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The International “Free Market” for Trade and Investment: Capital’s Global Power Play

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This will be shown to not be the case in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    Paul Krugman, for example, has since becoming a New York Times columnist been one of the most refreshingly outspoken critics of regressive and doctrinaire domestic free-market policies. However, in a widely distributed essay written at the time of the NAFTA debate, Krugman demonstrated his mainstream economic bona fides by roundly critiquing “noneconomist intellectuals” like Robert Reich, Lester Thurow, and John Kenneth Galbraith. Krugman claimed that their writings were superficial as their ideas were not based on complex underlying mathematical models, and most importantly, as they did not accept the implications of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, they were erroneous in their critiques of free trade (Krugman 1996). As a former mathematician, I have some sympathy for Krugman’s frustration with commentators who do not take mathematical modeling seriously, but strongly disagree with his notion that Ricardo’s theory provides indisputable proof, when its assumptions are satisfied, of the benefits of free trade—see discussion in text below. In fairness, Krugman’s position on trade has evolved since the writing of that essay to a point where he has become at least a lukewarm critic of the latest so-called free-trade deal, the Trans Pacific Partnership, and has highlighted the wage-productivity mismatch, that he dismissed as ignorant folly in his 1996 essay, as a central problem of the US economy (Krugman 2015, 2012).

  3. 3.

    I maintain this hope because, as is noted in the text above, the Comparative advantage parable constitutes the core of every undergraduate class on international trade. This suggests that conventional interpretations, or misinterpretations, of Ricardo’s story may have a profound intellectual influence in framing widely held trade policy views. I think that this is true even though questions regarding the theoretical validity and scope of these older trade theories are increasingly irrelevant to applied policy in current international trade and finance, as this is dominated by capital mobility and exchange rate speculation, both excluded from models that focus on current account fundamentals like Ricardo’s comparative advantage parable (Blecker 1999).

  4. 4.

    See: http://www.statista.com/statistics/226956/average-world-wages-in-purchasing-power-parity-dollars/

  5. 5.

    Op. cit.

  6. 6.

    A “price elasticity of demand” gives the percent increase in demand for a one percent decline in price, for a specific price and demand level. In a “fixed demand-elasticity specification,” the price elasticity of demand is fixed constant for price and demand levels.

  7. 7.

    In the two-goods, two-country case, own-price elasticities may be substituted for cross-price elasticities (Baiman 2010b, Appendix A).

  8. 8.

    See Baiman (2010b, Appendix D) which also shows that these values solve (8.1), (8.2), (8.3), (8.4), and (8.5) in the text above.

  9. 9.

    See, for example, Findlay (1995).

  10. 10.

    See Marglin (1984) for an extensive discussion of this point that lower includes the development of variable coefficient Post-Keynesian models with more realistic lower factor substitution rates (MRTS < 1) that, as expected, generally respond to quantity- signals much more than the NC assumption of extensive free-market and free-trade price-signal response.

  11. 11.

    For more on trade and unequal exchange see Baiman (2006, 2014).

  12. 12.

    See Marglin (1984) op. cit.

  13. 13.

    Lerner (1944).

  14. 14.

    Taylor (2004, Chap. 7) shows that (contrary to the standard NC story) satisfaction of the Marshall-Lerner conditions will not in itself ensure “normal” trade flow response in the presence of large trade-induced output changes, as the derivation of these conditions assumes (like most of standard NC high theory) that “Say’s Law” or full employment holds at all times.

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Baiman, R.P. (2016). The International “Free Market” for Trade and Investment: Capital’s Global Power Play. In: The Morality of Radical Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45559-8_8

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