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White Collar Crime and Risk pp 163–200Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Competition Law and LIBOR in Three Jurisdictions: The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society ((PSRCS))

Abstract

The London Interbank Offered Rate, better known as LIBOR, has ridden turbulent times over the last decade. Major banks, either through the collusion of individual traders operating on a discrete basis or on the instructions from more senior personnel, but always trading across national borders and on a global level, fixed the rate for at least four years. This resultant rigged market worked to limit competition and led to massive profits for the banks and individual traders. Furthermore, it enabled banks to be insulated from the shocks of the market during the financial crisis of 2007–8 and the consequences of that crisis. This chapter will investigate this market manipulation through the lens of competition law, and specifically price fixing, from the perspective of the three jurisdictions of the USA, the EU and the UK.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For comprehensive and entertaining accounts of the scandal, see L Vaughan, G Finch, The Fix: How Bankers Lied, Cheated and Colluded to Rig the World’s Most Important Number (Bloomberg Press, Chichester 2017) and D Enrich, The Spider Network (Harper Collins Press, London 2017).

  2. 2.

    J Macey, ‘LIBOR: Three Scandals in One’ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-07-20/libor-three-scandals-one last accessed 1 April 2016.

  3. 3.

    D MacKenzie, ‘What’s in a Number?’ (2008) 30 LRB 11, “The British Bankers Association’s London Interbank Offered Rate matters more than any other set of numbers in the world.”

  4. 4.

    At the time these were published on the website http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/the-basics, not now available. They can still be accessed at http://www.bbatrent.com/explained/the-basics last accessed 1 April 2016.

  5. 5.

    At the time these were published on the website http://www.bbalibor.com/technicalaspects/setting-bbalibor, not now available. They are set out in the US Department of Justice’s Letter, Reference USB AG, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1114446/000119312513106100/d497201dex43.htm, dated 18 December 2012 Appendix A, paragraph 7 last accessed 1 April 2016.

  6. 6.

    Financial Service Authority, Internal Audit Report: A review of the extent of awareness within the FSA of inappropriate LIBOR submissions’ March 2013, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/ia-libor.pdf last accessed 5 April 2013, 3.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    R Whish, D Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn OUP, Oxford 2015) 4. See also RM Steuer, ‘The Simplicity of Antitrust Law’ (2012) 14 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 543 where antitrust law is summarised as combating bullying and ganging up.

  9. 9.

    Whish, Competition Law (n 7) 4.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 5.

  11. 11.

    Indeed as Whish points out (ibid., 8), perfect competition will lie at one end of a scale with monopoly at the other.

  12. 12.

    For a layman’s account see T McNeese, The Robber Barons and the Sherman Antitrust Act (Chelsea House Publishers 2009). For a more robust legal account see WD Collins, ‘Trusts and the Origin of Antitrust Legislation’ (2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 2279.

  13. 13.

    Section 5(a)(2) empowers the FTC to enforce the prohibition of unlawful “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” set out in Section 5(a)(1). See FTC Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act dated 13 August 2015 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf last accessed 1 April 2016.

  14. 14.

    D Broder, US Antitrust Law and Enforcement (2010 OUP, Oxford) 37.

  15. 15.

    Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp. 467 US 752, 771 (1984).

  16. 16.

    Ibid., 771–777.

  17. 17.

    For example, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League 560 US 183 (2010)—see JM Schmitten ‘Antitrust’s Single-Entity Doctrine: A Formalistic Approach for a Formalistic Rule’ (2012) 46 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 93 for a highly critical analysis.

  18. 18.

    (n 13) 46.

  19. 19.

    Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the US Constitution.

  20. 20.

    US Department of Justice, “Antitrust Division Manual” (5th edn Department of Justice, Washington 2015) III-12.

  21. 21.

    Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates’ Memorandum ‘Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing’ dated 9 September 2015 https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download last accessed 12 August 2016.

  22. 22.

    Deputy Attorney General Bent Snyder ‘Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes’ dated 19 February 2016 https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/826721/download last accessed 12 August 2016.

  23. 23.

    Gatt Comm., Inc. v. PMC Assocs., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2013).

  24. 24.

    429 US 477, 489 (1977).

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    431 US 720 (1977).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., 536–545.

  28. 28.

    First granted powers under Regulation 17/62 the First Regulation implementing Articles 85 arid 86 of the Treaty [1962] OJ 204/62, now updated by Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.

  29. 29.

    Article 101(2) TFEU.

  30. 30.

    Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383 para 69—see O Black, ‘Agreement: Concurrence of Wills, or Offer and Acceptance?’ (2008) 4 European Competition Journal 103.

  31. 31.

    Case C-260/09 P Activision Blizzard German GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR I-419.

  32. 32.

    See Joined Cases 96–102, 104, 105, 108 & 110/82 IAZ International Belgium NV v Commission [1983] ECR 3369 para 20.

  33. 33.

    Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619 para 64.

  34. 34.

    Joined Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111 & 113–114/73 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 para 174.

  35. 35.

    Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v Commission [1979] ECR 1869 para 17.

  36. 36.

    (n 27).

  37. 37.

    See the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43.

  38. 38.

    Commission Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/81.

  39. 39.

    Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, 249.

  40. 40.

    Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 para 26.

  41. 41.

    Joined Cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., para 61.

  43. 43.

    Directive 2014/14/EU of the European Parliament and Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., Article 12(1).

  45. 45.

    Ibid., Article 12(3).

  46. 46.

    Ibid., Article 3(3).

  47. 47.

    As labeled in section 2(8).

  48. 48.

    For comprehensive analysis of the Cartel Offence see M Furse, S Nash, The Cartel Offence (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) and for a more theoretical examination see P Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges (OUP, Oxford 2014).

  49. 49.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 190(1).

  50. 50.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 188(3)(a).

  51. 51.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 188(1).

  52. 52.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 188(2)(a).

  53. 53.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 189(1).

  54. 54.

    Enterprise Act 2002 section 190(2).

  55. 55.

    Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130 (HL).

  56. 56.

    Whish and Bailey (n 7) 328.

  57. 57.

    Garden Cottage Foods (n 54).

  58. 58.

    WH Newson Ltd. and Others v IMI plc and Others [2014] Bus LR 156 (CA).

  59. 59.

    (n 39), and recognised by the Court of Appeal in the same case, Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company CPC [2004] EuLR 693.

  60. 60.

    Devenish Nutrition Ltd. v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) [2009] Ch 390 (CA) para 109.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., para 104.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., para 148.

  63. 63.

    2 Travel Group Plc v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd. [2012] CAT 19.

  64. 64.

    Devenish Nutrition Ltd. v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) [2008] 2 WLR 637 (Ch) para 52.

  65. 65.

    Rookes v Barnard [1964] 1 AC 1129, 1228 (HL).

  66. 66.

    SI 2003/1372, now replaced by the 2015 Rules, SI 2015/1648 Part IV for section 47A and Part V for section 47B. The CAT has also provided a more comprehensive Guide to Proceedings with, rather confusingly, Section 5 dealing with Part IV of the CAT Rules and section 47A, and Section 6 dealing with Part V and section 47B.

  67. 67.

    See http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7159-15 last accessed 25 April 2016. The banks were Deutsche Bank, UBS, Rabobank, RBS, Barclays and Lloyds, and the traders Icap Europe Ltd. and RP Martin Holdings Ltd. & Martin Brokers (UK) Ltd.

  68. 68.

    There were two actions, one brought against the parent company (RBS AG) and one against the subsidiary (RBS Securities Japan). The former received a fine of US$150 million for wire fraud and price fixing (see USA v RBS dated 5 February 2013 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/04-12-13the-royal-bank-of-scotland-dpa.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016) whilst the latter in a Connecticut District Court judgment received a fine of US$50 million for wire fraud that was incorporated in the total US$150 million fine of the parent company (see USA v RBS Securities Japan dated 6 January 2014 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/01-13-14the-royal-bank-of-scotland-securities-japan-limited-judgment.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016).

  69. 69.

    Like RBS there were two actions, one brought against the parent company (Deutsche Bank AG) and one against the subsidiary (Deutsche Bank Group Services UK Ltd.). The former received a fine of US$625 million for wire fraud and price fixing (see USA v Deutsche Bank AG DPA dated 23 April 2015 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/04/23/db_dpa.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016) whilst the latter received a fine of US$150 million for wire fraud (see USA v Deutsche Bank Group Services UK Ltd. Plea Agreement dated 23 April 2015, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/04/23/dbgs_plea_agreement.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016).

  70. 70.

    Like RBS there were two actions, one brought against the parent company (UBS AG) and one against the subsidiary (UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd.). The former received a fine of US$500 million for wire fraud (see USA v UBS AG DPA dated 18 December 2012 https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/836466/download last accessed 25 April 2016) whilst the latter in a Connecticut District Court judgment received a fine of US$100 million for wire fraud that was incorporated in the total US$500 million fine of the parent company (see USA v UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. dated 18 September 2013 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/09-18-13ubs-securities-japan-co-ltd-judgment.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016).

  71. 71.

    USA v Barclays Bank Plc DPA dated 26 June 2012 https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/337201271017335469822.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016.

  72. 72.

    USA v Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (Rabobank) DPA dated 29 October 2013 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/10-29-13rabobank-deferred-prosecution-agreement.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016.

  73. 73.

    USA v UBS AG Plea Agreement dated 20 May 2015 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/ubs-plea-agreement.pdf last accessed 25 April 2016.

  74. 74.

    USA v Anthony Allen dated 10 March 2016 https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/839511/download last accessed 25 April 2016.

  75. 75.

    USA v Anthony Conti dated 10 March 2016 https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/839516/download last accessed 25 April 2016.

  76. 76.

    USA v Allen, Conti et al. dated 11 February 2016 http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020160216727/U.S.%20v.%20Allen last accessed 25 April 2016. The defendants that involuntary compelled evidence to the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority could not be used in trial. Judge Rakoff held that the government had proved that its evidence derived from legitimate sources wholly independent of the compelled testimony.

  77. 77.

    See DoJ Press Release dated 10 March 2016 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-rabobank-traders-sentenced-prison-manipulating-us-dollar-and-japanese-yen-libor last accessed 25 April 2016.

  78. 78.

    In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation 935 F.Supp.2d 666 (2013). It should be noted that Buchwald J’s judgment has been confirmed and followed in two further LIBOR cases, namely Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. dated 28 March 2014 http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/mxv0451w/new-york-southern-district-court/laydon-v-mizuho-bank-ltd-et-al/ last accessed 4 May 2016 and 7 West 57th Street Realty Co. v. Citigroup, Inc. dated 31 March 2015 http://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2013cv00981/407735/172/0.pdf?ts=1427977380 last accessed 4 May 2016.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., 686.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., 687.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., 688–689.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., 689.

  83. 83.

    429 US 477 (1977).

  84. 84.

    Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) v USA Petroleum 495 US 328 (1990).

  85. 85.

    (n 77) 690.

  86. 86.

    Ibid. 691.

  87. 87.

    Ibid.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., 692.

  90. 90.

    SE Foster, ‘Harm to Competition and the Competitive Process: A Circular Charade in the LIBOR Antitrust Litigation’ (2014) 10 International Law & Management Review 91, 95 and SE Foster, ‘LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations’ (2013) 11 De Paul Business & Commercial Law Journal 291.

  91. 91.

    Ibid., 104.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., 106.

  93. 93.

    In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation 74 F.Supp.3d 581 (2015).

  94. 94.

    Ibid., 596.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., 597–598.

  96. 96.

    Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, et al. v Bank of America Corp., et al. dated 28 March 2016 https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2014cv07126/432152/209/0.pdf?ts=1459258628 last accessed 25 April 2016.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., 15.

  98. 98.

    Ibid., 15–16.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., 16–17.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., 17–18.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., 18–19.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., 19–20.

  103. 103.

    In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation dated 30 October 2013 http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Gelboim-2dCirorder.pdf last accessed 4 May 2016.

  104. 104.

    Gelboim, et al. v Bank of America Corp., et al. 135 S.Ct. 897.

  105. 105.

    Gelboim, et al. v Bank of America Corp., et al. 823 F.3d 759 (2nd Cir.2016).

  106. 106.

    Ibid., 770.

  107. 107.

    Ibid., 771.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., 773.

  109. 109.

    United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 US 150, 224.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 221.

  111. 111.

    (n 104) 777–780.

  112. 112.

    Commission Memo/11/711 dated 19 October 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-711_en.htm last accessed 4 May 2016.

  113. 113.

    Case AT.39924 Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives Cartel (CHF LIBOR) [2015] 4 CMLR 19.

  114. 114.

    Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C296/17 as amended by Commission Communication [2015] OJ C256/1.

  115. 115.

    Commission Press Release IP/13/1208 dated 4 December 2013 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1208_en.htm last accessed 6 May 2016. See Commission Decisions in Case AT.39924 Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives dated 21 October 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39924/39924_1156_3.pdf last accessed 6 May 2016 and Case AT.39861 Yen Interest Rate Derivatives dated 4 December 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39861/39861_4152_13.pdf last accessed 6 May 2016.

  116. 116.

    Commission Press Release IP/14/1190 dated 21 October 2014 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1190_en.htm last accessed 6 May 2016.

  117. 117.

    Commission Press Release IP/15/4104 dated 4 February 2015 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4104_en.htm last accessed 6 May 2016.

  118. 118.

    Case T-180/15 Icap a.o. v Commission [2015] OJ C-245/30.

  119. 119.

    FSA, Internal Audit Report: A Review of the Extent of Awareness Within the FSA of Inappropriate LIBOR Submissions dated 2013 last accessed 5 May 2016, 80.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., 80–81.

  121. 121.

    PJF Huizing, Parallel Enforcement of Rate Rigging: Lessons to be Learned from LIBOR (2015) 3 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 173, 178.

  122. 122.

    R v Tom Hayes sentencing remarks of Mr. Justice Cooke dated 3 August 2015 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/r-v-tom-hayes-sentencing1.pdf last accessed 5 May 2016 paras 1 and 17.

  123. 123.

    R v Tom Hayes [2015] EWCA Crim 1944 paras 101–108.

  124. 124.

    See H Kirton, R Smith, Former Barclays Pair—StylianosContogoulas and Ryan Reich—Acquitted of Libor Charges dated 6 April 2017 http://www.cityam.com/262503/former-barclays-pair-stylianos-contogoulas-and-ryan-reich last accessed 26 May 2017.

  125. 125.

    R v Peter Johnson and Others sentencing remarks of Mr. Justice Leonard dated July 2016 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/r-v-johnson-and-others-sentencing.pdf last accessed 24 August 2016.

  126. 126.

    Deutsche Bank AG and others v Unitech Global Ltd. and another [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 268 (QB) and [2016] EWCA Civ 119 (CA).

  127. 127.

    Courage v Crehan [1999] ECC 455 (CA).

  128. 128.

    R Nicholls, J O’Brien, ‘Hanging Together or Hanging Separately: Is Competition Law in the Process of Eclipsing Financial Regulation?’ (2014) 8 Law and Financial Markets Review 178.

  129. 129.

    Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations dated September 2011 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/hmt-sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ICB%20final%20report/ICB%2520Final%2520Report[1].pdf last accessed 24 August 2016.

  130. 130.

    FSMA2000 s 1B(1).

  131. 131.

    FSMA2000 s 1B(2).

  132. 132.

    FSMA2000 s 1B(3).

  133. 133.

    FSMA2000 s 1B(4).

  134. 134.

    For analysis see D Jones, M Bethell, I Cameron, ‘Competition at the Financial Conduct Authority’ [2015] Comp Law 179.

  135. 135.

    FSA Final Notice to Barclays Bank Plc. Reference Number 122702 dated 27 June 2012 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf last accessed FSA Final Notice to UBS AG Reference Number 186958 dated 19 December 2012 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/ubs.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FSA Final Notice to The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. Reference Number 121882 dated 6 February 2013 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/final-notices/rbs.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank) Reference Number 171596 dated 29 October 2013 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/rabobank.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Lloyds Bank Plc. and Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. Reference Numbers 119278 and 169628 dated 28 July 2014 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/lloyds-bank-of-scotland.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Deutsche Bank AG Reference Number 150018 dated 23 April 2015 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/deutsche-bank-ag-2015.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016.

  136. 136.

    FCA Final Notice to Paul Robson, Reference Number PXR01202 dated 27 February 2015 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/paul-robson.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Lee Bruce Stewart Reference Number LBS01002 dated 21 July 2015 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/lee-bruce-stewart.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Arif Hussein Reference Number AXH01348 dated 22 January 2016 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/decision-notices/arif-hussein.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Michael Ross Curtler Reference Number MRC01098 dated 29 February 2016 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/michael-ross-curtler.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Paul White, Reference Number PMW01135 dated 8 April 2016, https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/paul-white.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Peter Charles Johnson Reference Number PCJ01019 dated 26 August 2016 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/peter-johnson.pdf last accessed 28 August 2016.

  137. 137.

    FCA Final Notice to ICAP Europe Ltd. Reference Number 188984 dated 25 September 2013 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/icap-europe-limited.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Martins Brokers (UK) Ltd. Reference Number 187916 dated 15 May 2014 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/martin-brokers-uk-ltd.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to David Caplin Reference Number DSC01046 dated 22 January 2015 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/david-caplin.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016; FCA Final Notice to Jeremy Kraft Reference Number JDK01054 dated 22 January 2015 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/jeremy-kraft.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016.

  138. 138.

    Huizing (n 120) 191–200.

  139. 139.

    N Green, A Robertson (Eds), The Europeanisation of UK Competition Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) 1.

  140. 140.

    A MacCullough, ‘The Cartel Offence: Defining an Appropriate “Moral Space”’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 73.

  141. 141.

    R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053.

  142. 142.

    R v Whittle and others [2008] EWCA Crim 2560.

  143. 143.

    R v Burns and others, Unreported Judgment, Southwark Crown Court dated 10 May 2010.

  144. 144.

    See CMA9, Cartel Offence Prosecution Guidance (CMA, London 2014) on the CMA’s advice over prosecution of the amended Cartel Offence.

  145. 145.

    Enterprise Act 2002 s188A.

  146. 146.

    Enterprise Act 2002 s188B.

  147. 147.

    EM Michels, ‘The Real Shortcoming of the UK Cartel Offence: A Lack of Public and Political Support’ [2014] Global Antitrust Review 53.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., 71.

  149. 149.

    See Steur (n 7).

  150. 150.

    K Yeung, ‘Privatizing Competition Regulation’ (1998) 18 OJLS 581, 594.

  151. 151.

    For a thorough review of the efficiency model of competition law see A Ayal, Fairness in Antitrust: Protecting the Strong from the Weak (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2015) 38–64.

  152. 152.

    H Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press, London 2005) 10.

  153. 153.

    Gelboim (n 104).

  154. 154.

    JM Connor, ‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels’ (2006) 6 Journal of Industry Competition and Trade 195.

  155. 155.

    See Barclays’ $100bn settlement with 44 US States dated 8 August 2016 https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ag_barclays_settlement_agreement_signed_execution_copy_8_8_16.pdf last accessed 26 August 2016.

  156. 156.

    M Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: The Final Report dated September 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf last accessed 31 August 2016.

  157. 157.

    Anything deeper is outside the scope of this chapter and is a matter for further research.

  158. 158.

    For a well-reasoned and persuasive argument for consumer welfare see L Kaplow, S Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Harvard University Press, London 2006).

  159. 159.

    O Black, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 40.

  160. 160.

    AB Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Harvard University Press, London 2015) 126.

  161. 161.

    Whelan (n 47).

  162. 162.

    B Wardhaugh, ‘A Normative Approach to the Criminalisation of Cartel Activity’ (2012) 32 LS 369.

  163. 163.

    Ayal (n 149).

  164. 164.

    Ibid., ch 2.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., chs 3 and 4.

  166. 166.

    Ibid., ch 5.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., ch 3.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., ch 4.

  169. 169.

    J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 1999).

  170. 170.

    Where the law is defined as ‘the human attempt to establish social order as a way of regulating and managing human conflict’ in D Beyleveld, R Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1986) 2.

  171. 171.

    See G Monti, EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge 2007) ch 4.

  172. 172.

    M Carney, ‘Building a Resilient and Open Global Fianancial to Support Sustainable Cross-Border Investment’ dated 30 August 2016 http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair’s-letter-to-G20-Leaders-in-advance-of-their-meeting-in-Hangzhou-on-4-5-September..pdf point 5 last accessed 13 September 2016.

  173. 173.

    See FCA, ‘FG15/8: The FCA’s Concurrent Competition Enforcement Powers for the Provision of Financial Services – A Guide to the FCA’s Powers and Procedures under the Competition Act 1998’ dated July 2015 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/fg15-08.pdf last accessed 2 September 2016.

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  1. Bristol Law School, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

    Richard Ball

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  1. Bristol Law School, University of the West England, Bristol, UK

    Nic Ryder

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Ball, R. (2018). Competition Law and LIBOR in Three Jurisdictions: The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union. In: Ryder, N. (eds) White Collar Crime and Risk. Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47384-4_7

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