Abstract
In order to delve into the powerful interpellative allure of brain-imaging, I set out from Althusser’s concept of interpellation to understand how subjectivity is produced, and pose the question of where resistance is to be found? Therefore, I examine the status of the image within scientific culture. Drawing on Baudrillard, I probe the dimension of virtuality opened up by brain image culture. This raises the question of whether the digital brain is resisted by the old analogue psyche? After answering in the negative, I examine how the brain image is constructed from a data-gaze, which, in conjunction with an engagement with theories of iconology, culminates in the somewhat unexpected claim that the sought-after resistance lies in the very status of the image itself.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See also my remark in the previous chapter regarding how Adrian Johnston wants to reserve a place for Darwinist phylogenetics in his transcendental materialism.
- 2.
See, in this regard, the logic of representation, which I address in Chap. 6.
- 3.
One could object that neuroscience does not necessarily deal with subjectivity per se; some branches are restricted to investigating the general principles of the neural system. One could also put forward the counter-argument that not all neuroscience research results in or aims at the production of brain imaging. However, clearly even the most basic of neurological research cannot but impinge upon the dimensions of subjectivity and the psychological. After all, the locus or terminus of neural tissue is the brain, and the latter is, arguably, the very organ of subjectivity, regardless of how the latter is conceptualized. Moreover, this so-called basic neurological research undoubtedly also produces scientific data which is then subsequently used in brain imaging. At the bare minimum, then, questioning the function of the image within the broader brain sciences might be of value to those branches not directly involved with the psy-factor or with imaging as such.
- 4.
“The stepping out of (what we experience as) ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it” (Žižek, 1994).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
For an assessment of these kinds of resistance against neuroimaging see, for example, Whiteley (2012).
- 9.
Consider, here, the Greek concept of “exphrasis” which originally concerned not only visually describing art, but language in the broadest sense. As Hermogenes, a second-century ce Greek rhetorician, argued in relation to the literary description of a landscape or a person: it “brings before the eyes the sight which is to be shown” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 3).
- 10.
One could connect this to Actaeon, who after seeing what no mortal should see (Diana’s nudity) and being turned into a stag, is also in the grip of the absent presence. As he is attacked by his own dogs and fails to convey to them that it is him, Actaeon, as Philip Hardie writes (as already cited in Chap. 2), “would like to be absent, but he is present, and he would like to see, not feel as well, the fierce actions of his dogs” (Hardie, 2002, p. 169). In a similar vein, commenting on the metamorphosis of Myrrha, Hardie succinctly writes: “the product of every metamorphosis is an absent presence” (Hardie, 2002, p. 82).
- 11.
- 12.
See, for example, the website “Visual recognition”, a spin-off of the ISLA laboratory of the University of Amsterdam: http://www.visual-recognition.nl/. Although, of course, this could very easily be criticised on the basis of it being an overly artificial assessment of emotions, in which they are divided into a limited array of fixed categories.
- 13.
See Eugene Thacker’s claim that biology is always already digital (Thacker, 2004).
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
E.g., the BRAIN initiative (Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJuxLDRsSQc
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Buck-Morss argues that while, on the one hand, Christianity took over much of Roman iconography, on the other hand, once the Roman Empire was Christianised, the connection allowed a transcendent claim for sovereignty (Buck-Morss, 2007).
- 20.
This religious lineage perhaps goes some way to explaining why a number of authors have discerned a religious component to neuroscientific imaging. Slaby, for example, points to the ritualistic and quasi-religious connotations of the fMRI-procedure, in which the operators take on the role of priest-esque figures (Slaby, 2013b).
- 21.
In this respect, De Rijcke and Beaulieu stress that brain imaging is about relating individual data to brain atlases and their data-sets: it is not a process of comparing, they argue; rather, individual scan-data are processed in relation to the “average brain” (De Rijcke & Beaulieu, 2014, p. 136). Or, phrased otherwise, an individual brain is not compared with a standard brain, but is actually constructed as an image starting from the brain atlas. From here, De Rijcke and Beaulieu point to the “normative potential of brain scans” (De Rijcke & Beaulieu, 2014, p. 133).
- 22.
I rely here on Marc De Kesel’s etymological remark on the origin of the word subject; subjectum in Latin, or hypokeimenon in Greek, meaning platform, ground, carrier etc. (De Kesel, 2009, p. 22).
- 23.
This is strikingly similar to Hardie’s aforementioned understanding of the metamorphoses in Ovid as constituting an “absent presence”.
- 24.
Mitchell also stresses the need to distinguish between the image and the picture (Mitchell, 2005).
- 25.
Of course this is still image based language.
References
Aldworth, S. (2011). Cogito Ergo Sum 3. In A. I. Miller (Ed.), Art & science. Merging art & science to make a revolutionary new art movement (pp. 6–8). London: GV Art.
Althusser, L. (2006). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). In S. Aradhana & G. Akhil (Eds.), The anthropology of the state: A reader (pp. 86–111). Oxford: Blackwell.
Andreasen, N. C., Cohen, G., Harris, G., Cizadlo, T., Parkkinen, J., Rezai, K., et al. (1992). Image processing for the study of brain structure and function: Problems and programs. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 4(2), 125–133.
Ayers, D. (2011). Humans without bodies: DNA portraiture and biocybernetic reproduction. Configurations, 19(2), 287–321.
Baudrillard, J. (1988). America (C. Turner, Trans.). London: Verso.
Baudrillard, J. (1990). Seduction. London: Macmillan.
Baudrillard, J. (1998). The consumer society: Myths and structures. London: Sage.
Beaulieu, A. (2002). Images are not the (only) truth: Brain mapping, visual knowledge, and iconoclasm. Science, Technology & Human Values, 27(1), 53–86.
Benjamin, W. (2008). The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility, and other writings on media (E. Jephcott, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Buck-Morss, S. (2007). Visual empire. Diacritics, 37(2–3), 171–198.
Carter, R., & Frith, C. (1998). Mapping the mind. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Casini, S. (2011). Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) as mirror and portrait: MRI configurations between science and the arts. Configurations, 19(1), 73–99.
Chalmers, D. (2010). The singularity: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(9–10), 7–65.
Churchland, P. S. (2013a). The benefits of realising you’re just a brain (interview by Graham Lawton). New Scientist (2945), 30–31.
Churchland, P. S. (2013b). Touching a nerve: The self as brain. New York: Norton.
Cohn, S. (2008). Petty cash and the neuroscientific mapping of pleasure. BioSocieties, 3(2), 151–163.
Cowen, A. S., Chun, M. M., & Kuhl, B. A. (2014). Neural portraits of perception: Reconstructing face images from evoked brain activity. Neuroimage, 94, 12–22.
De Kesel, M. (2007). Als lucht bij longen. Over beeld en geweld: een teder pleidooi in drieentwintig stellingen. In S. Pleysier & B. Wydooghe (Eds.), Game over? Over game-en filmgeweld, angst en onzekerheid (pp. 213–219). Leuven: Garant.
De Kesel, M. (2009). Eros and ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan's Seminar VII (S. Jöttkandt, Trans.). Albany, NY: Suny Press.
De Rijcke, S., & Beaulieu, A. (2014). Networked neuroscience: Brain scans and visual knowing at the intersection of atlases and databases. In C. Coopmans & S. Woolgar (Eds.), Representation in scientific practice revisited (pp. 131–152). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
De Vos, J. (2009). On cerebral celebrity and reality TV. Subjectivity in times of brain-scans and psychotainment. Configurations, 17(3), 259–293.
De Vos, J. (2013b). Psychologization and the subject of late modernity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
De Vos, J. (2013c). The universality of the virtual absence of critical psychology in Flanders. Some personal remarks. Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 10, 391–407.
De Vos, J. (2015). What is critique in the era of the neurosciences? In J. De Vos & E. Pluth (Eds.), Neuroscience and critique. Exploring the limits of the neurological turn. London: Routledge.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
Derrida, J., Stiegler, B., & Bajorek, J. (2002). Echographies of television. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Descartes, R. (1996 [1637]). Discourse on the method and meditations on first philosophy (D. Weissman & W. Bluhm, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dumit, J. (2004). Picturing personhood: Brain scans and biomedical identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fodor, J. (1999). Let your brain alone. London Review of Books, 21(19), 68–69.
Fogel, J. F., & Patino, B. (2013). La condition numérique. Paris: Grasset.
Hardie, P. (2002). Ovid’s poetics of illusion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Janes, H. (2000, Sunday 1, October). Grey matters, The Observer. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2000/oct/01/life1.lifemagazine5
Johnson, D. (2008). “How do you know unless you look?”: Brain imaging, biopower and practical neuroscience. Journal of Medical Humanities, 29(3), 147–161.
Kant, I. (2005). Critique of pure reason (P. Guyer & A. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology. New York: Viking.
Lacan, J. (2001). Ecrits: A selection. London: Tavistock.
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Libet, B. (1999). Do we have a free will? Journal of Consciousness, 6(8–9), 47–57.
Logothetis, N. K. (2008). What we can do and what we cannot do with fMRI. Nature, 453(7197), 869–878.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miller, J. A. (2002). A contribution of the schizophrenic to the psychoanalytic clinic. Symptom, 2. Retrieved from http://www.lacan.com/contributionf.htm
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). What do pictures want?: The lives and loves of images. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T., & Smith, M. (2008). Mixing it up: The media, the senses, and global politics. Interview with W. J. T. Mitchell Visual culture studies: interviews with key thinkers (pp. 33–48). London: Sage.
Nancy, J.-L. (2006). Multiple arts: The muses II. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Nicolelis, M. (2013). The brain is not computable. MIT Technology Review. Retrieved from http://www.technologyreview.com/view/511421/the-brain-is-not-computable/
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ortega, F., & Vidal, F. (2007). Mapping the cerebral subject in contemporary culture. Reciis, Electronic Journal of Communication Information & Innovation in Health, 1(2), 255–259.
Panofsky, E. (1972). Studies in iconology. New York; London: Harper and Row.
Pearl, S. (2010). About faces: Physiognomy in nineteenth century Britain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Prasad, A. (2005). Making images/making bodies: Visibilizing and disciplining through magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Science, Technology & Human Values, 30(2), 291–316.
Rose, N. (2006). The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power & subjectivity in the twenty-first century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rose, N., & Abi-Rached, J. M. (2013). Neuro: The new brain sciences and the management of the mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Slaby, J. (2013a). Against empathy: Critical theory and the social brain . Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved from http:// www.academia.edu/3576043/Against_Empathy_Critical_Theory_and_the_Social_Brain
Slaby, J. (2013b). Brain images and neurosubjectivities. Paper presented at the Critical neuroscience. Summer school in social and cultural psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQ1Bp3bDEKE
Smith, S. M. (1999). American archives: Gender, race, and class in visual culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, P. (2008). Baudrillard’s resistance to the ob-scene as the mis-en-scene (or, refusing to think like a lap-dancer’s client). International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5(2). http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-5_2/v5-2-taylor.html.
Thacker, E. (2004). Biomedia. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the screen: Identity in the age of the internet. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Walker, R. (2012). The human brain project: A report to the European Commission. Lausanne: The HBP-PS Consortium.
Whiteley, L. (2012). Resisting the revelatory scanner? Critical engagements with fMRI in popular media. BioSocieties, 7(3), 245–272.
Young, A. (2011). Empathic cruelty and the origins of the social brain. In S. Choudhury & J. Slaby (Eds.), Critical neuroscience: A handbook of the social and cultural contexts of neuroscience (pp. 159–176). Oxford: Blackwell.
Žižek, S. (1994). Mapping ideology. London: Verso.
Žižek, S. (2002). Big Brother, or, the triumph of the gaze over the eye. In T. Y. Levin (Ed.), Ctrl [space]: Rhetorics of surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother (pp. 224–227). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
De Vos, J. (2016). The Iconographic Brain: An Inquiry into the Culture of Brain Imaging. In: The Metamorphoses of the Brain – Neurologisation and its Discontents. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50557-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50557-6_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-50556-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-50557-6
eBook Packages: Behavioral Science and PsychologyBehavioral Science and Psychology (R0)