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Why Rethink?

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Rethinking Sport and Exercise Psychology Research

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Abstract

In order to make critical judgements about research, and to make recommendations for ways forward, a normative philosophical stance must be adopted. In this introductory chapter we explore four popular yet contrasting views about science and research—those of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend—with the aim of establishing a framework for critical enquiry. This framework is illustrated with examples from sport and exercise psychology, inviting readers to consider how different views of research lead to different ways of doing it and writing about it. The chapter concludes by differentiating between ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ models of science, establishing the critical and normative concepts that inspire much of the subsequent analysis.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This ‘creative non-fiction’ is derived from Bryan Magee’s account of his first face-to-face encounter with Popper (Magee, 1998). Magee’s earlier book on Popper (Magee, 1973) is an excellent (and mercifully brief) introductory text.

  2. 2.

    This sketch is constructed from numerous sources, including Kuhn (1974: p. 817), Preston (2008: pp. 5–4) and a brief primary account from The Harvard Crimson (anonymous author, Feb 17 1950).

  3. 3.

    By ‘rational reconstruction’, Lakatos has in mind an explicitly theory-informed historical study, using his concepts as a particular lens through which to view historical cases. Feyerabend, though critical of Lakatos’ prescriptions for science, considered this theory ‘vastly superior to Kuhn’s’, and one that would ‘definitely lead to more detailed research’ (Feyerabend, in Motterlini, 1999: p. 16).

  4. 4.

    This conjectural sketch is based on Feyerabend’s letters to Lakatos (from the Lakatos archive at the LSE) and brief biographical notes in Motterlini (1999).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Health and Human Sciences, Southern Cross University, Coffs Harbour, New South Wales, Australia

    Peter Hassmén

  2. Research Institute for Sport and Exercise, University of Canberra, Canberra Australian Capital Territory, Australia

    Richard Keegan

  3. Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK

    David Piggott

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  1. Peter Hassmén
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  2. Richard Keegan
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  3. David Piggott
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Hassmén, P., Keegan, R., Piggott, D. (2016). Why Rethink?. In: Rethinking Sport and Exercise Psychology Research. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48338-6_1

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