Theoretical Explanations for Firm-Led Governance

Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


This chapter begins by providing an overview of the resource curse literature, highlighting the existing explanations for failed growth in resource-rich countries. In particular, it is noted that this well-developed scholarship is highly state-centric, ignoring the role of multinational firms. Next, the chapter introduces the cutting-edge scholarship on private authority and private governance, exploring how, why and in what ways firms act as industry governors. This section provides the theoretical underpinnings for understanding firms’ contributions to the governance of Africa’s gold mining sectors. Lastly, Elbra develops a political economy framework through the synthesis of the resource curse and private governance literatures. This framework provides an understanding of how private governance regimes may be used to alleviate the outcomes associated with the resource curse.


Resource Curse Dutch Disease Pollution Haven Private Governance Extractive Sector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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