Abstract
The second chapter explores in detail two conceptual questions: What is a weapon? And what is an autonomous weapon? In answer to the first question, two core elements of what constitute a weapon are examined: notions of design and harm. To address the second question, a working definition of autonomous weapons is put forward. I argue that autonomous weapons are not unprecedented but can be put on continuum with other precision-guided weapons systems. Nevertheless, their capacities are likely to exceed what is currently possible weapons technology.
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Notes
- 1.
I do not want to question the Doctrine of Double Effect here. There is a wide-ranging critical literature in practical ethics that examines the soundness of the doctrine. In the context of this book, I merely want to show that the doctrine cannot be invoked by weapons designers in order to justify their activities. For an in-depth treatment of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and some of the critical debates surrounding it, see T.A. Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- 2.
Joel Feinberg (1987) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol 1: Harm to Others, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 3.
Now, one could argue that the infliction of lethal and related harm on the enemy is also just a side effect of the operation of a machine gun. Just as Green, in the above example, does not need to destroy Blue’s fighter jets in order to carry out its aggressive war against Blue, a soldier who shoots his enemy with a machine gun does not, strictly speaking, require that the enemy soldier dies as a result. The soldier only needs to disable his opponent in order to accomplish the mission—if, via a miracle, the opponent came back to life after the wars is over, this would not pose a problem. Should we say that the main function of a machine gun is to disable opponents and that any lethal harm is merely a side effect of its operation. I do not think we should for two reasons. Firstly, the infliction of lethal or related harm is, more often than not, the means to disable the opponent. Secondly, in the unlikely event that dead soldiers could be resurrected, one could argue that the use of a machine gun allows its users to benefit from the lethal and related harms they inflict on enemies, if only temporarily. It involves enemies in the plans of the users of machine guns. This is different from a purely contingent side effect, such as crashes of Blue’s fighter jets in the above examples. It is possible to maintain that in order to be able to speak of a truly contingent side effect, parties must not benefit from the lethal and related harm they inflict on others. They also must not involve others in their use of a weapon. On the point of benefiting from a side effect, see Warren Quinn (1989) ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18(4): 334–351.
- 4.
I like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point with regard to one of my other papers on weapons technology.
- 5.
For a deeper discussions of group interests and the nature of group rights, see P. Jones (1999) ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 7(4): 353–377.
- 6.
One should not forget that, in 1994, the start signal for the Rwandan genocide was the shooting down of the airliner carrying the Rwandan and Burundi presidents, both belonging to the Hutu ethnic group. On Rwanda, see L. Melvern (2006) Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, revised edition, London: Verso.
- 7.
Immanuel Kant, of course, is the classic exponent of this view. See Immanuel Kant (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 8.
Alan Winfield (2013) Robotics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 9.
On the complexity of proportionality judgements, see Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, 1 (2005): 34–66.
- 10.
For a longer version of this argument, see A. Leveringhaus and T. de Greef (2014) ‘Keeping the Operator in-the-loop, A qualified defence of autonomous weapons’ in M. Aaronson et al. (eds.), Precision-Strike Technology and Intervention, London: Routledge.
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Leveringhaus, A. (2016). Autonomous Weaponry: Conceptual Issues. In: Ethics and Autonomous Weapons. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52361-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52361-7_2
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