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Abstract

The military coup staged in Egypt in the summer of 2013 cut short the life of the Muslim Brotherhood crescent. This chapter discusses why the rise of the Brotherhood-affiliated political parties and figures was a troublesome development for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The chapter discusses how these two countries waged an anti-Brotherhood campaign and supported the military coup in Egypt. The chapter also discusses how and why Turkey and Qatar reacted to the coup in Egypt differently. Yet, the impact of the coup for both countries has been the same: Turkey and Qatar found themselves increasingly isolated in the region. The chapter claims that to break this isolation, Turkey and Qatar have developed even stronger relations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The speech is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website in Turkish. The translations are mine. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesinde-verdigi-_buyuk-restorasyon_-kadim_den-kuresellesmeye-yeni.tr.mfa

  2. 2.

    The quotes are available in Turkey at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesinde-verdigi-_buyuk-restorasyon_-kadim_den-kuresellesmeye-yeni.tr.mfa

  3. 3.

    The following excerpts are from Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/

  4. 4.

    Michele Dunne and Scott Williamson, “Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability by the Numbers,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Article, March 24, 2014. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/egypt-s-unprecedented-instability-by-numbers/h5j3

  5. 5.

    Andrew Hammond, “A very Gulf coup,” Turkish Review, 3(5) (Sept./Oct. 2013), pp.498–505.

  6. 6.

    “Sisi received $39.5 bn from Gulf, leaked recordings show,” Middle East Monitor, Feb. 13, 2015. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/16952-sisi-received-395bn-from-gulf-leaked-recordings-show

  7. 7.

    Qatar originally deposited $3 billion, $1 billion of which had already been converted into money. Egypt returned the remaining US$2 billion. See “Egypt’s Central Bank Returns $2 Billion Qatari Deposit,” Al-Monitor, Sept. 24, 2013. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/09/qatar-egypt-tension-billion-dollars.html#

  8. 8.

    “Qatar joins calls for release of Egypt’s Morsi,” The Daily Star Lebanon, July 24, 2013. Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jul-24/224846-qatar-joins-calls-for-release-of-egypts-morsi.ashx#axzz2Zwpui91e

  9. 9.

    “UPDATE 2- Egypt summons Qatari envoy after criticisms of crackdown,” Reuters, Jan. 4, 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/04/egypt-brotherhood-qatar-idUSL6N0KE05S20140104

  10. 10.

    “Egypt recalls envoy from Qatar following Gulf decision.”

  11. 11.

    Cited in Jamal Abdullah, “Motives and Consequences of Ambassador Withdrawals from Doha,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies Report, April 10, 2014. Available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/04/201441061248251708.htm

  12. 12.

    “UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain recall their ambassadors from Qatar,” Gulf News, March 5, 2014. Available at http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-recall-their-ambassadors-from-qatar-1.1299586

  13. 13.

    “Başbakan’ın başdanışmanı ‘değerli yalnızlık’ı açıkladı: Yalnız değiliz ama,” Star, Aug. 26, 2013. Available at http://haber.star.com.tr/guncel/yalniz-degiliz-ama-yalnizligi-goze-alacak-kadar-ilkeliyiz/haber-783839

  14. 14.

    “Batı Mısır’daki olaya hala darbe diyememiştir,” Anadolu Ajansı, July 5, 2013. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/rss/200923--darbelerin-hedefi-halktir-demokrasidir

  15. 15.

    “Mursi’nin yargı karşısındaki duruşunu alkışlıyorum,” Anadolu Ajansı, Nov. 21, 2013. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/254621--mursinin-yargi-karsisindaki-durusunu-alkisliyorum.

  16. 16.

    “Turkish President hopes relations with Egypt return to normal,” Egypt Independent, Nov. 23, 2013. Available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/turkish-president-hopes-relations-egypt-return-normal.

  17. 17.

    Cited in Sedat Ergin, “Erdoğan Suudilerle köprüleri atıyor,” Hürriyet, Aug. 20, 2013. Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/24552407.asp

  18. 18.

    “Erdoğan: Mısır’da darbenin arkasında İsrail var,” Radikal, Aug. 21, 2013. Available http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/Erdoğan_misirda_darbenin_arkasinda_israil_var-1146951

  19. 19.

    Cited in Sedat Ergin, “Erdoğan Suudilerle köprüleri atıyor.”

  20. 20.

    Erdoğan’s personal interests might have played a critical role in his silence. In a recording of a phone call between a Saudi businessman, Yasin al Qadi, and Bilal Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son, leaked to the public, al Qadi asks Bilal to arrange a meeting with his father, the Prime Minister. Al Qadi tells Bilal that he wants to explain why Erdoğan should not use harsh words against Saudi Arabia. In another leaked recording, now between Erdoğan the father and Erdoğan the son, the father asks the son about who might have posted a tweet harshly critical of Saudi Arabia. Bilal confides that he himself posted it. Erdoğan gets extremely angry with Bilal to the point that he says, “We are searching for the enemy outside, but the enemy is inside.” Erdoğan adds, “Do you think these guys will trust us again? Hurry and remove the tweet.” Obviously, Yasin al Qadi was quite persuasive in explaining why Erdoğan should not criticize Saudi Arabia. The recordings are available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77bT5uuEVT8

  21. 21.

    In September 2008, the GCC declared Turkey as a strategic partner in the annual meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of GCC states. In the same meeting, Turkey and the GCC agreed to hold joint ministerial meetings every year. The first meeting was held in Istanbul in July 2009. See decision # 38 in the joint statement of the fourth ministerial meeting available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-turkey-gcc-high-level-strategic-dialogue-4th-joint-ministerial-meeting_-28january-2012_-istanbul-_-turkey.en.mfa

  22. 22.

    Benny Avni, “Turkey Loses U.N. Security Council Seat in Huge Upset,” Newsweek, Oct. 16, 2014. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-malaysia-angola-new-zealand-win-un-council-seats-277962

  23. 23.

    For the list of attendees, see “Çankaya Köşkü’nde tarihi tören,” Anadolu Ajansı, Aug. 29, 2014. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/380754--cankaya-koskunde-tarihi-toren.

  24. 24.

    “Foreign dignitaries attend al-Sisi inauguration,” Daily News Egypt, June 8, 2014. Available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/08/foreign-dignitaries-attend-al-sisi-inauguration/

  25. 25.

    “King Abdullah pays visit to Egypt,” Asharq al Awsat, June 21, 2014. Available at http://www.aawsat.net/2014/06/article55333494

  26. 26.

    “Mısır’da ordunun yönetime el koyması,” Haberler.Com, July 4, 2013. http://www.haberler.com/misir-da-ordunun-yonetime-el-koymasi-4798472-haberi/

  27. 27.

    “Erdoğan: Mısır’da darbenin arkasında İsrail var,” Radikal, Aug 21, 2013. Available http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/Erdoğan_misirda_darbenin_arkasinda_israil_var-1146951

  28. 28.

    Gönül Tol, “Gaza crisis shows Turkey’s declining regional influence,” Middle East Institute Blog, July 29, 2014. Available at http://www.mei.edu/content/at/gaza-crisis-shows-turkeys-declining-regional-influence

  29. 29.

    Mick Krever, “Qatar’s Emir: We don’t fund terrorists,” CNN, Sept. 25, 2014. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/25/world/meast/qatar-emir/

  30. 30.

    “Suriye’de sadece Kobani yok,” DHA, Oct. 31, 2014. Available at http://www.dha.com.tr/suriyede-sadece-kobani-yok_792788.html

  31. 31.

    “Saudi Foreign Minister: Kingdom at forefront of fighting terrorism,” Khaleej Times, Dec. 4, 2014. Available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2014/December/middleeast_December41.xml&section=middleeast

  32. 32.

    Mick Krever, “Syria ‘a festering wound’ that fostered ISIS, says former Saudi intelligence chief,” CNN, July 1, 2014. Available at http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/01/syria-a-festering-wound-that-fostered-isis-says-former-saudi-intelligence-chief/

  33. 33.

    For what Turkey seeks from the agreement, see Menekşe Tokyay, “What does the Turkey-Qatar military deal mean for Arab conflicts,” Al Arabiya, June 25, 2015. See http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/06/25/What-does-Turkey-Qatar-military-deal-mean-for-Arab-conflicts-.html. For what Qatar seeks from the agreement, see Feyza Gümüşlüoğlu, “Katar’da 100 yıl sonra Türk askeri,” Star, June 26, 2015. Available at http://haber.star.com.tr/acikgorus/katarda-100-yil-sonra-turk-askeri/haber-1038052

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Başkan, B. (2016). The Coup and Its Aftermath. In: Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_6

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