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Substantive and Objective Criteria in Preferential Public Procurement: The Case of the 2011 Regulations in South Africa

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Book cover Public Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa

Part of the book series: Contemporary African Political Economy ((CONTAPE))

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Abstract

The author subjects methods of calculating and attributing points for preferential purpose in government contracts to intense scrutiny and finds that substantive and objective criteria for the empowerment of preferred groups often clash. While Harpe (de La) takes a different view from the proponents of perfect freedom in public procurement schemes in the developing countries, he nevertheless finds “termites” that undermine the substantive goals of empowerment. These undermining factors are related to the absence of a time limit on the use of preferences to achieve noneconomic, targeted, or collateral objectives in public procurement.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Arrowsmith, Sue. The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Oxford: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, 1225–1226. Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 251–252; PPLR 36; Bolton 2006 JoPP 193; Bolton 2004 SALJ 619. McCrudden, Christopher. “Using Procurement to Achieve Social Outcomes.” Natural Resources Forum 28 (2004): 257–267. These objectives can also include social and national agendas by the government, see Watermeyer, Ron. “Unpacking Transparency in Government Procurement: Rethinking WTO Government Procurement Agreements.” Jaipur: Cuts International, 2004. Executive summary available http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/Executive%20Summary.pdf. Arrowsmith, Sue. “National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or Conflict?” In Public Procurement: Global Revolution, edited by Arrowsmith and Davies, 3. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998.

  2. 2.

    Green procurement refers to the idea that the damage to the environment should be limited as far as possible by using environmental friendly methods of production and environmentally friendly products. See De la Harpe, Stephen. “Green Public Procurement: An option for South Africa?” Speculum Juris 2 (2008): 53–74.

  3. 3.

    See Watermeyer, Ron. “The use of Targeted Procurement as an Instrument of Poverty Alleviation and Job Creation in InfrastructureProjects.” Public Procurement Law Review no. 5 (2000): 201–226.

  4. 4.

    Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 252–254.

  5. 5.

    http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html.

  6. 6.

    See in general on the origin, mandate, and composition of UNCITRAL 1994 Model Law www.uncitral.org/.

  7. 7.

    Art 8.1, 8.2 and 9.6.

  8. 8.

    Art 8.3.

  9. 9.

    Art 8.4.

  10. 10.

    Art 8.1 provides: Suppliers or contractors shall be permitted to participate in procurement proceedings without regard to nationality, except where the procuring entity decides to limit participation in procurement proceedings on the basis of nationality on grounds specified in the procurement regulations or other provisions of law of this State.

  11. 11.

    Art 11.3(b).

  12. 12.

    Arrowsmith, S. & Tillipman, J., eds. Reform of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement: Procurement Regulation for the 21st Century, (2010) see ch 1; Hunja, R. “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and its Impact on Procurement Reform,” in Arrowsmith, S. and Davies, A. eds. Public Procurement: Global Revolution. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998; Hunja, R. “Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing Countries,” in Arrowsmith, S. and Trybus, M., eds. Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003. See Basheka, B. “Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: A Tool for Effective Governance of the Public Sector and Poverty Reduction.” In Thai, K.V., ed. International Handbook of Public Procurement. Florida: Auerbach Publications, 2009, 131.

  13. 13.

    Uncitral Secretariat www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html 16th May, 2014.

  14. 14.

    COMESA Legal Notice No. 3 of 2009, COMESA Official Gazette vol 15, No. 3, 9 June 2009.

  15. 15.

    Quinot, G. and Arrowsmith, S. eds. Public Procurement Regulation in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 4 who refers to the African Development Bank Group COMESA Public Procurement Reform and Capacity Building Projects Project Performance Evaluation Report.

  16. 16.

    Act 16 of 1996.

  17. 17.

    Namely a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-efficient.

  18. 18.

    Act 5 of 2000.

  19. 19.

    This entails that not all WTO members are bound thereby but only those that choose to adopt the agreement.

  20. 20.

    “Recognizing that measures regarding government procurement should not be prepared, adopted or applied so as to afford protection to domestic suppliers, goods or services, or to discriminate among foreign suppliers, goods or services.”

  21. 21.

    Art IV.1(a).

  22. 22.

    Art IV.1.1(b).

  23. 23.

    Art IV.2.

  24. 24.

    Offsets is defined in art 1.l to mean “any condition or undertaking that encourages local development or improves a Party’s balance-of-payments accounts, such as the use of domestic content, the licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade and similar action or requirement.”

  25. 25.

    Art IV.6.

  26. 26.

    Art VIII.1.

  27. 27.

    See the preamble of the GPA where it is stated: “Recognizing the need to take into account the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular the least developed countries.”

  28. 28.

    Art V.3(a).

  29. 29.

    Art V.3(b).

  30. 30.

    Art V.3(c).

  31. 31.

    Art V.3(d).

  32. 32.

    Art V.3.

  33. 33.

    GPA art IV:4. The obligation provided for in art V:1(b)—that each party should accord immediately and unconditionally to the goods and services of any other Party and to the suppliers of any other Party offering the goods or services of any Party, treatment no less favorable than the treatment the Party, including its procuring entities, accords to goods, services, and suppliers of any other Party—are excluded.

  34. 34.

    GPA art IV:4(a) and (b).

  35. 35.

    GPA art IV:6.

  36. 36.

    GPA art IV:7.

  37. 37.

    GPA art IV:2.

  38. 38.

    Most favored nation treatment.

  39. 39.

    De Lima e Silva 2008 PPLR 79.

  40. 40.

    GPA art IV:3.

  41. 41.

    De Lima e Silva 2008 PPLR 79.

  42. 42.

    Dugard, John and Nicholas Haysom and Gilbert Marcus. The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in South Africa. New York: Ford Foundation, 1992. For a short summary and interesting statistics, see Chokshi M a.o. The History of Apartheid, http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html where a table can be found which provides an overview of the disproportionate treatment between blacks and whites in 1978. Despite the fact that the black population was 19 million and the white population only 4.5 million, 87 % of land was allocated to whites. The whites had 75 % of the national income as opposed to the 20 % of the black citizens. The annual cost that a black person was able to spend on his/her child’s education was R45 whereas the whites were able to spend an average of R696.

  43. 43.

    The term “black,” depending on the context, can refer to people of color, including Coloreds (mixed race) and Indians. It is often used to refer to all people that are not white. In the B-BBEE Act 53 of 2003, the term “black” is defined to refer to blacks, coloreds, and Indians.

  44. 44.

    No White Paper was issued. The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement can be accessed at Polity 2009 Green Papers www.polity.org.za/. The Government’s aim is to transform the public procurement process in order to achieve its socioeconomic objectives within the ambit of good governance. In the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement it was set out as follows:

    1.4.1. Socioeconomic objectives:

    • • To seek value for money on behalf of all tax payers.

    • • To eliminate corruption in the procurement process.

    • • To make the public procurement process accessible to all by simplifying the process, and by encouraging fairness and transparency.

    • • To encourage greater competition in the public procurement process through the creation of an enabling environment for small, medium, and micro enterprises while retaining quality and standards.

    • • To support participation of a broadened range of enterprises with appropriate inland revenue registration and acceptable labor practices in order to ensure sustainability.

    • • To revise the concept of value-for-money in the procurement process in terms of the new objectives which are to be applied.

    • • To set out targeting policies in order to create opportunities for the broadest possible participation in the public procurement process.

    • • To increase the volume of work available to the poor and enhance the income generation of marginalised sectors of society.”

  45. 45.

    Green Paper part 3.

  46. 46.

    Constitution Act 1996.

  47. 47.

    5 of 2000.

  48. 48.

    53 of 2003.

  49. 49.

    The achieving of secondary goals through, for instance, affirmative action may be perceived as reverse discrimination, especially if it is utilized over a long period of time.

  50. 50.

    Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 257–259.

  51. 51.

    S 217.

  52. 52.

    For a general discussion of the use of procurement as a policy tool in South Africa, see Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 251–307.

  53. 53.

    In many instances, the allowing of a preference will have a negative cost implication and will be less competitive in that tenderers do not compete on the same footing.

  54. 54.

    This is in accordance with S 9(2) of the Constitution: “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”

  55. 55.

    The definition of “organ of state” in the PPPFA is more restrictive than the one in the Constitution. The PPPFA does, however, provide that the relevant minister may make the provisions of the Act applicable to any of the organs of state included in section 239 of the Constitution.

  56. 56.

    The subsection states that organs of state are not prevented from implementing such policies, implying that they do have a discretion. The legislation referred to in subsection (3) provides for a framework in terms of which organs of state may implement such policies, also implying the existence of a discretion to implement such policies. To allow such a discretion seems logical in that in certain instances such a policy need not be applied under the particular circumstances, and secondly at some stage, the policy may have served its purpose and need not be applied any more.

  57. 57.

    S 217(3).

  58. 58.

    Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 263.

  59. 59.

    S 217(1) of the Constitution refers to fairness, equitability, transparency, competitiveness, and cost effectiveness.

  60. 60.

    See Du Preez v TRC 1997 3 SA 204 (SCA) 234H-I; Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 SA 91 (CC) par 41; President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) par 214; Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC).

  61. 61.

    In practice, no party should be given preference. All parties should be given the same information and awarded the same time to partake in the procurement opportunities.

  62. 62.

    See Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC).

  63. 63.

    See Concise Oxford English Dictionary 2001, which refers to “treating people equally—just or appropriate in the circumstances.” See also Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 45–49. At 47 she states that as public procurement is of an administrative nature, the word “fair” in s 217 can be said to refer to procedural fairness as opposed to substantive fairness. For a different view, see Quinot, Geo. “The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa, Phoebe Bolton.” Public Procurement Law Review no. 16 (2007): 464–467 where he states that the interpretation of the word “fair” should include substantive fairness.

  64. 64.

    Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) par 30. One aspect would, for instance, be that parastatals are often perceived to have an unfair advantage in competing for contracts with the private sector. They can base their price on operating costs alone, might have tax concessions, are not always obliged to earn a return on their investment, and they might even undercut the prices of competitors despite making losses. Where parastatals are permitted to compete with the private sector, it is necessary to develop criteria that allow the private sector to compete with parastatals in an equitable manner.

  65. 65.

    Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) par 33, the court had to decide what is equitable in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. In this regard, the court held that in that instance the court had to break away from a purely legalistic approach and have regard to extraneous factors such as morality, fairness, social values, and implications and circumstances, which would necessitate bringing out an equitably principled judgment.

  66. 66.

    See Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC).

  67. 67.

    Du Plessis, LM. “Just Legal Institutions in an Optimally Just South Africa under 1996 Constitution.” The Stellenbosh Law Review 9 no. 3 (1998): 239–255.

  68. 68.

    Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 49–53.

  69. 69.

    2007 JOL 20670 (C) and [2009] JOL 22914 (C).

  70. 70.

    Act 3 of 2000.

  71. 71.

    Act 4 of 2000.

  72. 72.

    2009 JOL 22914 (C).

  73. 73.

    Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape (no 2) 2008 6 SA 434 (Eqc) also reported at [2009] JOL 22914 (C).

  74. 74.

    Par 25 of the judgment.

  75. 75.

    City of Cape Town.

  76. 76.

    Par 25 of the judgment.

  77. 77.

    Par 26 of the judgment.

  78. 78.

    Id par 25 and 26.

  79. 79.

    Id par 30.

  80. 80.

    Act 5 of 2000, hereafter the PPPFA.

  81. 81.

    S 2(1).

  82. 82.

    “Organ of state” is defined in s 1(iii) of the Act. The definition in the Act is more restricted than the definition in the Constitution.

  83. 83.

    Bolton is of the opinion that this implies that organs of state are obliged to implement a preferential procurement policy, as opposed to only a procurement policy which does not include the collateral goals provided for in section 217(2). Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 269. With regard to the definition of “preferential procurement policy” in the Act, namely a procurement policy contemplated in section 217(2) of the Constitution (which is not compulsory) and the wording of the section, this provision is open to a different interpretation. It could be interpreted to mean that only in the event of an organ of state’s wishing to determine and implement such a policy must it be done within the framework of the Act. The word “must” does not necessarily imply that organs of state are obliged to implement such policies, but only that if they wish to do so they must do so in terms of the Act.

  84. 84.

    S2(1)(a).

  85. 85.

    This is provided for in the Preferential Procurement Regulations GN R501 in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011 issued in terms of s 5 of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000. In Barry Kotze Inspections CC t/a Bis in Joint Venture with Pugubye Investments (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg 2004 3 BCLR 274 (T) it was decided that the amount must be an estimate.

  86. 86.

    S 2(1)(b)(i).

  87. 87.

    S 2(1)(b)(ii).

  88. 88.

    The formula in terms of which this must be done is prescribed in the Preferential Procurement Regulations GN R501 published in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011.

  89. 89.

    S 2(1)(d).

  90. 90.

    A historically disadvantaged person was defined in the now repealed regulation 1(h) GN R725 published in GG 22549 of 10 August 2001 but not in the Act itself. Reg 5(2) of the new regulations provides for points to be awarded for B-BBEE status level to tenderers and contains no definition of historically disadvantaged persons.

  91. 91.

    As published in Government Gazette No. 16085 dated 23 November 1994.

  92. 92.

    S 2(2).

  93. 93.

    See the decision of de Villiers J in Grinaker LTA Ltd, Ulusha Projects (Pty) Ltd v The Tender Board (Mpumalanga) [2002] 3 All SA 336 (T).

  94. 94.

    The PPFA thus ensures that all preferencing in public procurement is done on the same basis by all organs of the state and at all levels of government.

  95. 95.

    Objective criteria are not defined in the Act.

  96. 96.

    S 2(1)(f). See also Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 4 SA 346 (T).

  97. 97.

    S 1(i). See also JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee [2004] 3 All SA 715 (C) and Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd [2005] JOL 15567 (SCA).

  98. 98.

    See Grinaker LTA Ltd, Ulusha Projects (Pty) Ltd v The Tender Board (Mpumalanga) [2002] 3 All SA 336 (T); RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works 2003 5 BCLR 544 (Ck); and Sebenza Kahle Trade CC v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 All SA 340 (T).

  99. 99.

    [2002] 3 All SA 336 (T). This decision was concurred with in RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads & Public Works, Eastern Cape [2003] JOL 10790 (Ck) par 32.

  100. 100.

    The Second, Third, and Fourth Respondents formed a joint venture which included historically disadvantaged individuals.

  101. 101.

    The First and Second Applicants likewise formed a joint venture which included historically disadvantaged individuals.

  102. 102.

    These facts formed part of the goals for which points were specifically awarded in the evaluation of the tender.

  103. 103.

    Ibid par 52.

  104. 104.

    [2006] JOL 16724 (E) par 29 and 30.

  105. 105.

    [2005] JDR 1033 (HC).

  106. 106.

    National and public interest is not defined in the Act. It will depend on the particular circumstances whether the Minister may utilize this section.

  107. 107.

    S 3 of Act 5 of 2000.

  108. 108.

    See Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 1999 1 SA 324 (Ck); SAPO Ltd v Chairperson Western Cape Provincial Tender Board 2001 2 SA 675 (C); and JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee [2004] 3 All SA 715 (C).

  109. 109.

    See Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province and others 1999 (1) SA 324 (Ck).

  110. 110.

    GN R502 in Regulation Gazette 9544 published in the Government Gazette 34350 of 8 June 2011.

  111. 111.

    It provides: “The Minister may make regulations regarding any matter that may be necessary or expedient to prescribe in order to achieve the objects of this Act.” An argument can be made out that some of the regulations do not relate to the objectives of the PPPFA.

  112. 112.

    GN R725 dated 10 August 2001.

  113. 113.

    These criteria have no direct bearing on preferential procurement. It is, however, prudent to have the criteria of functionality as a prerequisite to qualify as it ensures that tenderers that cannot do the work are not appointed.

  114. 114.

    These are aspects such as planning, award of contracts to tenderers not scoring the highest points, cancellation and re-invitation of tenders, B-BBEE status level certificates, general conditions, declarations, remedies, and tax clearance.

  115. 115.

    Reg 4(1).

  116. 116.

    Reg 1(k).

  117. 117.

    The evaluation criteria may include criteria such as the consultant’s relevant experience for the assignment, the quality of the methodology, the qualifications of key personnel, and the transfer of knowledge, etc.

  118. 118.

    Reg 4(2). The applicable values that will be utilized when scoring each criterion should be objective. As a guide, values ranging from 1 being poor, 2 being average, 3 being good, 4 being very good, and 5 being excellent, may be utilized.

  119. 119.

    The National Treasury Instruction Note on the Amended Guidelines in respect of Bids that include Functionality as a Criterion for Evaluation (Issued 15 September 2010) refers to the consultant’s relevant experience for the assignment, the quality of the methodology, the qualifications of key personnel, and the transfer of knowledge as such criteria.

  120. 120.

    The weight should be determined separately for each procurement. The weight that is allocated to each criterion should not be generic, but should be determined separately for each bid on a case-by-case basis.

  121. 121.

    The National Treasury Instruction Note on the Amended Guidelines in respect of Bids that Include Functionality as a Criterion for Evaluation par 6 states that as a guide, values ranging from 1 being poor, 2 being average, 3 being good, 4 being very good, and 5 being excellent should be used.

  122. 122.

    Reg 4(3). According to the National Treasury Instruction Note on the Amended Guidelines In Respect of Bids that Include Functionality as a Criterion for Evaluation, par 6, the minimum qualifying score should not be generic and be determined separately for each bid on a case-by-case basis. The minimum prescribed score must not be so low that it may jeopardize the quality and not so high that it may be unfairly restrictive.

  123. 123.

    Reg 4(4).

  124. 124.

    Implementation Guide: Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 Pertaining to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, Act No 5 of 2000 of 1 December 2011 par 11.

  125. 125.

    Gn R502 Reg 4(5). See also National Treasury Instruction Note on the Amended Guidelines in respect of Bids that include Functionality as a Criterion for Evaluation par 3.

  126. 126.

    Sizabonke Civils CC T/A Pilcon Projects v Zululand District Municipality and others 2011 (4) SA 406 (KZP).

  127. 127.

    National Treasury’s Implementation Guide: Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 Pertaining to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, Act No 5 of 2000 of 1 December 2011 at 10–11.

  128. 128.

    1 of 1999.

  129. 129.

    56 of 2003.

  130. 130.

    There is no necessary link between allowing a preference and functionality while there could be a necessary link between functionality and procurement where no preference is provided.

  131. 131.

    Reg 9.

  132. 132.

    The Minister of Trade and Industry designates these sectors are. Such designation will then be applicable to procurement by organs of state at all levels of government.

  133. 133.

    Reg 9(1).

  134. 134.

    Reg 9(3).

  135. 135.

    Reg 9(5).

  136. 136.

    Put differently, functionality and local content and production are prerequisites to qualify but do not play any role in the evaluation to award the tender. This evaluation is limited to the criteria of price and B-BBEE.

  137. 137.

    S 2 of the PPPFA.

  138. 138.

    As published in Government Gazette No. 16085 dated 23 November 1994.

  139. 139.

    Reg 5, 6 and 7.

  140. 140.

    Bolton, Phoebe. The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa. Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007, 286.

  141. 141.

    53 of 2003.

  142. 142.

    S 1.

  143. 143.

    This includes blacks, coloreds, and Indians.

  144. 144.

    S 2 Act 53 of 2003.

  145. 145.

    S 9(1)(c) and (d).

  146. 146.

    At the writing hereof the exchange rate was R9 to the US$.

  147. 147.

    Reg 5.

  148. 148.

    Reg 6.

  149. 149.

    Reg 5(1)(b).

  150. 150.

    Reg 10.

  151. 151.

    Reg 10. Tenderers with a turnover of less than R5 million qualify as an Exempted Micro Enterprise (EME).

  152. 152.

    Reg 11(4).

  153. 153.

    Reg 11(5).

  154. 154.

    S 2(f) and reg 5(5) and 6(5).

  155. 155.

    Reg 11(6) and (7).

  156. 156.

    Reg 11 (8) and (9).

  157. 157.

    Reg 11(10).

  158. 158.

    Reg 11(11) and (12). The National Treasury Instruction Note on the Amended Guidelines in respect of Bids that include Functionality as a Criterion for Evaluation par 8 states that if it appears on a thorough analysis of the market that specific services can only be provided by tertiary institutions, written price quotations for such services may be invited.

  159. 159.

    Reg 11(13).

  160. 160.

    Baloyi, M. An investigation into the Preferential Procurement practices in South Africa: Impacts on the South African Construction Industry. Dissertation Thesis. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 2012. A research report submitted to the faculty of Engineering and Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Building: Property studies.

  161. 161.

    Baloyi, M. Op. Cit.

  162. 162.

    Watermeyer, Ron. “Facilitating Sustainable Development Through Public and Donor Procurement Regimes: Tools and Techniques.” Public Procurement Law Review no. 1 (2004): 30–55.

  163. 163.

    Watermeyer, Ron. “The use of Targeted Procurement as an Instrument of Poverty Alleviation and Job Creation in InfrastructureProjects.” Public Procurement Law Review no. 5 (2000): 201–226.

  164. 164.

    There could of course be negative outcomes of preferential procurement as it may dissuade foreign investors and companies from tendering.

  165. 165.

    For contracts over R1,000,000.

  166. 166.

    For contracts under R1,000,000.

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  1. North West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa

    Stephen de La Harpe

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Clarkson University, USA, Bangor, United Kingdom

    S.N. Nyeck

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de La Harpe, S. (2016). Substantive and Objective Criteria in Preferential Public Procurement: The Case of the 2011 Regulations in South Africa. In: Nyeck, S. (eds) Public Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa. Contemporary African Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52137-8_5

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