Abstract
This chapter considers the democratic oversight of the EU intelligence community. Although it has no autonomous operational capabilities, this community manages the bulk of information discreetly provided by Member States, contributes to the transfer of sensitive data and handles a wide variety of intelligence deliverables. Given the specific nature of EU intelligence cooperation, this chapter elaborates on the concept of tri-dimensional accountability. It underscores the peculiar aspects of intelligence cooperation in the EU by analysing the oversight and control functions performed by EU institutions and bodies in two dimensions: the horizontal and the vertical. It also frames the complexity of EU intelligence control mechanisms in the context of tensions between national scrutiny and supranational oversight.
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Gruszczak, A. (2016). EU Intelligence Oversight. In: Intelligence Security in the European Union. New Security Challenges. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45512-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45512-3_10
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