The Discursive Power of Firms

Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


In this chapter Elbra argues that gold mining firms rely heavily on discursive power in order to promote firm-led regulation as a legitimate form of governance. In order to demonstrate this, a three faces of power framework is introduced highlighting the features of instrumental, structural and discursive power. Following this, empirical evidence based on interviews with mining company executives is analysed in order to demonstrate the manner in which firms leverage their private authority. It is argued that as the effectiveness of instrumental power declines, gold mining firms increasingly find that discursive power, supported by structural power, is enabling business to paint itself as a legitimate governor, in turn sharing sovereignty with the SSA state.


Gold Mining Chief Executive Officer Structural Power Industry Regulation United Nations Global Compact 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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