Abstract
The notion of mixed strategy, as originally introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is a basic ingredient of classical game theory. Yet, as pointed out by von Neumann and Morgenstern themselves, the idea that a rational player may have to use a randomizing device, such as a coin flip, to decide on their actions poses some insuperable conceptual difficulties.
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Acknowledgements
This chapter relies on a published article “The intrinsic quantum nature of Nash equilibrium mixtures,” Journal of Philosophical Logic. DOI 10.1007/s10992-015-9349-7. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
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Pelosse, Y. (2017). The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Classical Game Theory. In: Haven, E., Khrennikov, A. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Quantum Models in Social Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-49276-0_4
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