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Empirical Inquiries Versus Armchair Investigations

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The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology
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Abstract

The author introduces experimental philosophy’s main tenet: philosophy needs to test empirically the spontaneous responses that people give to philosophical thought experiments. She discusses experimental philosophers’ criticism of the appeal to intuitions, such as the intuitions’ variability and disagreement objection, and concludes that experimental philosophy, allegedly the empirical branch of traditional philosophy, in fact undermines philosophical armchair investigations.

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Nicoli, S.M. (2016). Empirical Inquiries Versus Armchair Investigations. In: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_7

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