Abstract
This chapter takes up the problem of the double in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In Cartesian Meditations, and through his commitment to the transcendental Ego, Husserl has created an aporia. On the one hand, he has devoted himself to the axiomatic thought that all sense arises from the Ego’s intentional life, effectively constructing a fundamental solipsism. On the other hand, and in order to obtain his aim of confirming an objective world, he knows he must establish an other, that is, in order to have objectivity, he must work out intersubjectivity. I show that this project is a failure. Without a double, Husserl is locked inside of himself, and his commitment to the Ego confirms this to the very end. Finally, I return to the theme of intersubjectivity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, which I had touched on in Chap. 2.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Husserl, Edmund. 1977. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2007. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Trans. Edward G. Ballard, and Lester E. Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1975. Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Seitz, B. (2016). The Ineluctable Double: Phenomenology’s Other. In: Intersubjectivity and the Double. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-56374-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-56375-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)