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Criminology of Corruption pp 43–66Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Extent of Corruption

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Abstract

It was discussed in Chap. 2 that no international consensus existed concerning a definition of corruption. This makes the subject difficult to study empirically. Furthermore, there are also often no witnesses who are unaware they are a victim of corruption. However, understanding the level of corruption is important; if corruption can be measured, regardless of how approximate the data might be, it can be learned which factors are potentially involved in any reduction of its incidence (Collier 2000; Heywood 2015). Measurement is therefore critical, providing some benchmark of progress, understanding its extent, and identifying what effective factors reduced its rate of incidence, if any. This chapter therefore examines the various efforts that have been made, both historically and contemporarily (Hough 2015), to gauge the prevalence of corruption, its impact on people and the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives and reforms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are four pillars of economic freedom. These are: Rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption); Government size (fiscal freedom, government spending); Regulatory efficiency (business ferrdom, labour freedom, monetary freedom); and Market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom), and assess a country’s economic progress.

  2. 2.

    ‘In the field means primary research (i.e., interviewing someone)’.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, UK

    Graham Brooks

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  1. Graham Brooks
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Brooks, G. (2016). The Extent of Corruption. In: Criminology of Corruption. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51724-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51724-1_3

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