The Social Networks of Officers

Parnell, David Alan

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56204-3_5

David Alan Parnell²

Part of the book series: New Approaches to Byzantine History and Culture ((NABHC))

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Abstract

Parnell describes the relationships that Byzantine army officers had with one another. Officers built up social networks during their careers and used these networks to advance their own interests. This chapter explores examples in Italy, North Africa, and on the eastern frontier in which generals such as Belisarius, Narses, Peter, Sergius, and John sought to marshal support among their fellow officers. These networks benefitted top generals by helping them to amass support for their opinions in war councils and benefitted junior officers by giving them a patron who might help to advance their career. Parnell argues that networks were required for generalship because the emperors often did not clarify the military hierarchy. The networks were however personal and social, not purely the result of career ambitions.

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Notes

1.
The majority of this chapter originally appeared as Parnell 2015a. Copyright (c) 2015 Johns Hopkins University Press. This article was first published in Journal of Late Antiquity 8:1 (2015), 114–135. Reprinted with permission by Johns Hopkins University Press.
2.
Scott 2000, 20.
3.
Wasserman and Faust 1994, 20. It should be noted that this chapter is not strictly a work of social network analysis in all the possible dimensions of the method. There is simply not enough detail in ancient sources to provide all of the data that full network analysis would require (on typical data, see Scott 2000, 2–3). There is, however, enough evidence to show that Byzantine officers formed social networks, and the terminology of social network analysis is helpful.
4.
Schor 2007 and Schor 2011.
5.
While there exists no full study that analyzes the personal relationships of Byzantine officers, these scholars have offered brief insights on the subject in works with different goals. See Kaegi 1981, Kaegi 1995, Whitby 2007, Whitby 2000b, and Rance 2005.
6.
Kaegi 1995, 86.
7.
Maurice Strategikon 8.2.23, translated by Dennis 1984, 85.
8.
Maurice Strategikon 8.2.97, translated by Dennis 1984, 91. Centuries later, Leo VI gave generals similar advice, encouraging them to attract the respect of their officers (Leo Taktika 2.10, translated by Dennis 2010, 21. See also Haldon 1999, 231).
9.
Agathias Histories 4.16.9–10, translated by Frendo 1975, 118. Compare Procopius Wars 7.1.16–24.
10.
North Africa (Procopius Wars 3.11.5–6), Italy in 537–540 (5.24.18), the East in 541 (2.14.8), and Italy in 548 (7.27.3, 7.30.1–2).
11.
In the Gothic War, Procopius builds a narrative around praising as a heroic protagonist first Belisarius, then Totila, and finally Narses (Treadgold 2007, 204). Agathias builds up Narses as the protagonist of the first part of his narrative (Agathias Histories 2.9).
12.
On the complexity of this narrative, see Treadgold 2007, 204.
13.
Procopius Wars 5.5.1–4, 7.1.18–21. In comparison, Belisarius had received approximately 18,000 soldiers for the invasion of Vandal Africa in 533 (3.11.2–20). On Procopius’ use of numbers and statistics, see Treadgold 2007, 210–18.
14.
Procopius Wars 5.24.1–17.
15.
Procopius Wars 6.5.1. For John, see Jones, Martindale, and Morris 1971 [Hereafter PLRE], Ioannes 46, 3:652–61. For the rebellion of Vitalian, see Joh. Mal. 16.16. For Vitalian’s family in military service, see Chap. 6, ‘Examples of Family Military Service.’
16.
Procopius Wars 6.7.25–34.
17.
Procopius Wars 6.10.5–7.
18.
Procopius Wars 6.11.4–8.
19.
Procopius Wars 6.11.22.
20.
Procopius Wars 6.12.17.
21.
Procopius Wars 6.13.16–18.
22.
Procopius Wars 6.16.1–24. Procopius summarizes the conference with a few brief speeches mostly devoid of technical content, but this is probably because he wishes to present a neatly classicized narrative (Cameron 1985, 37). It is likely that the conference included technical discussion of how to actually accomplish the goals about which the generals argued. Compare with the meetings of Charlemagne and his military advisers described by Bachrach 2002, 318–51.
23.
Procopius Wars 6.16.4. Presumably avarice referred to the opportunity of a general commanding a garrison to extort money from the city’s inhabitants. For a contemporary example, see Bessas at Rome in 545–6 (7.17.9–14).
24.
Procopius Wars 6.16.9–10, translated by Dewing 1914, 4:5–7.
25.
This rhetorical strategy also served to conceal Narses’ personal affection for John (Procopius Wars 6.16.5).
26.
Procopius Wars 6.16.15–16.
27.
Procopius Wars 6.16.17–24.
28.
Procopius Wars 6.16.21–3.
29.
Procopius Wars 6.18.2–3.
30.
Procopius Wars 6.18.27–9, 6.19.8–10.
31.
Procopius Wars 6.21.1. Belisarius routinely assigned a joint command to a general and one of his bucellarii. For other examples, see 6.4.6 and Chap. 7, ‘Neutral Descriptions of Individual Soldiers.’
32.
Procopius Wars 6.21.13–16.
33.
Procopius Wars 6.21.17–22.
34.
Procopius Wars 6.16.9–10.
35.
Compare Cameron 1985: ‘The Wars is pervaded by Procopius’ personal views of people and events, and however he defined its real purpose to himself, it was from the beginning inspired by his own strongly held opinions’ (137).
36.
Procopius Wars 6.21.23–39.
37.
Procopius Wars 6.22.4.
38.
Procopius Wars 6.22.4, 8.13.14 and see Chap. 4.
39.
Procopius Wars 6.21.42–6.22.3.
40.
Kaegi 1981 briefly describes these problems in the Byzantine army in Italy, although he focuses on the events only as evidence of personal disagreement between the main characters (50–54).
41.
Procopius Wars 6.21.1–15.
42.
Procopius Wars 1.21.23–27.
43.
Procopius Wars 3.11.5–6.
44.
Procopius Wars 7.1.1 and 2.13.16.
45.
General of the East: Procopius Wars 2.24.13. For the career of Martin, see PLRE 3: Martinus 2.
46.
For the career of Uliaris, see PLRE 3: Vliaris 1.
47.
See the judgment of PLRE 3: Ildiger, at 615.
48.
Procopius Wars 4.15.49.
49.
Procopius Wars 6.8.16.
50.
Procopius Wars 6.16.21–24.
51.
Procopius Wars 7.1.1. For the career of Ildiger, see PLRE 3: Ildiger.
52.
Procopius Wars 6.21.1.
53.
See note 10 of this chapter.
54.
Procopius Wars 7.1.1. To recapitulate, the four senior officers who accompanied Belisarius were Martin, Ildiger, Valerian, and Herodian (not discussed here).
55.
For Cyprian, see PLRE 3: Cyprianus, at 368–70.
56.
Cf. PLRE 3: Valerianus 1, at 1357.
57.
Instead, Justinian selected Narses (Procopius Wars 8.21.7–9).
58.
Procopius Wars 6.16.5.
59.
In 539, after splitting from Belisarius, Narses dispatched John to Caesena (Procopius Wars 6.19.19). In 552, John joined Narses in commanding the left wing of the army at the Battle of Busta Gallorum (8.31.2–3). Later in 552, Narses dispatched John into Tuscany to try to cut off Teias (8.34.21–24).
60.
In 552, John advised Narses on techniques for transporting the army across rivers (Procopius Wars 8.26.24–25). See Rance 2005, 470.
61.
Procopius Wars 6.18.6. Narses had the support of the Herul allies as a body, including their commander. Their personal connection to Narses seems to have been strong. In 539, when Narses was recalled, the Herul allies refused to serve with Belisarius and left Italy (6.22.5). On the Heruls, see Chap. 3.
62.
Procopius Wars 6.18.6–10.
63.
In 538, Narses the Eunuch arrived in Italy with Justin and the other Narses, and Aratius, who had arrived shortly before, quickly joined them (Procopius Wars 6.13.16–18).
64.
Procopius Wars 1.15.31.
65.
Procopius Wars 6.21.16.
66.
Many important officers might have commanded several hundred bucellarii. Having more than that would be exceptional, and lower-ranking officers likely had far fewer. See Schmitt 1994, 162–3.
67.
Procopius Wars 6.23.3–5 and 2.19.15.
68.
For John’s betrayal and Belisarius’ fall from grace, see Procopius Secret History 4.1–13.
69.
Procopius Wars 7.13.21–25, 8.26.13, 8.31.4. For the career of John the Glutton, see PLRE 3: Ioannes ‘The Glutton’ 64.
70.
Procopius Wars 6.18.4, translated by Dewing 1914, 4:19–21.
71.
Procopius Wars 6.29.29. Kaegi 1981 recognized the significance of the selection of these four officers, connecting it to earlier disagreements between Belisarius and Narses, but he did not comment upon the inclusion in this list of Bessas, who was not a part of those previous disagreements (53).
72.
Narses the Eunuch was not included in this list because he had already been withdrawn from Italy by Justinian (in 539).
73.
On the beginning of Bessas’ career, see Greatrex 1998a, 74, note 4.
74.
Procopius Wars 5.5.2–3.
75.
By 550 Bessas was the General of Armenia (magister militum per Armeniam) and had taken charge of operations against the Persians in Lazica (Procopius Wars 8.9.4).
76.
Procopius Wars 7.19.13–14, 7.20.1, 26–28.
77.
Scott 2000, 10.
78.
Compare this figure to those presented by Schor 2011, 44 and 89.
79.
Procopius Wars 7.25.22–24, translated by Dewing 1914, 4:377.
80.
Procopius Wars 7.1.22–24, translated by Dewing 1914, 4:157–159, emphasis added.
81.
Procopius Wars 6.8.14–17. For more on this episode, see Chap. 4, ‘Review: Keeping a Position.’
82.
Procopius Secret History 1.30.
83.
On Uliaris, see note 46 of this chapter. On John, see Procopius Wars 6.21.13–16.
84.
See note 45 of this chapter.
85.
Procopius Wars 4.22.1–5, Procopius Secret History 5.28–33.
86.
On the career of Peter the General, see PLRE 2: Petrus 27, at 870. He had been a general since at least 528 (Joh. Mal. 18.4).
87.
Procopius Wars 2.18.6.
88.
Procopius Wars 2.18.16.
89.
Procopius likely left Belisarius’ service in 540 to begin writing (Treadgold 2007, 184).
90.
Procopius describes the events in Italy between spring 538 and spring 539 in 14 chapters (Procopius Wars 6.7–21) and the events in the East between spring 541 and summer 542 in only seven chapters (2.14–21).
91.
Procopius Secret History 4.1–16. For more on Belisarius’ relationship with Justinian, see Chap. 4.
92.
Procopius Wars 2.24.13.
93.
Procopius Wars 4.14.7–42, 4.24.9–15.
94.
Sergius was Praetorian Prefect of Africa and magister militum (PLRE 3: Sergius 4, at 1124). John probably ranked as a mid-level commander (comes rei militaris), but may have been a magister militum (PLRE 3: Ioannes 27, at 640). On ranks in the Byzantine army, see Chap. 2.
95.
Procopius Secret History 5.32.
96.
Procopius Wars 4.22.4.
97.
Procopius Wars 4.24.1–16.
98.
Procopius describes these events in Africa between spring 544 and spring 545 in just three chapters (Procopius Wars 4.21–24), compared to the 14 chapters he devoted to the chronologically similar period in Italy (6.7–21).
99.
Scott 2000, 10–11.
100.
Ammianus 25.5.2.
101.
Ammianus 25.5.4.
102.
Thucydides 6.46–50. See also Kagan 1981, 217.
103.
On the various magistri militum, see Chap. 2. See also Treadgold 1995, 15–17 and Jones 1964, 1:535. Lee sees a connection between the number of generals in the East and the failure of a dominating military figure to emerge there in the fifth century (Lee 2007b, 397).
104.
Procopius Wars 3.11.18–21, 6.18.27–28. See Ravegnani 1998, who describes this bestowal of authority as an innovation of Justinian (76–7).
105.
Whitby 2007b, 336 and Kaegi 1981, 30–33.
106.
See Procopius Secret History 4.40 and, for example, Lee 2007b, 398–400. See also the extensive discussion of the subject in Chap. 4.
107.
Meier has argued for a change in Justinian’s reign after the arrival of the plague and other setbacks that made the emperor recognize his own limitations and become pensive about the future. See Meier 2004.
108.
Several scholars have argued that dissension among generals in the Byzantine military reached its peak in this period. See Kaegi 2007, 255 and Lee 2004, 125. Whitby 2000a notes that this sort of dissension was not limited to Belisarius, but was also experienced by other generals of the period (474).
109.
Procopius Wars 6.22.4.
110.
Procopius Wars 6.29.17–41.
111.
Procopius Wars 7.1.23–24, 7.3.1, 7.6.9.
112.
Procopius Secret History 1.24.
113.
Procopius Wars 4.4.22–24.
114.
Procopius Wars 2.3.26.
115.
Procopius Wars 6.16.4–5.

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David Alan Parnell

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Parnell, D.A. (2017). The Social Networks of Officers. In: Justinian's Men. New Approaches to Byzantine History and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56204-3_5

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56204-3_5
Published: 05 November 2016
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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