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Theorizing Perception

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Psychology and Philosophy of Abstract Art

Abstract

An abstract painting may be considered a configuration of marks representational of something but not essentially so. If the artwork possesses representational qualities, these may arise through associations with the sociocultural and physical contexts surrounding the work. Exception has been taken to representationalism and its reliance of locating events within specific environments to provide them with an identity. I briefly deliberate direct/indirect realism, phenomenalism, intentional/representational theories of perception and disjunctive accounts/adverbalists. Qualia are individual conscious experiences and are considered as philosophical accounts of perception by Bertrand Russell, John Locke and John Searle. Additionally, psychological and neuroscientific research is viewed and I claim the need for phenomenological research perspectives when attempting to understand the perception of abstract artwork.

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Hackett, P.M.W. (2016). Theorizing Perception. In: Psychology and Philosophy of Abstract Art. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_2

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