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An Ethics of Adventure

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Abstract

Savransky takes up the challenge of providing a characterisation of an ethics of adventure. To do this, the chapter elucidates the nature of ‘relevance’ as an event and investigates the complex temporal and ethical requirements that events pose on practices of social inquiry. While many traditions of social inquiry consist in reducing the becoming of events to pre-existing historical and social conditions, Savransky argues that an ethics of adventure characterises a mode of social inquiry that seeks not to explain, but to orient itself by, and towards, events. Thus, adventures are defined by a double challenge, which is at once temporal and ethical—that of inventing ways of inheriting the past while becoming exposed to possibilities concerning the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Another way of saying this is that the present is nothing but the transition between events (See Chap. 7).

  2. 2.

    This is not to be taken to mean that history is erased with every event, or that the actual world poses no constraints on how the future might be shaped. What this means is that the continuity of history, or indeed, of any experience for that matter, is not a given, but itself an achievement—a process whereby events conform to previous events. In Whitehead’s (1978: 35) words, ‘there is a becoming of continuity but no continuity of becoming’.

  3. 3.

    At most, the only event that such a form of historiography does take seriously—for some reason—is an inaugural, cosmic-like event such as, say, ‘capitalism’, which ipso facto becomes the subsequent determining cause of everything that follows (Sewell 2005).

  4. 4.

    In fact, in his On History, Braudel (1982: 31) himself explicitly acknowledges his debt to Lévi-Strauss, arguing that ‘for better or ill, [structure] dominates the problems of the longue durée’.

  5. 5.

    Interestingly, in the latter genealogy, a child learning to walk might perhaps be conceptualised as what Paul Veyne (1984: 19) would call a ‘non-event’. A non-event is not the absence of an event but ‘an event not yet recognized as such—the history of territories, of mentalities, of madness, or of the search of security through the ages.’

  6. 6.

    It should be noted that ‘Shakespeare’ here names the event of the work itself and not the author, of whom we know close to nothing (Bloom 1999: 718). Indeed, the difference between the former and the latter is the very difference between a pragmatics of the event and a theory of genius. Although a reading of Bloom certainly makes both readings possible—and I am emphatically interested in the former rather than the latter—it is not at all clear to me what his own position on the matter is, considering that he has dedicated yet another monumental book to the question and history of Genius (2003).

  7. 7.

    For it ‘is highly probable’, Deleuze (2004: 170) suggests, ‘that resignation is only one more figure of ressentiment, since ressentiment has many figures.’

  8. 8.

    To the extent that history and event, as I have shown above, implicate each other reciprocally, to attempt to explain away an event by historicising it is something of a paradoxical operation. For although it mobilises historicism as a method, thereby suggesting that everything has a history, it implicitly shares the metaphysical assumptions of those it seeks to ‘debunk’, namely, that only that which has no history is, in a complete sense, true and real.

  9. 9.

    It is arguably for this reason that Henri Bergson (see especially his ‘The Possible and The Real’ in Bergson 2007) and, later, Gilles Deleuze, are generally critical—although not always, as this chapter shows—of the notion of ‘the possible’ and argue instead for a concept of ‘the virtual’. Needless to say, the way in which I have been employing the notion of the possible here is closer to their use of the term ‘virtual.’

  10. 10.

    And I shall have more to say about such critical operations in the next chapter.

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Savransky, M. (2016). An Ethics of Adventure. In: The Adventure of Relevance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57146-5_6

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