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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

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Abstract

Central banking can be defined as an integrated set of public policies aimed at addressing the sources of market failures in the financial sector, esp.: a) network externalities in the payment infrastructure, b) information asymmetries in financial intermediation, c) search frictions hindering the convergence towards a cashless economy, and d) financial frictions hindering monetary stability. Central banks have always derived their legitimation from their “public utility” character: as financial activities complexify, the demand for intervention should increase accordingly. Because strong economies of scope appear to derive from a joint provision of the four central banking functions, central banks may be expected to play an increasingly important role in the future.

If our forefathers – who invented a lot of excellent institutions and sound provisions – had envisioned doing nothing but what their predecessors had done, today we would certainly lack many comforts which, not contrived by ancestry, have been actually devised by posterity. […] If we want to follow in our progenitors’ footsteps, we must imitate them in their alacrity to invent things that are beneficial to the public, as they were used to do; which cannot be done without establishing new provisions and new methods.

Tommaso Contarini , Speech to the Venetian Senate in Support of the Creation of a Public Bank, 28 December 1584 (quoted in Lattes (1869, p. 134), my translation).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The so-called Goodhart critique (an early version of the more famous Lucas critique ) argues that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.” It was formulated by Charles Goodhart in a paper originally published in 1975: Goodhart (1984).

Bibliography

  • C. A. E. Goodhart (1984) ‘Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience’ in C. A. E. Goodhart (ed.), Monetary Theory and Practice: The UK Experience (London: Palgrave), 91–121.

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  • E. Lattes (1869) La libertà delle banche a Venezia dal secolo XIII al XVII (Milan: Valentiner & Mues).

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Ugolini, S. (2017). Conclusions. In: The Evolution of Central Banking: Theory and History. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48525-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48525-0_6

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-137-48524-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-48525-0

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