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Notes
- 1.
See Henry E. Allison, Kant’s “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals”: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 53–69; and Eckhart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 41–56.
- 2.
See, most notably, Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 214–49; Karl Ameriks, “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19, no. 1 (Jan. 1981): 53–79; Dieter Henrich, “Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft,” in Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken: Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Dieter Henrich, Walter Schulz, and Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), 77–115; John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 235–72; and Jens Timmermann, “Reversal or Retreat? Kant’s Deductions of Freedom and Morality,” in Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason”: A Critical Guide, ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 73–89.
- 3.
Throughout this chapter, I will use “objective reality” and “objective legitimacy” (or “objective validity”) synonymously. In doing so, I take myself to be faithful to the way that Kant uses those terms in both the first and second Critiques. (Compare for instance his use of “objective validity [objektive Gültigkeit]” at CPrR 5:46 with his use of “objective reality [objective Realität]” at CPrR 5:47.) For a different view on this matter, see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 133–36.
- 4.
On this point, see Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27–68; and Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 75–85.
- 5.
For such a view, see Robert B. Pippin, “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 2 (1987): 449–75.
- 6.
See, for instance, Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 238–41.
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Zapero, D. (2017). Moral Skepticism and the Critique of Practical Reason. In: Altman, M. (eds) The Palgrave Kant Handbook. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54656-2_11
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