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Abstract

It could be argued that the failures to create an international judicial body that would be empowered to prosecute war criminals over the course of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the outstanding impacts of the Industrial Revolution on arms technology, significantly contributed to the outbreak of World War I. Although it is not possible to prove that point with certainty, it is clear that power politics and the struggle between nations over sharing the world’s economic and strategic assets were the major reasons for the war. The fact that the warring parties largely ignored the sanctity of human life led to a deadly war.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Andreasen, “The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the United States?,” p. 703.

  2. 2.

    See Richard G. Hovanassian, The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986); Vahakn D. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to Caucasus (Providence: Berghahn, 1995); Jay Winter, America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Yair Auron, The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2000); Vahakn Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Richard G. Hovanassian, The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

  3. 3.

    Michelle Tusan, “Crimes Against Humanity: Human Rights, the British Empire, and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide,” American Historical Review, Vol. 119, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 47–77.

  4. 4.

    See Richard D. Kloian, Armenian Genocide: First 20th Century Holocaust (San Francisco, CA: Armenian Commemorative Committee, 1980).

  5. 5.

    See, for instance, Vahakn Dadrian, “The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 503–559; Dadrian, “Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 1988, pp. 151–169; particularly Kevork B. Bardakjian, Hitler and the Armenian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1985).

  6. 6.

    Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide,” American Scholar, Vol. 15, Issue 2, April 1946, p. 229.

  7. 7.

    The English version is in a condensed form: Na’im Bek, The Memoirs of Naim Bey (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920).

  8. 8.

    Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction? (Istanbul and London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1986).

  9. 9.

    Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 172–179.

  10. 10.

    Hans Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Page and Co., 1918) and Morgenthau, Secrets of the Bosphorus (London: Hutchinson, 1918).

  11. 11.

    Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London: Hadder and Stoughton, 1916).

  12. 12.

    Rafael de Nogales, Four Years Beneath the Crescent (New York, NY: Scribner’s, 1916).

  13. 13.

    See Armen K. Hovanassian, “The United States Inquiry and the Armenian Question, 1917–1919: The Archival Papers,” Armenian Review, Vol. 37, Issue 1, 1984, pp. 146–163.

  14. 14.

    Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in German and Austrian Sources,” in I. Charny (ed.), The Widening Circle of Genocide (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994). Also see, Dadrian, “The Armenian Question and the Wartime Fate of the Armenians as Documented by the Officials of the Ottoman Empire’s World War I Allies: Germany and Austria-Hungary,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2002, pp. 59–85.

  15. 15.

    Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 4, 1991, pp. 549–576.

  16. 16.

    Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 107.

  17. 17.

    See Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 28–59.

  18. 18.

    Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, p. 106.

  19. 19.

    The Peace Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920, Article 226.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., Article 230.

  21. 21.

    James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 9.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p. 13.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p. 19.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  25. 25.

    Matthew Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” San Diego Justice Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1995, p. 3.

  26. 26.

    Elihu Root, “The Outlook For International Law,” Proceedings of American Society of International Law, Vol. 9, 1915, pp. 2–4, cited in Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” San Diego Justice Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1995, p. 5, at note 22.

  27. 27.

    Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 6.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., pp. 8–9.

  29. 29.

    Andreasen, “The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the United States?,” p. 702.

  30. 30.

    Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, Official English text, reprinted from Pamphlet No. 32, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 1920, pp. 95–154.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., pp. 97–98.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., p. 98.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., p. 107.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., p. 115.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    The relevant conclusion in the report reads as follows: “all persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank…are liable to criminal prosecution.” Ibid., p. 117.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., p. 116.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., p. 117.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 118.

  40. 40.

    MacPherson, “Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” p. 5.

  41. 41.

    Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, p. 121.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., p. 122.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., pp. 122–123.

  44. 44.

    Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 16.

  45. 45.

    The text of the “Memorandum of Reservations Presented by The Representatives of The United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities,” is annexed to the Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, pp. 127ff.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., p. 134.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., pp. 135–36, 144, 148.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., p. 142.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 145.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., p. 146.

  51. 51.

    “In view of their objections to the uncertain law to be applied…and in view also of their objections to the extent of the proposed jurisdiction of that tribunal, the American representatives were constrained to decline to be a party of its creation…They therefore refrained from taking part either in the discussion of the constitution or of the procedure of the tribunal” Ibid., pp. 148–149.

  52. 52.

    “Reservations by the Japanese Delegation,” Annex III to Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, pp. 151–152.

  53. 53.

    Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at Versailles, June 28, 1919 (Treaty of Versailles). The treaty text can be reached at: http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/all440.html.

  54. 54.

    Treaty of Versailles, Article 227. This article states: “A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.”

  55. 55.

    Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, p. 3.

  56. 56.

    O’Connor, “The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why The United States Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” p. 936.

  57. 57.

    Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 9.

  58. 58.

    This note was reprinted in William Adams, “The American Peace Commission and the Punishment of Crimes Committed During War,” Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 39, 1923, pp. 245–248, cited in Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” pp. 9–10, at note 42.

  59. 59.

    Treaty of Versailles, Articles 228 and 229. Article 229 states:

    Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

    Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

  60. 60.

    Jamison, “A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections,” p. 422.

  61. 61.

    Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” p. 16.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., p. 19.

  63. 63.

    O’Connor, “The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why The United States Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” p. 936.

  64. 64.

    MacPherson, “Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” p. 6.

  65. 65.

    Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” p. 19.

  66. 66.

    It is argued that the Allies originally sought to try 1,580 war criminals, a figure that contrasts with the commission’s list of 895. However, the Allies reduced this number to 854. See MacPherson, “Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” p. 6. However, despite this conflict, it is certain that the Allies submitted 45 names for possible prosecution.

  67. 67.

    Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” p. 20.

  68. 68.

    MacPherson, “Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” p. 6.

  69. 69.

    Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, p. 4.

  70. 70.

    Andreasen, “The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the United States?,” p. 704.

  71. 71.

    O’Connor, “The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why The United States Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” p. 936.

  72. 72.

    For a detailed account on this matter, see, Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War.

  73. 73.

    Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” p. 20.

  74. 74.

    Bassiouni, “Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical Survey,” p. 51.

  75. 75.

    O’Connor, “The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why The United States Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” p. 938.

  76. 76.

    Jamison, “A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections,” p. 423.

  77. 77.

    Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, pp. 4–5.

  78. 78.

    MacPherson, “Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” p. 7.

  79. 79.

    Hugh H.L. Bellot, “A Permanent International Criminal Court,” The International Law Association, Report of the Thirty-First Conference, Buenos Aires, 1922, p. 63, cited in Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 38, at footnote 138.

  80. 80.

    Hugh H.L. Bellot, “Draft Statute for the Permanent International Criminal Court,” in International Law Association, Report of the Thirty-Third Conference, 1924, cited in Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 31.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., pp. 101–102.

  82. 82.

    International Law Association, Report of The Permanent International Criminal Court Committee Report of the Thirty-Fourth Conference, Vienna, 1926 (London, 1927), cited in Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 33, at footnote 161.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., pp. 109–110.

  84. 84.

    Jamison, “A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections,” p. 423.

  85. 85.

    “Development in the Law: International Criminal Law,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 114, Issue 7, 2001, pp. 1950–1951. Article 1 of the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1929 states, “The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.” This pact is also important in that it was referred to as the basis for the war crimes trials that were conducted following the end of WWII. See John A. Maxwell and James J. Friedberg (eds.), Human Rights in Western Civilization: 1600-Present, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1994), p. 128.

  86. 86.

    Suggestions Presented to the Council by the French Government, Appendix IV, Committee for The International Repression of Terrorism, Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee, 1935, reprinted in ibid., pp. 269ff.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., p. 270.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., pp. 271–272.

  89. 89.

    It is argued that multiple world crises that erupted during the late 1930s prevented the proposed court’s establishment. See Latore, “Escape Out the Back Door or Charge in the Front Door: U.S. Reactions to the International Criminal Court,” p. 162.

  90. 90.

    Jamison, “A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections,” p. 423.

  91. 91.

    Lippman, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” p. 44.

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Çakmak, C. (2017). The Interwar Period. In: A Brief History of International Criminal Law and International Criminal Court. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56736-9_3

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