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Conclusion: A Matter of Principals

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National Administrations in EU Trade Policy

Part of the book series: European Administrative Governance ((EAGOV))

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Abstract

What are the main theoretical and empirical contributions of this research? Following a brief overview of the lessons learnt, the conclusion takes a more prospective angle. The relationship between administrative capacity and member-state control has several normative implications that warrant a proper reflection. A prospective angle is also useful for looking beyond the empirical ambitions of this book. The final section identifies paths for further research, not only to extend the scope of the initiated research, but also to offer suggestions on how to improve to the applied research design.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Original in Dutch: “[Deze ontwikkelingen] vragen ook om een andere en scherpere inzet vanuit Nederland. Nog meer dan in het verleden is het van cruciaal belang dat Nederland in een vroeg stadium inzicht heeft in de eigen belangen en deze pro-actief in Brussel agendeert. Dat vraagt veel van een kleiner wordende overheid; maar het vraagt zeker ook meer van alle andere belanghebbenden: bedrijfsleven, maatschappelijke organisaties, vakbonden en andere instellingen dienen zich hiervan bewust te zijn.”

  2. 2.

    Compare for example Dür and Mateo (Dür & Mateo, 2010a, 2010b) with Dür and Elsig (2011); Niemann and Huigens (2011) with Niemann (2004), or da Conceição-Heldt (2011) with da Conceição-Heldt (2006).

  3. 3.

    Further research is required to substantiate this finding, as it is unclear whether the source of an increase in workload is due to the deepening and widening of the trade agenda, declining budgets, or the supranational character of the policy domain—that is, if the results are not affected by social desirability bias in the first place.

  4. 4.

    A Geographic Indication is defined as “an indication which identifies an agricultural product or foodstuff as originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the product is essentially attributable to its geographical origin” ( Art.7 of the CETA chapter on intellectual property rights 2015). If a trading partner accepts such a geographic indication, it implies its producers cannot call their products “Champagne” or “Parma ham.”

  5. 5.

    But for a critique on the sustainability of such a dialogue, see Jørgensen and Valbjørrn (2012).

  6. 6.

    Clearly one has to take into account that to effectively observe a “regionisation” effect, one needs to compare with similar countries that are not part of the regional organisation (Haverland, 2006). Nevertheless, the comparison of trade administrations across these regions can be of interest to understand whether the adjustment processes are similar and, if not, what explains such differences.

  7. 7.

    The absence of LDCs in trade disputes should not be overstated, however. The possibility to free-ride in dispute settlement procedures as well as the “indirect use of the litigation system in the negotiations” mitigates the gravity of their absence in trade disputes (Elsig & Stucki, 2012).

  8. 8.

    Original in French: “Rien ne recule plus le progrès des connoissances, qu’un mauvais ouvrage d’un auteur célèbre: parce qu’avant d’instuire, il faut commencer par détromper.”

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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  1. Johan Adriaensen
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Adriaensen, J. (2016). Conclusion: A Matter of Principals. In: National Administrations in EU Trade Policy. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54767-5_8

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