Abstract
The author introduces the two main criticisms of the armchair methodology of philosophy: (1) the objection of the incompatibility between the nature of the evidence philosophers appeal to and the nature of the aims and results of their inquiries; and (2) the objection of intuitions’ variability and disagreement. She explains how these two criticisms are developed in Part II and Part III and anticipates the strategies that are used to reply to them: both objections will be countered by pointing out the corrective and enhancing nature of the method and the normative aspect of intuitions.
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References
Gendler, T.S 2011. On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias. Philosophical Studies 156: 33–63.
Williamson, T 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
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Nicoli, S.M. (2016). Introduction to Part II and Part III. In: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_4
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