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Introduction

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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

This chapter defines and outlines the resource curse as it applies to three of Africa’s largest gold-producing states—South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania. It uses World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and government data to highlight the importance of gold mining to these countries, contrasting this with the entrenched poverty and underdevelopment seen in these states in order to demonstrate how they can be considered to be ‘resource cursed’. The chapter highlights the concentrated ownership of large-scale gold mines across the three case studies and the authority this provides firms. It concludes by outlining the research design and methods, data sources and rationale for studying the cases of South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania as well as providing an overview of the structure of the book.

Keywords

Gold Mining Resource Curse Private Governance Income Volatility Slow Economic Growth 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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