Abstract
In this chapter, we provide a methodological and theoretical justification for travel and movement in clinical psychology. We draw on various world traditions—Buddhism (especially Zen) and phenomenology (especially Husserl)—in order to both analyze and offer ways to overcome the problems of insularity. In so doing, we reposition the world and its betterment as integral to clinical psychology. We then examine the possibility of traveling into the world, without presupposition, in order to see how suffering appears in all its forms—psychological, social, cultural, and beyond. Social justice and social movements naturally become an integral component of this work.
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Notes
- 1.
“The Buddha was the greatest of the transcendental phenomenologists.” ~ J. N. Mohanty, as paraphrased to this author by Lester Embree at ICNAP 2012.
- 2.
Storey (2012) discussed how Zen practice can help bring Heidegerrian insights to life. Similarly, I suggest that Zen Buddhist practice may represent another way to seeing phenomenology in action, a way to the phenomenological attitude (cf., Hanna, 1995). As Hanna points out , Husserl’s own trusted assistant and endorsed interpreter Eugen Fink described phenomenology as akin to Buddhist practice.
- 3.
Trying to think one’s way to “don’t know” has its limitations—anything that can be said or thought about “don’t know” necessarily becomes instantiated as a form. For instance, as Zen Master Jok Um (Ken Kessel) discussed with this author, even to say one is in “don’t know,” creates an inner and outer to don’t know.
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One analogy to describe self-objectification (see Seifried, 2015, on the beneficial use of analogy) is to imagine a pre-digital video camera continually laying down new film of an infinite stream of scenes. Each frame, however, is only one moment captured in static form. To say the level of the psychic is a self-objectification is to acknowledge that any “present” immediately becomes a passed “past.” In addition, that scene of actors takes place in an environment with various interrelations (between objects, people, etc.). Those interrelations themselves become objectifications, once passed. The camera is primary, conducting its business in an infinite stream of nows. Davidson and Cosgrove (2002) interestingly employed the analogy of a frame in a movie, which further supports the above analogy (p. 166).
- 6.
Hanna (1993b) shows how the relation between pure consciousness and the constitution of objectivity was a central focus of various Buddhist philosophies.
- 7.
- 8.
Interestingly, I read Hanna’s work after producing the first major drafts of this chapter, and, the remarkable convergence of Hanna’s comparative work with the one here suggests some consensus about the similarities between Husserlian phenomenology and various Asian traditions. These convergences include a focus on clear seeing, bracketing, awareness of the absolute/transcendental dimension, the difficulty if not impossibility of properly languaging the transcendental (or arriving at it through intellect alone), the possibility of personal transformation, and intersubjectivity . While the present work zeroes in on Buddhism (esp., Zen), Hanna covers, along with Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism. Similarly, in his work on positioning (Buddhism-informed) mindfulness as a qualitative method in psychology, the phenomenologist Morley (2016) emphasizes the importance of the bracketing of core existential beliefs about the reality character of things and fostering the attentional capacity to see clearly. Further, when comparing Yoga and phenomenology , Morley notes that Husserl (1928/1991, 1952/1989) himself stated that the living body and the present moment serve as the foundations for inquiry. Clearly, this comparative work within psychology is ripe for continued investigation.
- 9.
Even eidetic analysis—the phenomenological procedure that helps elucidate “what is” and renders phenomenological methods genuinely scientific according to modern criteria (even in the Popperian tradition)—is tied to freedom , or free imaginative inquiry (see Wertz, 2010 for a full exposition; also Sowa, 2007).
- 10.
I began the chapter with a discussion of the relation between Buddhism and phenomenology on some key issues, such as the standpoint of beginnership, clear seeing, “don’t know ,” and the “ultimate I.” What I did not describe, but was implicit in all of these discussions, was the possibility of personal transformation for those engaging in the methods of these traditions (cf., Hanna, 1993b, 1995). In the popular imagination, Buddhism of course has the reputation of being able to promote personal movement . Phenomenology , while far younger and less developed than Buddhism in this regard, may also carry within its methods seeds for radical personal transformation, which Husserl here compared to a type of religious experience (and as being able to be used in “work or play,” Husserl , 1954/1970, p. 137). Hanna (1993a, 1995) suggested that Husserl’s advanced spiritual capacities fueled his transcendental insights, which Hanna cited as reason why his followers may not have been able to follow his transcendental turn. Perhaps it is then the case that transformation can occur through the seeing and experiencing of the interconnectivity of being, of which our human existence is only one small, but precious part. The related Buddhist focus on compassion for “self” and “others” (Wada & Park, 2009), and beyond, fits within this context of radical interdependence and move toward collective harmony. Perhaps this is also partly why Pema Chödrön ’s (1994) translation of the absolute dimension, or absolute bodhichitta , is awakened heart.
- 11.
From Husserl , we see that the very possibility of objectivity requires others: “We see things, not as mere surfaces, but as multi-sided objects based on an implicit reference to the (real or potential) perceptual perspectives that others can take on the same objects. Our basic experience of the world as having reality or objectivity depends on a kind of tacit confirmation by others” (Gallagher, 2014, p. 2).
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Desai, M. (2018). Travel and Movement as Science and Inquiry: Zen and Phenomenology. In: Travel and Movement in Clinical Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57174-8_3
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