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Why Do Some African Countries Negotiate Unfair Natural Resource Contracts?

  • Chrysantus Ayangafac
  • Dassa Bulcha
  • Sehen Bekele
Chapter
Part of the Contemporary African Political Economy book series (CONTAPE)

Abstract

This chapter revisits the literature on resource curse, or the phenomenon whereby natural resource abundance yields poor development outcomes, and the role of unfair government contracts in underwriting poverty in Africa. The chapter takes issues with governance approaches and interventions biased toward transparency on rent appropriation and argues that attention be paid to the bargaining process, the negotiation stage where abuse of authority and corruption often occur. Thus, within the “law-politics-business” matrix it is not the legality of contractual agreements that is put into question, but their substantial value for sustainable development.

Keywords

Foreign Direct Investment Gross Domestic Product Government Revenue Resource Rent Resource Curse 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chrysantus Ayangafac
    • 1
  • Dassa Bulcha
    • 1
  • Sehen Bekele
    • 1
  1. 1.UNDPAddis AbabaEthiopia

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