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Social Accountability Mechanisms and Public Procurement Reform in Nigeria

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Public Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa

Part of the book series: Contemporary African Political Economy ((CONTAPE))

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Abstract

This chapter presents the regulatory framework that empowers civil society and professional organizations as regulators in Nigeria. He then juxtaposes both the opportunities that the law offers to administrative practices that potentially hamper full participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in procurement regulation. For instance, Udeh notes that by law all federal agencies must invite at least one representative of a CSO to observe the procurement process. Considering the interplay of law, politics, and business, the chapter identifies substantive issues such as mistrust between government and business communities in Nigeria as corrosive.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html (Last accessed on March 31, 2013). The 2011 update of UNCITRAL Model Law modified the 1994 version.

  2. 2.

    States that have adapted the PPA as their public procurement regulatory framework include Anambra, Bauchi, Cross River, Enugu, Jigawa, Lagos, and Osun. Other states, such as Taraba and Zamfara, have begun legislative process to adapt the PPA for the regulation of their public procurement.

  3. 3.

    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended S.162). The Federation Account is a special account into which all revenues the Federal Republic of Nigeria collects are paid, except the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of the armed forces, the police force, the Ministry or department of government charged with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents of the federal capital territory, Abuja.

  4. 4.

    For an overview of Nigeria’s public procurement system, see Udeh, K.T. and M.L. Ahmadu. “The Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement in Nigeria.” In Public Procurement Regulation in Africa. Edited by G. Quinot and Sue Arrowsmith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

  5. 5.

    The limitation of public access to government circulars and documents was largely due to the Official Secrets Act 1962, O3 L.F.N. 2004, which prohibited public disclosure or obtention of classified government information and documents without authorization. Note, however, that the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act of 2011 has modified the operation of the Official Secrets Act by vesting the public with the right to access public information and documents, notwithstanding whether they are classified or not.

  6. 6.

    The concept of social accountability is explained in the second subtopic below.

  7. 7.

    Williams-Elegbe, S. “The Reform and Regulation of Public Procurement in Nigeria.” PCLJ 41(2) (2012): 343.

  8. 8.

    World Bank. Nigeria—Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR). Vol. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000: 8.

  9. 9.

    Williams-Elegbe, S. 2012: 343.

  10. 10.

    The concept and constituent of CSO, as obtained in Nigeria, are discussed under the subtopic below.

  11. 11.

    See Igwenyi, B.O. Modern Constitutional Law in Nigeria. Abakaliki: Nwamazi Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd, 2006: 167–169; also, Nwabueze, B.O. A Constitutional History of Nigeria. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1982: 161–175.

  12. 12.

    CFRN sections 80–83 and 120–123. See Udeh and Ahmadu 2013: 143.

  13. 13.

    The most far reaching of those was to base the budget on a conservative reference price for oil (Nigerian main economic resource), with the excess saved in a special Excess Crude Account (ECA). The economy responded with strong growth between 2003 and 2010, averaging 7.6 % (World Bank, “Nigeria Overview”). http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview: (December 13, 2014). See Edo, S. and A. Ikelegbe. “The Nigerian Economy: Reforms, Emerging Trends and Prospects.” CPED Monograph Series 8 (2014).

  14. 14.

    Luqman, S. and F.M. Lawal. “The Political Economy of Oil and the Reform Process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Successes and Continued Challenges.” Journal of Arts, Science & Commerce II (2) (2011): 61; Jega, A. “The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria.” In Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. Edited by A. Jega. Uppsala and Kano: Nordic Africa Institute and Centre for Research and Documentation, 2000: 24–40. See also Mkandawire, T. and A. Olukoshi (Editors). Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995: 2.

  15. 15.

    Luqman and Lawal. 2011: 69.

  16. 16.

    Luqman and Lawal. 2011: 70.

  17. 17.

    Williams-Elegbe. 2012: 339–340.

  18. 18.

    Page 29.

  19. 19.

    Luqman and Lawal 2011: 70.

    Williams-Elegbe, S. 2012: 345.

    Utomi, P, Duncan, A and G. Williams. Nigeria the Political Economy of Reform: Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth. Brighton: the Policy Practice, 2007: 4 and 20.

  20. 20.

    See PPA, sections 4 (c); 16(1)(e); 53; see also preamble of the UNCITRAL Model Law 1994, paragraph (e).

  21. 21.

    Nigeria CPAR (Vol. 1) 2000: 3–4.

  22. 22.

    PPA, section 16 (1)(d).

  23. 23.

    Hardcopies are published as official gazettes by the Federal Government Printer, available for purchase, but distributed for free by Nigeria’s BPP. Electronic copies are published on the website of BPP: http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&view=documents&path=Public_Procurement_Act_2007.pdf&Itemid=614 (July 3, 2015); and of the Nigeria’s federal legislature, the National Assembly: http://www.nassnig.org/document/download/5815 (July 3, 2015).

  24. 24.

    PPA, sections 38(2)(a) and 54.

  25. 25.

    PPA, section 38(2)(a).

  26. 26.

    PPA, section 54.

  27. 27.

    PPA, section 19(b). Discussed in detail below.

  28. 28.

    PPA, section 1(2). Discussed further below.

  29. 29.

    World Bank. “Social Accountability: What Does It Mean for the World Bank?” in Social Accountability Sourcebook. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005: 5. Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP). The Evolving Meaning of Social Accountability in Cambodia. Quezon City, Philippines: ANSA-EAP, 2010: 11. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Reflections on Social Accountability. New York City: UNDP, 2013: 3.

  30. 30.

    ANSA-EAP, 2010: 11.

  31. 31.

    Essia, U. and A. Yearoo. “Strengthening Civil Society Organizations/Government Partnership in Nigeria” International NGO Journal 4 (9) (2009): 368. See also Ikelegbe, A.O. “State, Civil Society and Sustainable Development in Nigeria.” CPED Monograph Series 7 (2013): 5–6.

  32. 32.

    Essien, E.D. “Civil society in Nigeria: A Force for Social Inclusion and Sustainable Development?” In Davies papers Africa Series 1 (2014): 4. Karp, D.R. and Sullivan, W.M. The Idea of Civil Society: Scholarship and Debate. West Port: Smith Richardson Foundation, 1997: 2.

  33. 33.

    Essien 2014: 4.

  34. 34.

    Essia and Yearoo 2009:368. Ikelegbe 2013:8–9.

  35. 35.

    See Diamond, L. Developing Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999: 218–260. Omede, A.J. and A.R. Bakare “The Impact of Civil Society Organizations on Sustainable Development in Developing Countries: The Nigerian Experience” African Research Review 8, no. 1 (2014): 206. See also Gyimah-Boadi, E. Democratic Reform in Africa: the Quality of Progress. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

  36. 36.

    Essien 2014: 8.

  37. 37.

    As seen in the previous subtopic.

  38. 38.

    Igbokwe-Ibeto, C.J., Ewuim, N., Anazodo R.O. and C.O. Osawe. “Civil Society Organizations and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and the Way Forward” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 16, no. 5 (2014): 1. See also Ikubaje J. “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Regimes: The Changing Roles and Contributions of Civil Society to Democratisation process in Nigeria (1985–2005)” African Community of Practice, 2011 http://afrik4r.org/profiles/blogs/the-changing-roles-and (July 4, 2015). Also, Omede and Bakare (2014): 206.

  39. 39.

    Igbokwe-Ibeto et al (2014): 1.

  40. 40.

    Companies and Allied Matters Act, section 7.

  41. 41.

    Companies and Allied Matters Act, sections 37 and 596.

  42. 42.

    http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&view=documents&path=CSO_LIST.pdf&Itemid=569. August 14, 2013.

  43. 43.

    Since the duty is mandatory, the court can issue a mandamus or a mandatory injunction to that effect. Okonjo v Council of Legal Education 1979 1 FNLR 70; Cohen v. Ford 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 417, 339 A.2d 175, 177.

  44. 44.

    PPA, section 32(8).

  45. 45.

    PPA, section 38(2)(a).

  46. 46.

    PPA, section 19(b)(ii).

  47. 47.

    PPA, section 54(1).

  48. 48.

    See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2011 (2012), commentary 2 on art 64. The basis of the restriction is that there must, in the public interest, be an end to litigation. It is expressed in the Latin maxim: “Interest Rei publicae ut sit finis litium.” See Akanbi v Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 108) 118 140; Tsiu v Lesotho National General Insurance Company Limited [2004] LSHC 132; and PGP Body Corp Administration CC v The Trustees of the body Corporate Club Kerkira (AR 403/11) [2012] ZAKZPHC 81.

  49. 49.

    PPA, sections 30(b), 16(14), and 38(2)(a); and FOI Act, sections 1 and 3.

  50. 50.

    In most jurisdictions, it is regarded that every citizen has a duty to report a suspected offense to law enforcement agencies; see Bank of West Africa, Ltd. v. Odiatu (1956) L.L.R. 48; Afribank Nig. PLC. v. Sylvester Onyima [2004] 2 NWLR (PT. 858) 654.

  51. 51.

    PPA, section 58.

  52. 52.

    The National Assembly and Implementation of the Public procurement Act 2007: an Assessment of the Level of National Assembly’s Compliance with the Provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007, PPDC/UNDEF, 2012: 31–32. Implementing the Nigerian Procurement Law—Compliance with the Public Procurement Act 2007: A Survey of Procuring Entities, Civil Society Observers, Bidders and Contractors, Legislators, and the Bureau of Public Procurement (PPDC/UNDEF/USAID/Pact Nigeria, 2011): 84.

  53. 53.

    Section 54.

  54. 54.

    Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2011, commentary on Chapter VIII, A 1.2.

  55. 55.

    Gordon, D.I. “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices That Every Procurement Challenge System Must Make.” Pub. Cont L J 35 (2006): 430. Marshall, R.C. Muerer, M.J. and J-F Richard. “The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest.” Hofstra L. Rev 20 (1991): 6. See also Arrowsmith S. “Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: the Remedies System in England and Wales.” PPLR 2 (1992): 92.

  56. 56.

    In 2011 the bidders filed a total of 158 suppliers review cases with the BPP to challenge perceived government procurement breaches. In 2012, 165 of such cases were filed.

  57. 57.

    See Quinot, G. “A Comparative Perspective on Supplier Remedies in African Public Procurement systems.” In Public Procurement Regulation in Africa. Edited by G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013: 313. See also Pachnou, D. The Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies for Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: A case Study of the Public Works Sector in the United Kingdom and Greece (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2003).

  58. 58.

    In Nigeria, there have been several instances where the observers reported breaches that the suppliers did not petition.

  59. 59.

    See the effort of the Niger Delta Monitoring Group in this regard under subheading. The facts of the relevant cases are also available at: http://www.nigerdeltabudget.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84:fmoe&catid=40:public-petitions&Itemid=2. August 14, 2012. For a detailed examination of the impact and significance of CSOs’ independent budget analysis and advocacy initiatives that are designed to improve budget transparency, see M. Robinson, “Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Nongovernmental Public Action,” IDS working paper 279, 2006; Rajkumar, A.S. and V. Swaroop. “Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?” Journal of Development Economics 86 (2008): 96–111.

  60. 60.

    The Public and Private Development Centre with the support of the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) created one of the checklists widely in use. See Ekwekwuo and Nyeck Chap. 11.

  61. 61.

    Quinot 2013: 318.

    Preiss, H.J. and P. Friton. “Designing Effective Challenge Procedures: The EU’s Experience with Remedies.” In The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform. Edited by S. Arrowsmith and R.D. Anderson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011: 526–528.

  62. 62.

    PPA, section 53(4)(b).

  63. 63.

    PPA, section 53(4) as held in R v Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Commissioners [1920] 1 K.B. 155 at p. 165, a mandamus cannot be issued where the duty is a purely discretionary or where it is not a duty but a power.

  64. 64.

    http://www.nigerdeltabudget.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84:fmoe&catid=40:public-petitions&Itemid=2. April 18, 2013.

  65. 65.

    This author witnessed the event.

  66. 66.

    PPA, sections 18 and 38 (2)(a).

  67. 67.

    IREX. “Nigeria.” In Media Sustainability Index 2012. Washington, DC: IREX, 2012: 312–321.

  68. 68.

    Apart from the Federal Tenders Journal (official listing of scheduled Nigeria Federal Government procurement notices), published by the Federal Ministry of Information, private national dailies serve as the primary channel for advertising procurement notices and awards, etc.

  69. 69.

    PPA, sections 25(2), 44(a), and 45(2); FOI Act, sections 2(3), (4), and (5). Jeppesen, R. Accountability in Public Procurement—transparency and the role of civil society. New York: United Nations Procurement Capacity Development Centre (UNPCDC), 2010.

  70. 70.

    Jeppesen 2010: 4.

  71. 71.

    For example, the BPP publishes relevant procurement information resources, such as regulations, manuals, SBDs, and tender notices, on its publicly accessible website: www.bpp.gov.ng.

  72. 72.

    It is noteworthy that there is currently an aggressive power (electricity) improvement effort by the Nigerian Federal Government, which includes the recent liberalization of the power sector, which has enabled private sector investment in the sector.

  73. 73.

    http://www.procurementmonitor.org/index.php?page=News&id=73. April 19, 2013.

  74. 74.

    However, it is acknowledged that the FOI Act, section 21, has prescribed for summary hearing in suits to enforce the right of access to public information and records; this could substantially reduce litigation time.

  75. 75.

    Section 1(2).

  76. 76.

    Others include the Attorney General of the federation, the Secretary to the government of the federation, the head of service of the federation, and the economic adviser to the President.

  77. 77.

    These include the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Institute of Purchasing and Supply Management, Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, Nigerian Society of Engineers, and Civil Society (to refer to NGOs in the narrow sense) and the media.

  78. 78.

    PPA, section 1(4).

  79. 79.

    Section 2. These are the core functions of the NCPP; its other functions are found in various sections of the PPA other than section 2.

  80. 80.

    PPA, section 7(1).

  81. 81.

    PPA, section 1(3).

  82. 82.

    Attah, M.B. “Abati’s Blunder: FEC, Procurement Council and Contract Approval” (February 27, 2012). Newsdiaryonline http://newsdiaryonline.com/abatis-blunderfec-procurement-council-and-contract-approval-by-mohammed-bougei-attah/. May 28, 2015.

    Citizen Confidential “Deepening Violations of the Public Procurement Act” (Media Statement by the National Procurement Watch Platform) (February 27, 2012).

  83. 83.

    Nigerian parliamentary practice restrains a presiding officer from voting, except for casting votes in event of a tie: CFRN sections 56(1) and 98(1). Conversely, the Interpretation Act, section 27(1) (b) provides that in any vote taken at a meeting of a body, the person presiding when the vote is ordered shall have a casting vote, whether or not s/he also has a deliberative vote, which means that the chairman can vote during a deliberation and when there is a tie. This may be the procedure that would be adopted by the NCPP when inaugurated, considering that the government would want the government-official members to have more voting power than the CSO members in the NCPP.

  84. 84.

    Abuja division, June 12, 2012, suit no. FHC/Abj/CS/867/11.

  85. 85.

    As observed by the author in the course of observing procurement exercises, and interacting with stakeholders in the Nigeria’s public procurement market.

  86. 86.

    However, a CSO, Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), had recently sued the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the Federation at the Federal High Court on the need to constitute the National Council on Public Procurement. The High Court ruled against CSJ, and it has however proceeded on appeal. http://csj-ng.org/programmes/public-finance/public-procurement/. December 16, 2014.

  87. 87.

    They are aided by the provisions of the FOI Act which grant public access to public information and records, upon request. For information on a similar open budget survey in Ghana, see Nchor, D. Improving Transparency, Accountability and Participation in Ghana’s Budgetary Process: the National Launch of the 2012 Open Budget Survey. Accra: Integrated Social Development Centre, 2013.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. T.K. Udeh & Associates, Abuja, Nigeria

    Kingsley Tochi Udeh

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  1. Clarkson University, USA, Bangor, United Kingdom

    S.N. Nyeck

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Udeh, K.T. (2016). Social Accountability Mechanisms and Public Procurement Reform in Nigeria. In: Nyeck, S. (eds) Public Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa. Contemporary African Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52137-8_10

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