Abstract
This chapter examines thought experiment methodology by discussing three popular cases: Gettier’s counterexamples, a case introduced by Plato in The Republic, and Thomson’s ailing violinist case. The author illustrates the role of thought experiments in the broader dynamics of theory’s construction and justification of reflective equilibrium. She refers to Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007) to explain why imaginary and actual counterexamples are equally effective.
Finally, two theses by Gendler (Thought experiment: on the powers and limits of imaginary cases. Garland Press, 2000) are introduced: the idea that the possibility of acquiring new knowledge of the object under inquiry is due to the exceptionality of the case, and the thesis according to which thought experiments are aimed at providing interlocutors with resources enabling them to make a perspective shift.
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Nicoli, S.M. (2016). Thought Experiments. In: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_2
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