Abstract
All nuclear initiatives directly geared to European security were treated warily in Washington as raising risks of early escalation and in doing so diverting resources away from the top priority of raising the nuclear threshold. Whilst the Europeans wanted to strengthen deterrence, the Administration insisted on keeping tight control over how—if at all—the weapons would be used. But the strength of the Administration’s positions on these issues created a counter-reaction which risked a much larger loss of control, if one after another European power decided to acquire their own nuclear arsenals.
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Notes
- 1.
Martin Rink, ‘The Service Staffs’ Struggle Over Structure. The Bundeswehr’s Internal Debates on Adopting NATO Doctrine 1950–1963’ in James S. Corum (ed), Rearming Germany (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2011), p. 243.
- 2.
Rink, pp. 236, 244–5.
- 3.
Christian Tuschhoff, ‘Causes and Consequences of Germany’s Deployment of Nuclear Capable Delivery Systems, 1957–1963’, Nuclear History Program occasional papers , Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, 1994.
- 4.
Pertti Ahonen, ‘Franz-Josef Strauss and the German Nuclear Question’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 18: 2 (1995), 28; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 165, 282.
- 5.
Quoted in Kelleher, p. 160.
- 6.
Quoted in Ahonen, p. 37., 29.
- 7.
Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘Les problem de sécurité dans les rapports de 1956 à 1963’, Relations Internationales 58 (1989) and Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996); Leopoldo Nuti, ‘Le role de l’Italie dans les négociations trilatérales, 1957–1958’, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique 104 (1990).
- 8.
William Burr, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the German Nuclear Question, Part 1, 1954–1964 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2018), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2018-02-02/german-nuclear-question-nonproliferation-treaty.
- 9.
General Lauris Norstad, ‘NATO as the fourth atomic power’, Survival, 2: 3, 1960, pp. 107–6.
- 10.
For a comprehensive discussion of the MRBM proposals, see: Andreas Lutsch, ‘The MRBM Problem, West Germany and Nuclear Proliferation during the Berlin Crisis’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Forthcoming. For a history of the issue of nuclear cooperation in Europe in the context of the distinctive national policies of the major powers see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London: Palgrave, 1997).
- 11.
John D Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).
- 12.
For the arguments in favour of the MLF, see Robert Bowie, ‘Strategy and the Atlantic alliance’ International Organization, XVII:3 (Summer 1963).
- 13.
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa and Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume V, The McNamara Ascendancy 1961–1965 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), p. 391.
- 14.
Andrew Priest, ‘The President, the “Theologians” and the Europeans: The Johnson Administration and NATO Nuclear Sharing’, The International History Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2011, pp. 257–75.
- 15.
Kaplan et al, op. cit., p. 392.
- 16.
Ibid., p. 411.
- 17.
Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: A Historical Perspective (London: IISS, 1964).
- 18.
Priest, pp. 261–2.
- 19.
A. Wohlstetter, ‘Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country’.
- 20.
Gallois, ‘US strategy and the defense of Europe’, Orbis, VII:2 (Summer 1963).
- 21.
Beaufre, ‘The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities’, op. cit.
- 22.
NATO in the 1960s (2nd edn.), p. 92.
- 23.
Buchan, The Multilateral Force.
- 24.
Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 188–9.
- 25.
Beatrice Heuser, ‘Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence’ in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger, War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 210–1.
- 26.
J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, RAND R-2964FF, April 1983.
- 27.
See for instance, Cable from USMISSION NATO to SECSTATE 11 September 1974. Subject: NPG Study on Communicating NATO’s Intentions to Use Nuclear Weapons.
- 28.
Non-aligned Yugoslavia might also be considered relevant to this discussion. As with Sweden and Switzerland, the ideas underpinning Yugoslavia’s approach to national defence received a great deal of attention during the Cold War. Whilst there is some evidence that Tito considered developing a nuclear arsenal, there are few details presently available on nuclear decision-making in Yugoslavia during the period, particularly the decision to forgo the nuclear option. For more information, see: William Potter, Djuro Miljanic, Ivo Slaus, ‘Tito’s Nuclear Legacy’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, pp. 63–70.
- 29.
Robert Dalsjö, ‘The hidden rationality of Sweden’s policy of neutrality during the Cold War’, Cold War History, 14: 2, 2014, pp. 178–9, 188–90.
- 30.
Paul M. Cole, ‘Atomic bombast: Nuclear weapon decision-making in Sweden, 1946–1972’, The Washington Quarterly, 20: 2, 1997; Paul M. Cole, ‘Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons’, RAND, 1994, p. xviii; Thomas Jonter & Emma Rosengren, ‘From nuclear weapons acquisition to nuclear disarmament—the Swedish case’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30: sup1, 2014, s46–s63.
- 31.
Wilhelm Agrell, ‘Behind the Submarine Crisis: Evolution of the Swedish Defence Doctrine and Soviet War Planning’, Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 197–217 pp. 199–200; Cole, 1997, pp. 236–7, 239, 242; Karl E. Birnbaum, ‘Sweden’s Nuclear Policy’, International Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 300.
- 32.
Birnbaum, pp. 299–300.
- 33.
Ibid., pp. 302–4, Jonter and Rosengren, pp. s58–s59, Cole, 1994, pp. x–xi, xiv.
- 34.
One Swiss air force commander, Etienne Primault, eager to acquire the nuclear-capable Mirage, suggested this aircraft would give Switzerland the option of threatening Soviet territory.
- 35.
Ursula Jasper, ‘The Ambivalent Neutral’, The Nonproliferation Review, 19: 2, 2012, pp. 244–5, 269, 278–9; TV Paul, Power versus Prudence, pp. 95–6; Gastegeyer, pp. 204–5; Jurg Stussi—Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament, December 31, 1995 (Federal Administration, Bern); Philip Windsor, Rosalyn Higgins, Curt Gasteyger & Adam Roberts, ‘Book reviews—Review of Strategie des Kleinstaats by Gustav Däniker’, Survival, 9: 6, 1967, 202–6.
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Freedman, L., Michaels, J. (2019). A NATO Nuclear Force. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57350-6_24
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