Abstract
In this chapter, the focus is on what I term the ‘first wave’ of the debate on autonomous weapons. This wave has two components: (1) arguments in favour of autonomous weapons technology; and (2) criticisms that machine autonomy leads to responsibility gaps in the military. The chapter explores these components in great detail and argues that, ultimately, autonomous weapons do not lead to responsibility gaps. Moreover, my analysis indicates that risk, rather than responsibility, should be central to the debate on autonomous weapons.
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Notes
- 1.
This also seems to be increasingly recognised by the law. In the UK, for instance, there have been various legal cases invoking human rights legislation that challenged the Ministry of Defence’s decision, during operations in Afghanistan in particular, to equip soldiers with kit that—in the eyes of those who brought the charges—was inadequate.
- 2.
Robots are already widely deployed when it comes to the dismantling of bombs and other explosive devices. It is better for a robot to get blown up than a bomb disposal technician. With advances in machine autonomy, it might be possible to extend to increasingly use robots for combat functions.
- 3.
Michael Walzer (2006) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th edn, New York: Basic Books.
- 4.
BBC News, ‘Staff Sgt Robert Bales admits Afghan massacre’, 5 June 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22788987.
- 5.
The issue of the responsibility is prominently voiced by Andreas Mathias and Robert Sparrow. What follows below is a response to their work. See Andreas Matthias (2004) ‘The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata’, Ethics and Information Technology, 6: 175–183; and R. Sparrow (2007) ‘Killer Robots’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24(1): 62–77.
- 6.
Peter Strawson (1974) ‘Freedom and Resentment’ reprinted in P. Russell and O. Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 63–83.
- 7.
I thank Laurence Lustgarten for raising this objection. For an important treatment of responsibility in the collective context of armed conflict and counterterrorism, see Neta C. Crawford (2014) Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility in America’s Post-9/11 Wars, Oxford: Oxford University Press. For wider accounts of responsibility in the context of collectives, see Tracy Isaacs (2011) Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also, see Seumas Miller (2010) The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially chapter IV.
- 8.
Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’.
- 9.
I thank David Rodin for alerting me to the relevance of the debate on corporate responsibility in business ethics to the debate on autonomous weapons.
- 10.
Jeff McMahan (1994a) ‘Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 2(3): 193–221 and Jeff McMahan (1994b) ‘Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’, Ethics, 104(2): 252–290.
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Leveringhaus, A. (2016). From Warfare Without Humans to Warfare Without Responsibility?. In: Ethics and Autonomous Weapons. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52361-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52361-7_3
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