Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Government and the Reparation (Recovery) Act, 1927–8

Abstract

That the German Government was made to make financial recompense to the victorious powers is one of the most widely discussed aspects of the peacemaking process at the end of the First World War.¹ Such was the importance and technical complexity of the reparation question that the Allied and Associated powers decided to postpone the setting of the final total and means of payment until 1921. Indeed, the subject dominated the diplomatic landscape of relations between Britain, France and Germany for much of the 1920s, along with discussions about security and disarmament.² Together they did much to expose the fault lines in the relations between these countries.³ Yet, despite wide recognition of the importance of the economic and commercial aspects of the peacemaking process, in recent years, analyses of these issues has increasingly become the preserve of specialist books and journals, with little aimed at a wider academic audience.⁴ The exceptions are few and are now quite dated.