Abstract
In this chapter I argue that Freud struggled to reconcile his commitment to mind-body nondualism with a scientific culture shaped by the dualism implied by Western rationalism. Psychoanalysis, therefore, acts as a bridge between attempts to define the self and underlying psychic processes in the abstract and explorations of the open-ended, transformational potential of experience. Although Freud attempted a universal theory, his writing increasingly explored the open-ended approach, an approach that the post-Freudian psychoanalytic tradition has embraced more fully. Some of Freud’s earliest literary readers acknowledged this, and while discredited attempts at psychobiography or applied psychoanalysis have fallen out of fashion, theorists of both literature and psychoanalysis have increasingly established links between the ambiguity of literary meaning and an aesthetics of the self.
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Notes
- 1.
Marcus, Laura, ‘Psychoanalysis at the Margins,’ A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Culture, Laura Marcus and Ankhi Mukherjee, eds., Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014, p. 4; Rabaté, Jean-Michel., The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and Psychoanalysis, 2014, p. 4.
- 2.
‘irritate, v.1.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2016. Web. 9 February 2017.
- 3.
In their influential account of cognitive science, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991), Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch critique the ‘abstract, theoretical reasoning’ traditionally employed by Western science to describe the mind, asserting that mind-brain nondualism demands an ‘open-ended’ study of mental processes rather than reductive or foundationalist abstractions. Their model demands not only the inclusion of the subjective perspective as a valid field of study but in doing so proposes a ‘nonobjectivist (and at best also nonsubjectivist) approach to biology and cognitive science’ (1991, 9). This approach is ‘open-ended’ because, by including rather than attempting to exclude the ongoing experience of the observing consciousness, it becomes necessary to acknowledge that the mind-body relation is ‘not simply fixed and given but can be fundamentally changed’ (1991, 28). Psychoanalysis, the authors suggest, is ‘the closest discipline familiar to Westerners that verges on a pragmatic, open-ended view toward knowledge’ (1991, 31). Although the authors critique Freud’s reliance on theoretical abstractions, they single out Jacques Lacan (1991, 48) and object relations psychoanalysis (1991, 108) as desirable paradigm shifts towards an open-ended study of the mind.
- 4.
See Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, New York: Basic Books, 1999.
- 5.
Lionel Trilling quotes from this passage from ‘The Sanity of Genius’ in the essay ‘Freud and Literature’ (1940), adding that ‘the illusions of art are made to serve the purpose of a closer and truer relation with reality’ (1961 [1940], 45).
- 6.
In the period referred to by Eliot, of course, mind-body dualism or ‘substance dualism’ is associated most with Descartes, whose insistence that res extensa and res cogitans differ ontologically has, as Antonio Damasio notes, remained influential. Substance dualism, Damasio writes, ‘is no longer mainstream in science or philosophy, although it is probably the view that most human beings today would regard as their own’ (2003, 187). Although Freud insists on the ‘dualistic’ nature of his theory, Freud’s use of the term ‘dualism’ refers specifically (and, as is discussed later in this chapter, rather ambiguously) to his theory of drives and is not to be mistaken for the more fundamental substance dualism of Descartes. Freud’s ambitions of absolute scientific objectivity nevertheless betray the influence of Cartesian dualism, although Damasio also notes a single instance in which Freud, in a letter of 1931, explicitly acknowledges the influence of Spinoza, one of the few European philosophers of the seventeenth century to espouse a nondualist model (2003, 260). This acknowledgement was, however, slight and fleeting.
- 7.
James Strachey adopted the title ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ for the Standard Edition. The title in the original German publication was ‘Sketch of a Psychology.’ Neither title was Freud’s, who did not include one. The specification of Freud’s enterprise as ‘science’ in its English translation points to a distinction between the so-called two cultures that is somewhat culturally specific—the German Wissenschaft refers more broadly to ‘knowledge’ and can include subjects thought of in English as humanities.
- 8.
Freud’s insistence on mind-body nondualism is acknowledged today in the field of neuropsychoanalysis, which employs a range of conceptual and descriptive tools in order to integrate the more ‘subjective’ (or ‘top-down’) study of the mind with the more ‘scientific’ (or ‘bottom-up’) study of the brain, a form of ‘dual-aspect monism’ (see Fotopoulou, Aikaterini; Pfaff, Donald W., From the Couch to the Lab: Trends in Neuropsychoanalysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). In their seminal work on affective neuroscience, The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions (2011), neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp and psychoanalyst Lucy Biven describe their joint endeavour as ‘thoroughly monistic, with no remaining dualistic perspectives,’ and use the alternating term BrainMind/MindBrain depending on whether the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ approach is taken.
- 9.
The significance of the maternal relationship in early infancy is explored in greater detail by the school of object relations, pioneered by theorists such as Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott and building on the work of Freud’s contemporaries Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank. It is also central to John Bowlby’s attachment theory, which, though often considered antithetical to psychoanalysis, overlaps with it in a number of ways (Fonagy 2001).
- 10.
The notion that psychoanalysis can be ‘applied’ to reveal an underlying truth to art is critiqued in Jean-Francois Lyotard’s ‘Beyond Representation [1974]’ (in 1989). It is epistemologically ‘flabby,’ Lyotard writes, to suggest that ‘a body of theory, more or less rigorously formulated, can be applied without modification to a set of data or to a field of study (in this case, works of art), different from that for which it was constructed’ (1989, 155). Lyotard’s critique itself betrays the influence of substance dualism, presuming as it does the clear taxonomical separation between the text and the person to be ‘analysed,’ although the general tenor of the essay is to propose, in keeping with a nondualist approach, the rejection of a mimetic theory of artworks: ‘they are not in place of anything; they do not stand for but stand; that is to say, they function through their material and its organization’ (1989, 158).
- 11.
The aphorism Wo Es war, soll Ich werden is much debated in psychoanalysis. The translation used here in the Standard Edition, ‘Where id was, there ego shall be,’ is questionable on the grounds that elsewhere in the translation the terms ‘id’ and ‘ego’ are used mainly when Freud uses the definite article das before Es and Ich. The sentence could equally be translated as ‘Where it was, there I shall/should/or must be.’ Lacan bases his processual ontology and ethics of the subject on this passage, taking it to mean that the subject must be defined by a continual coming into being (Fink 1995).
- 12.
Shoshana Felman makes liberal use of italics in her writing. All italics in the following quotes from Felman are, as here, in the original.
- 13.
Lacan’s very complex and rigorous theory of the subject is amply and lucidly outlined in Bruce Fink’s The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (1995), especially ch. 4, in which Fink crucially explains that ‘The Lacanian Subject Is Not the “Individual” or Conscious Subject of Anglo-American Philosophy’ (1995, 36). With his terms ‘true self’ and ‘false self,’ Donald Winnicott employs similar language to convey the desirability of a responsive, processual selfhood that does not grasp onto an ideal of identity.
- 14.
Felman in fact describes how, for Lacan, the usefulness of Sophocles’s dramatization of the Oedipus myth culminates in the passage, in Oedipus at Colonus, in which Oedipus asks: ‘Is it now that I am nothing that I am made to be a man?’ In Seminar II, Felman writes, Lacan describes this as ‘the end of Oedipus’s psychoanalysis’ (cited in Felman 1983, 83–84). Felman also compares the relationship between Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams and Beyond the Pleasure Principle to that between Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus. Lacan’s reference to Oedipus at Colonus, Felman writes, tells the story of ‘psychoanalysis’s inherent, radical, and destined self-expropriation’ (1983, 94).
- 15.
As we come to understand the ‘tenuous, fictive, arbitrary status of ends,’ Brooks writes in his epilogue, we find that narrative meaning ‘no longer wishes to be seen as end-determined, moving toward full predication of the narrative sentence, claiming a final plenitude of meaning’ (1984, 314). While Brooks observes how our narrative understanding evolves from an end-oriented hermeneutics to a processual ontology in a manner that reflects (or enacts) the central innovations of Freud’s drive theory, Nancy Armstrong traces how the development of the novel reflects (or enacts) the genesis and development of the liberal individual in the West through the creation of a particular kind of agential protagonicity (Armstrong, Nancy, 2005, How Novels Think, New York: Columbia University Press), before, in a more recent essay, observing how the study of mind, brain, and affect is contributing to the dissolution of this concept in the less humanist and more broadly ontological concerns of the contemporary novel (Armstrong, Nancy 2014, ‘The Affective Turn in Contemporary Fiction,’ Contemporary Literature, vol. 55, no. 3, Fall 2014, pp. 441–65).
- 16.
Replacing the concept of a search for the lost (and idealized) object of infancy with the death drive as the source of the compulsion to repeat brings Freud’s theory of repetition into much closer correspondence with a wider intellectual genealogy (Hume, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Deleuze) that theorizes repetition not as the duplication of something identical but as the production of something different and new.
- 17.
For a psychoanalytic work that focuses on embodiment in Freudian theory, see Anzieu, Didier (2016 [1985]) The Skin-Ego, trans. Naomi Segal, London: Karnac (see also Segal, Naomi (2014), ‘Touching Not Touching,’ in A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Culture, Laura Marcus and Ankhi Mukherjee, eds., Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell).
- 18.
In this respect, Freud’s theory of the life and death drives is remarkably similar to Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana’s biological theory of autopoiesis. See Maturana, Humberto, and Francisco J. Varela’s (1980) Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht, Holland, Boston: D Reidel Pub. Co.
- 19.
The tension between Freud’s nondualism and the forms of Platonic idealism that dominated Western thought at the time appears in his reference to the pre-Socratic physicist Empodocles in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable.’ Freud’s description of Empodocles recalls the cliché that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery: ‘He was exact and sober in his physical and physiological researches, yet he did not shrink from the obscurities of mysticism’ (SE XXIII, 245). Freud attempts a subtle differentiation between Empodocles’s theory of ‘Love and Strife’ and his own theory of Eros and Thanatos, initially suggesting that Empodocles’s theory is a ‘cosmic phantasy’ while his own is ‘content to claim biological validity’ (SE XXIII, 245). However, Freud immediately concedes that Empodocles’s belief that the universe possesses the same ‘animate nature’ as individual organisms ‘robs this difference of much of its importance’ (SE XXIII, 245–46). Love and Strife and Eros and Thanatos are, Freud writes, equivalent ‘in name and function.’ Although he later claims that, in his own time, ‘what is living has been sharply differentiated from what is inanimate,’ he qualifies this distinction by noting ‘the urge of what is living to return to an inanimate state’ (SE XXIII, 246) and adds that his own contribution does not claim to deny that ‘an analogous [drive] already existed earlier’ nor to ‘assert that [a drive] of this sort only came into existence with the emergence of life’ (SE XXIII, 246–47). (Here I substitute the more correct and now more widely used ‘drive’ for the Standard Edition’s ‘instinct’ as a translation of Trieb.) Any critique of Freud’s assertiveness and self-belief regarding his own theory should be measured alongside the following quote from The Question of Lay Analysis: ‘Only a few years ago I should have had to clothe this theory in other terms. Nor, of course, can I guarantee to you that the form in which it is expressed to-day will be the final one. Science, as you know, is not a revelation; long after its beginnings it still lacks the attributes of definiteness, immutability and infallibility for which human thought so deeply longs’ (SE XX, 191).
- 20.
Bakhtin refers not only to different national languages in his concepts of polyglossia and heteroglossia but also to ‘territorial dialects, social and professional dialects and jargons, literary language, generic languages within literary language, epochs in language and so forth’ (1981, 12). In other words, language fragments into an unending multiplicity of voices and registers, each one unique and specific to its moment of utterance and capable of transforming and being transformed in the continually shifting context of parodic relations.
- 21.
Lacan’s reading of Freud’s Oedipus theory, which, in his seminar The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, he refers to as ‘Freud’s dream’ (implying that it conveyed both manifest and latent meaning), could be said to constitute a kind of ‘novelization’ of Freud’s interpretation of the original Greek text.
- 22.
See Agamben, Giorgio, The Use of Bodies, trans. Adam Kotsko, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016, for a philosophical analysis of how the concept of ‘use’ subverts the dualist dichotomy of the subject-object distinction.
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Long, W. (2018). Psychoanalysis. In: Stocker, B., Mack, M. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Literature. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54794-1_23
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