Abstract
It is a key assumption within mainstream patient safety literature that healthcare is dominated by a culture of blame. To test this claim, Pedersen presents empirical studies on medical training, internal error regulation and clinical safety culture by medical sociologists Rene Fox, Charles Bosk, Marianne Paget and Marilynn Rosenthal. Here, the image of a person-centred and blame-inducing clinical culture is fundamentally contested. Rather, the analysis reveals a delicate ecology of co-collegial observation, classification and management of different sorts of errors, mistakes and misconduct, where the uncertain, time-dependent and fallible character of medical knowledge has such an effect that incompetence and malpractice are sometimes hard to identify. By rearticulating these traditional modes of error management within the professional community, Pedersen challenges current blame-free strategies of safety management.
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Notes
- 1.
These earlier studies all investigate the medical communities from within. They do not deal with the public or political view of medical culture, which might at times well be dominated by an attitude of ‘naming, blaming and shaming’. Also, they do not deal with the problem of rising liability suits and malpractice claims.
- 2.
That medicine has a problematic relationship with probability per se can easily be contested. As Foucault argues in The Birth of the Clinic (1994/1963), the collection of sick into clinical hospitals in the late eighteenth century became the start of the development of medical statistics. Disease also came to be viewed epidemiologically—as the distribution of morbidity in a population, and in terms of the statistical likelihood of becoming ill, being cured, dying, and so on.
- 3.
While Rosenthal’s analyses are predominantly based on British material, she shortly refers to a Swedish case. In the Swedish case, she concludes that ‘there is even greater reluctance to criticize, not only because of cultural norms that discourage public criticism of anyone. Problem doctors are a “forbidden” subject, a subject of shame that one of their numbers should be causing problems or found to be incompetent’ (Rosenthal 1995: 106). She further suggests that the ‘export’ problem where a problem doctor is exported to somewhere else in the healthcare system is more evident in Sweden, where jobs are changed more frequently.
- 4.
Is not entirely clear what Rosenthal means when she speaks about formality and informality. Obviously, that something is internal, and behind closed doors, does not exempt it from being formalized. Most often, however, it seems that Rosenthal is not talking about the degree of formalization but rather the degree of ‘closedness’: When measures are taken by and of professionals only, she describes them as informal. When they include management, they are quasi-formal. And when they are public, they are formal.
- 5.
In the Danish legal system, questions of impairment and negligence are regulated in Law of Authorization (LBK no. 877), in which §6 establishes that Danish Health Authority can withdraw authorization because of physical or mental illness or drug/alcohol addiction while §7 on negligence concerns instances of serious or repeated ‘criticizable professional conduct’.
- 6.
Personal comment, September 18, 2012, internal seminar at Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School.
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Pedersen, K.Z. (2018). Blame and Responsibility in Patient Safety. In: Organizing Patient Safety. Health, Technology and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53786-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53786-7_4
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