Abstract
The second qualitative empirical chapter contains a case study where the foci is directed toward the different narratives regarding the discussions on intervention/nonintervention in Libya. This case study focuses particularly on the narratives concerning UNSC resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) regarding Libya. Here the decision went in a more active direction compared to the decision on Côte d’Ivoire, including a large-scale military intervention.
The results regarding the Libyan case show how media, early in the process, built a narrative of “brave rebels” fighting the unjust regime of Muammar Gaddafi and crying out for help from the global community. Soon the political decision-makers followed along this polarized path. The findings show how the more active line of action was accompanied with a high degree of media attention and also a high degree of mediatization of both media reports and foreign policy roles.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Operation Odyssey Dawn was the name of the American mission in Libya. The British and the French had their own names of their contributions. When NATO took the lead in late March, the name for the joint mission became Operation Unified Protector.
- 2.
See Chap. 3 above.
- 3.
Another explanation is obviously the more limited number of pages in Hufvudstadsbladet compared to British newspapers. We argue, however, that the number of articles still reflect the degree of intensity in the newspapers’ coverage of the conflict.
- 4.
One high-ranking Finnish diplomat describes how the position of Halonen was discussed at a conference with Finnish ambassadors in 2011 and how this position was met with strong criticism. The critique included some of the most prominent Finnish diplomats that today hold very central positions in the Finnish foreign ministry (Interview #1, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs). However, another high-ranking diplomat balances this picture and thinks Halonen represented the right decision, especially seen in the aftermath with a chaotic situation in Libya following OUP (Interview #5, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
- 5.
Two other examples, at least in the initial phase of the conflict, of this traditional foreign policy with a focus on the Finnish interests were the unwillingness to recognize the Libyan opposition as the legitimate representative of Libya (Finnish MFA 03/11/11) and the decision not to make any statements on the role of Gaddafi or the need of a new Libyan leadership (Finnish MFA 02/21/11).
- 6.
Carl Bildt is likely to have been the Swedish foreign minister who travelled the most. To communicate with media and others with an interest in the Swedish foreign minister he was away from Stockholm, he often used (and still uses) his personal blog and his twitter account. Even if this lies outside the scope of this study, one can see Bildt’s way of communicating as a mediatized phenomenon of its own. His very active relation with online communication made it to the headlines as diplomats who worked on certain issues could read his fast statements on the Internet on the very same issues without prior consultation. All references to Bildt refer to his personal blog “Alla dessa dagar” [All these days].
- 7.
We also present the findings within the different categories in a different order compared to the Finnish and Swedish cases since the chronology of the British case was somewhat different.
References
Literature
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Vincent Pouliot. 2014. Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations 20(4): 889–911.
Anderson, Lisa. 1985. Assessing Libya’s Qaddafi. Current History 84(502): 197–200.
Brommesson, Douglas, and Ann-Marie Ekengren. 2017. Homogenisation or Fragmentation? Perceptions of Mediatisation among Finnish and Swedish Parliamentarians. In Cartelization, Convergence, or Increasing Similarities? Lessons from Parliamentary Parties, ed. Henrik Enroth and Magnus Hagevi. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Paoletti, Emanuela. 2011. Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict. Mediterranean Politics 16(2): 313–319.
Piiparinen, Touko. 2012. Sovereignty-building: Three Images of Positive Sovereignty Projected through Responsibility to Protect. Global Change, Peace & Security 24(3): 405–424.
Zoubir, Yahia H. 2002. Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow? Third World Quarterly 23(1): 31–53.
Written Empirical Sources
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2011. Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on March 17, 2011.
United Nations Security Council. 2011. Resolution 1975, S/RES/1975. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6508th meeting, on March 30, 2011.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brommesson, D., Ekengren, AM. (2017). Mixed Logics at Play in Libya. In: The Mediatization of Foreign Policy, Political Decision-Making, and Humanitarian Intervention. The Palgrave Macmillan Series in International Political Communication. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54461-2_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54461-2_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-54460-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-54461-2
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)