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The Spanish State and the Basque Conflict

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Terrorism and the State

Part of the book series: Rethinking Political Violence ((RPV))

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Abstract

This chapter will look at the conflict between the Spanish state and the militant Basque nationalist organisation ETA, beginning in the mid twentieth century and spanning over five decades. It will look at the development of the Spanish state, highlighting factors that account for the characteristics of Spain through time and how these impacted upon the response to ETA’s violent campaign.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007), p. 60.

  2. 2.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952–1980 (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1984), p. 14.

  3. 3.

    S.G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic 1931–1936 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 6.

  4. 4.

    D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1993) p. 45.

  5. 5.

    G. Darby, Spain in the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1994), p. 10.

  6. 6.

    A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, p. 40.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p. 47.

  9. 9.

    R. Carr, Modern Spain: 1875–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 1–2.

  10. 10.

    C.P. Boyd, cited in J.A. Junco and A. Shubert, (eds.) Spanish History Since 1808, (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 67.

  11. 11.

    R. Carr, Modern Spain: 1875–1980, p. 98.

  12. 12.

    Ibid, p. 108.

  13. 13.

    D. Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, p. 76.

  14. 14.

    H. Graham, The Spanish Republic at War 1936–1939, p. 25.

  15. 15.

    S.G Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, p. 365.

  16. 16.

    J. Tussell, Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy: 1939 to the Present, (trans.) R. Clarke, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) pp. 9–10.

  17. 17.

    D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p. 81.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    C.J. Watson, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of ETA (Reno: University of Nevada, 2007), p. 173.

  21. 21.

    P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, p. 42. However, while this was a characteristic of the military that served Franco’s purposes, it was not a situation entirely of his own creation. The military had since the mid nineteenth centuries regarded the ‘internal enemies’ of Basques and Catalans with suspicion. See D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, pp. 43–4.

  22. 22.

    P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, pp. 41–2.

  23. 23.

    D. Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, p. 83.

  24. 24.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 14.

  25. 25.

    J. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890–1986 (London; New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 31.

  26. 26.

    J.M Garmendia, quoted in J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 176.

  27. 27.

    It is claimed by some that the first death that ETA caused was actually a 22-month-old baby after a bomb was detonated in San Sebastián train station in June 1960, although ETA have never claimed responsibility for the attack. See J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 178.

  28. 28.

    R.P. Clark, The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979), p. 157.

  29. 29.

    A close examination of these internal splits and politicking by the various incarnations of ETA is somewhat beyond the remit of this work. However, for further reading on this topic, see R.P. Clark, The Basques, pp. 160–4.

  30. 30.

    R.P. Clark, The Basques, p. 160.

  31. 31.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 49, cited in D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p. 98.

  32. 32.

    First published as F. Fanon, Les Damnés de la Terre (Paris: François Maspéro, 1961) Published in English as: F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1967).

  33. 33.

    D. Conversi, ‘Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism’, West European Politics, 16/3, p. 269, n. 41, See also, J. Zulaika, Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1988, p. 285.

  34. 34.

    P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, p. 42.

  35. 35.

    See D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain: From Franco to the Constitutional Monarchy (London: Quartet Books, 1985), pp. 24–5, on the Charter of the Spanish People and the conditions placed on the rights it guaranteed.

  36. 36.

    D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain, p. 29.

  37. 37.

    P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, p. 27.

  38. 38.

    J. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, p. 92.

  39. 39.

    D. Conversi, D., The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, p. 101 speaking of the abandonment of the Franco regime by the church from 1969, and P. Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1993) p. 753, on the intervention by the military, asking for more robust government from Franco and the request for the suspension of habeas corpus at the time of the Burgos trial.

  40. 40.

    P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, p. 91.

  41. 41.

    Francisco Franco, cited in D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, p. 106.

  42. 42.

    See also P. Preston, Franco, p. 761, for details of the tremendous effect that the death of Carrero Blanco had on Franco personally.

  43. 43.

    J. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, p. 151.

  44. 44.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 89.

  45. 45.

    Ibid, pp. 88–89.

  46. 46.

    Ibid, p. 90.

  47. 47.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 89.

  48. 48.

    Ibid, p. 93.

  49. 49.

    See I. Sànchez -Cuenca, ‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 19/3, (2007) p. 291 table 1.1.

  50. 50.

    F.J Llera, J.M. Mata, and C.L. Irvin, ‘ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement - the Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 5/3, (1993), p. 117.

  51. 51.

    A. Lecours, ‘Violence as Politics: ETA and Basque Nationalism’, in S.M. Saideman and M.J. Zahar (eds.) Intra-state Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), p. 123.

  52. 52.

    D. Muro, ‘The Basque Experience of the Transition to Democracy’, in G. Alonso, and D. Muro, (eds.) The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model (New York; Oxford: Routledge, 2011), p. 175.

  53. 53.

    L. Mees, cited by A. Lecours, ‘Violence as Politics: ETA and Basque Nationalism’, p. 123.

  54. 54.

    D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain, p. 200.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    ibid, pp. 201–2.

  57. 57.

    See D. Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, p. 145.

  58. 58.

    R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 257.

  59. 59.

    D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain, p. 203.

  60. 60.

    Ibid, p. 204

  61. 61.

    F.J Llera, J.M. Mata, and C.L. Irvin, ‘ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement - the Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 5/3, (1993), p. 120.

  62. 62.

    See D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, pp. 128–131.

  63. 63.

    Ibid, pp. 130–1.

  64. 64.

    D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain, p. 227. See also, D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, pp. 8–9 on the effect of state repression and the difficulty for members of the Basque community to disavow violence as a result.

  65. 65.

    N. Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, pp. 145–6.

  66. 66.

    P. Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands: ETA, The GAL and Democracy in Spain, (Cork; Cork University Press, 2001), p. 64.

  67. 67.

    O.G Encarnación, ‘Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29/4, (2007), p. 963.

  68. 68.

    Albertio Oliart, cited in N. Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, p. 153.

  69. 69.

    S. Martí, P. Domingo, and P. Ibarra, ‘Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorist Measures in Spain’, in A. Brysk and G Shafir, (eds.) National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism (London: University of California Press, 2007), p. 129.

  70. 70.

    O.G. Encarnación, Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain’, p. 961.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    R.P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990), p. 52.

  73. 73.

    P. Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands, p. 64.

  74. 74.

    R.P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, p. 53.

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    Ibid.

  77. 77.

    P. Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands, p. 68

  78. 78.

    P. Chalk, ‘The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44/3, (1998), p. 381.

  79. 79.

    S. Martí, P. Domingo, and P. Ibarra, ‘Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorist Measures in Spain’, p. 124

  80. 80.

    O.G Encarnación, ‘Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain’, p. 954. Senior police officers were also convicted of murder and kidnapping in a case in 1995. The former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales was however cleared of all involvement with the GAL.

  81. 81.

    P. Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands, p. 83.

  82. 82.

    Ibid, p. 105.

  83. 83.

    Ibid, p. 134.

  84. 84.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 203.

  85. 85.

    However, some elements of ETA(m) were clearly unhappy with the damage to moral of their organisation that the social reinsertion measures were causing. In September 1986, a former ETA(m) etarra, Dolores Gonzáles Catarain ‘Yoyes’ was gunned down by an ETA commando for abandoning the struggle. It is a clear attempt to send a message to other etarras who might have been considering the programme. See T. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country (London: Hurst, 2014), p. 66.

  86. 86.

    Clark lists the demands of the KAS Alternative as: Total amnesty for all ETA etarras, legalisation of all political parties, including those whose programme included the creation of an independent Basque state, expulsion from the Basque country of Spanish police forces, a package of social and economic reform to improve conditions for Basque working classes, and an autonomy statute that recognised the sovereignty of Euskal Herria, Euskera as the official language, and put Basque authorities in control of all security forces and military in the territory. See R.P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, p. 82.

  87. 87.

    R.P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, p. 83.

  88. 88.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, pp. 209–10, T. Whitfield, Endgame for ETA, pp. 70–1.

  89. 89.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 213

  90. 90.

    Ibid, p. 215.

  91. 91.

    R. Alonso, and F. Reinares, ‘Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 17/1–2 (2005), pp. 273, 275.

  92. 92.

    Ibid, p. 275.

  93. 93.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 221.

  94. 94.

    Ibid, p. 223.

  95. 95.

    R. Alonso, ‘Pathways out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16/4, (2004), p. 697.

  96. 96.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 224.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, p. 225.

  98. 98.

    Ibid, p. 226.

  99. 99.

    J.K. Esser, and C.M. Bridges, ‘Negotiating with Terrorists: The Case of the Basques and Spain’, Peace and Conflict, 17/1, (2011), p. 64.

  100. 100.

    R. Alonso, ‘The Madrid Bombings and Negotiations With ETA: A Case Study of the Impact of

    Terrorism on Spanish Politics’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 25/1, (2013), p. 114.

  101. 101.

    For a fuller explanation of the LOPP, see L. Turano, ‘Spain: Banning Political Parties As a Response to Terrorism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1/4, (2003).

  102. 102.

    Herri Batasuna was founded in 1978, but was reincarnated in 1998 as Euskal Herritarrok, and in 2001 as Batasuna, in attempts to sidestep the ban on the organisation. See D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, p. 4.

  103. 103.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 231.

  104. 104.

    L. Crawford, ‘ETA goes into demise after al-Qaeda´s train bombs in Madrid’, Financial Times, London 14 Jan. (2005), p. 6.

  105. 105.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 233.

  106. 106.

    A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, p. 109.

  107. 107.

    J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists, p. 238.

  108. 108.

    ‘Basque Separatist Group ETA “declares ceasefire”’, BBC, 5 September 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11191395 accessed 5 February 2013.

  109. 109.

    R. Minder, ‘Peace Talks Pressure Basque Separatists to Disarm’, New York Times, 18 October (2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/europe/peace-talks-pressure-basque-separatists-to-disarm.html?_r=0 accessed 5 February 2013.

  110. 110.

    G. Tremlett, ‘ETA allies support call to end violence’, The Guardian, 18 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/18/eta-allies-support-end-violence accessed 5 February 2013.

  111. 111.

    G. Tremlett, ‘ETA declares halt to armed conflict’, The Guardian, 20 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/eta-spain accessed 5 February 2013.

  112. 112.

    ETA, ‘Basque ceasefire statement: full text’, The Guardian, 20 September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/basque-ceasefire-statement-full-text accessed 5 February 2013.

  113. 113.

    G. Tremlett, ‘Basque separatist group Eta gives up token part of arsenal’

    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/basque-separatist-eta-disarmament accessed May 22 2016.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

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McConaghy, K. (2017). The Spanish State and the Basque Conflict. In: Terrorism and the State. Rethinking Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57267-7_2

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