
FRUS;1945/VIII/267–268.
- 20.
FRUS;1945/VIII/268–269.
- 21.
FRUS;1945/VIII/268–269.
- 22.
FRUS;1945/VIII/270–271.
- 23.
Address at the official dinner by the Greek Government. Seferis (1985) p. 66.
- 24.
FRUS;1945/VIII/270–271.
- 25.
A more sympathetic view of Kassimatis ’ demands was expressed at the time by the political officer at the Embassy, Chargé d’ Affairs Rankin . He explained that the Greek Government felt an urgent need of a psychological support by the Allies, which would be dramatized by the public announcement of new credits for the purchase of goods through normal trade channels and by the supply of additional gold. He added that the last item involved foreign exchange spending of less than $6 million. FRUS;1945/VIII/257.
- 26.
FRUS;1945/VIII/263–265.
- 27.
Such conditions would be put in almost identical terms by Acheson to the Venizelos Mission in 1946, also to Premier Tsaldaris in 1947.
- 28.
FRUS 1945/VIII/263–265.
- 29.
FRUS 1945/VIII/253. Sir Alan Brook , who had also visited Greece, reached similar conclusions.
- 30.
Lord Keynes , letter to E.P. Bitsaxis, dated Bloomsbury, 12 February 1946, as published in E. Bitsaxis, 1943–1953, Δέκα Χρόνια Δημοσιογραφίας (1943–1953, Ten Years of Journalism), I. Sideris, Athens 1954, p. 25.
- 31.
Richter has argued that the domestic initiative was lost earlier, as a result of the demoralizing of the people following the Civil War of December 1944; H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece, From Varkiza to Civil War, February 1945 to August 1946 , Merlin Press, London 1986, p. 201.
- 32.
He had held talks with him in the British Embassy in Athens on 21–22/11; Memo of Tsouderos discussions with McNeil, T.A.F. 147/64a HABoG_A3S1Y2F194T1. For the memo Tsouderos submitted to McNeil in Athens on 17/11, see T.A.F. 147/63 HABoG_A3S1Y2F194T2. According to Kanellopoulos , Tsouderos was the main advisor on financial policy during his time in office; FRUS;1945/VIII/259.
- 33.
FRUS;1945/VIII/274–275.
- 34.
FRUS;1945/VIII/283–284.
- 35.
FRUS;1945/VIII/288–289.
- 36.
A financial expert with Lazard Frères.
- 37.
Out of which £20 million had been spent and a balance of £26 million was accounted for in Greek reserves.
- 38.
FRUS;1945/VIII/294.
- 39.
According to Athens daily Acropolis of 17/4/1946, Bevin had worked as a truck driver in his father’s business; Board was sent to Athens as Bevin’s personal emissary.
- 40.
FRUS;1945/VIII/294.
- 41.
FRUS;1945/VIII/293.
- 42.
The Labour Government was criticized domestically for its Greek policy. Bevin had also to defend British policy from Soviet attacks in allied councils. In fact, every time the Soviet Union was attacked for its military presence in the Balkans or for its interference in the domestic affairs of Bulgaria or Romania , it responded in kind, by bringing up Britain’s Greek entanglement.
- 43.
T.A.F. 148/3 HABoGA3S1Y2F198/3, 147/78 HABoGA3S1Y2F196/2; FRUS;1946/VII/88.
- 44.
FRUS;1946/VII/91–92.
- 45.
The Foreign Office had to fight a battle against Hugh Dalton , the Chancellor, who believed that this was another case of good money following bad. See A. Bullock , Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951, OUP, 1983, p. 226.
- 46.
T.A.F. 148/17 HABoGA3S1Y2F198/17.
- 47.
At the time of the adjustment it was estimated that the post-devaluation differential between the domestic and foreign values of the drachma was of the order of 100%, that is, domestic prices were approximately double world prices. It was expected that after the devaluation, the discrepancy would be dealt by the normal flow of imports; A. Angelopoulos in N.O. A-3/Jan-1947/173.
- 48.
FRUS;1946/VII/103–105.
- 49.
FRUS;1946/VII/263–265.
- 50.
FRUS;1945/VIII/290–292, 299.
- 51.
Amen (1978).
- 52.
For an account of these developments, HABoG_A4S1Y2F15T1, pp. 3–4, 7.
- 53.
FRUS;1945/VIII/237–238.
- 54.
FRUS;1945/VIII/237–238.
- 55.
According to A. Diomidis , the Greek economist, Central Banker and later Premier, the three most important aspects of Greek reconstruction were to rebuilt the transportation network, to supply the countryside, and to rebuild houses; N.O. A-5/Feb-1947/182.
- 56.
Amen (1978) p. 240.
- 57.
According to a press statement by Maben of 17 October 1946, the condition of roads was very bad. From 10,000 km of road network, 5% were in good condition, 45% in bad condition allowing use by half-loaded trucks, and 50% out of use altogether. Although UNRRA had imported material worth $3 million for road repairs, they remained unused since the Government did not provide credits from the budget to pay labor costs. N.O. A-1/Dec-1946/45.
- 58.
Amen (1978) p. 50.
- 59.
N.O. A-7/May-1947/347.
- 60.
On the tentative allocation; FRUS;1945/VIII/272, 283; on the firmly designated uses; T.A.F. 147/86 HABoGA3S1Y2F197/1.
- 61.
Zolotas “The three threats to Reconstruction” Το Βήμα 12/Jul/1948; on these allegations see also statement by the Minister of Coordination, S. Stephanopoulos ; Min.Par. for 19/Jul/1946 p. 260.
- 62.
FRUS;1946/VII/116, 125.
- 63.
Min.Par. for 19/Jul/1946, pp. 258, 260–262.
- 64.
FRUS;1946/VII/131–132.
- 65.
FRUS;1946/VII/165.
- 66.
FRUS;1946/VII/170.
- 67.
FRUS;1946/VII/170–171.
- 68.
FRUS;1946/VII/171–172.
- 69.
FRUS;1946/VII/172–173.
- 70.
FRUS;1946/VII/174–175.
- 71.
FRUS;1946/VII/175–177.
- 72.
FRUS;1946/VII/177–178.
- 73.
FRUS;1946/VII/184.
- 74.
FRUS;1946/VII/180–181.
- 75.
Later prime minister (1955–1963, 1974–1980), and president of Greece (1980–1985, 1990–1995).
- 76.
FRUS;1946/VII/181–182.
- 77.
FRUS;1946/VII/191–192.
- 78.
Reserves and flow of foreign exchange; on the lack of accurate information on Greece’s foreign exchange position, see p. 133 ff.
- 79.
FRUS;1946/VII/187–188.
- 80.
Amen (1978) pp. 105–113.
- 81.
FRUS;1946/VII/209–212.
- 82.
FRUS;1946/VII/223–224.
- 83.
FRUS;1946/VII/232.
- 84.
FRUS;1946/VII/236.
- 85.
FRUS;1946/VII/244.
- 86.
On the reconstruction agency, see pp. 183, 184, 192.
- 87.
FRUS;1946/VII/250–254. Athens daily Το Βήμα on 27 November 1946 carried a story from New York on the conditions under which USA prepared to give aid to Greece, a leak of Acheson ’s memorandum. N.O. A-2/Dec-1946/110.
- 88.
Gouras (1957) p. 31.
- 89.
Acheson (1969) pp. 77, 198–199. Other evidence in support of the thesis that Varvaressos was then and remained throughout the Acheson years close to the State Department can be found in the commissioning by the Department from the IBRD of a study entitled “The Report of the Economic Position for Europe, ‘Economic Survey for 1948’ A Summary and Contents” (Washington, May 1949). This study was intended to be published as a rebuttal of the Report for the year 1948 of the UN Economic Commission of Europe and was entrusted by the Department to Varvaressos and his long-standing assistant R. Zafiriou . Milward, A. S., The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1946–1951, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1984, p. 84.
- 90.
However, it was not originally included in his archive, deposited at the Bank of Greece Bank II p. 344 footnote 1; N.O. A-9/Jul-1947/495.
- 91.
Dated 2 August 1946; V.A.F. (20)/18 HabogA4S1Y5F17.
- 92.
Varvaressos’ initial appointment as Director for two years expired at the end of 1948. Varvaressos remained with the Bank until his death in Washington in 1957. He continued to advise on Greek matters, sometimes against the wishes of those in power in Greece, as in the summer of 1946 (p. 169.) or as an advisor to the Government of Greece, as in 1951–1952 (p. 348). The reader may also want to consult the recent biography of Kyriakos Varvaressos by Andreas Kakridis Κυριάκος Βαρβαρέσος Η βιογραφία ως οικονομική ιστορία, Bank of Greece, Athens, 2017; for this time with the World Bank pp. 435–468; for his role as advisor to the government of Greece pp. 478–507.
- 93.
FRUS;1946/VII/254–255. Opposition to US advice in Greece among the Government was widespread, though mostly carefully silenced. The Deputy Minister of Coordination, M. Ailianos , a member of the Venizelos Mission, made his feelings known in a statement before Parliament on 27 November 1946; Min.Par. p. 797.
- 94.
FRUS;1946/VII/257.
- 95.
FRUS;1946/VII/256.
- 96.
FRUS;1946/VII/259–260.
- 97.
His American interlocutor replied that the announcement was delayed because of the wait for the designated leader to accept appointment. FRUS;1946/VII/264.
- 98.
FRUS;1946/VII/264.
- 99.
The Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met at New York City from 4/11 to 12/12/1946; FRUS;1946/VII/256.
- 100.
FRUS;1946/VII/263–264.
- 101.
FRUS;1946/VII/286; N.O. A-4/Feb-1947/236; for Tsaldaris’ version, Min.Par. 23/1/1947 pp. 925, 926, 930.
- 102.
FRUS;1946/VII/286–287.
- 103.
Amen (1978) pp. 105–113.
- 104.
See among others, L.S. Wittner , American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949, Columbia University press, New York 1982; Amen (1978).
Bibliography
Non-Official and Secondary Publications
Acheson, D., Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, Northon, New York 1969.
Amen, M. M., American Policy in Greece, 1944–1949: Military and Institutional Aspects, Frankfurt am Main, 1978.
Daphnis, G., Συνοπτική Ιστορία της Συγχρόνου Ελλάδος (OEDB), Athens 1969.
Oikonomou-Gouras, P., Το Δόγμα Τρούμαν και η Σωτηρία της Ελλάδος (The Truman Doctrine and the Salvation of Greece), Athens 1957.
Seferis, G., Πολιτικό Ημερολόγιο, (Political Journal), A. Xydis (ed.), volume A, 1935–1944, Ikaros, Athens 1979, volume B, 1945–1947, 1949, 1952, Ikaros, Athens 1985.
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Politakis, G. (2018). Greek External Economic Relations Until the End of 1946. In: The Post-War Reconstruction of Greece. Palgrave Studies in Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Growth. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57734-4_5
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