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Disintegration or Not?

  • Hans Vollaard
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)

Abstract

EU-related dissatisfaction will not necessarily lead to full withdrawal from the EU. Full withdrawal will only happen if compensation for member states’ external consolidation, EU loyalty, voice opportunities within the EU, and exit costs are low, and viable national or international exit options are available. If this final condition is not fulfilled, member states will only seek partial exits (e.g., less power attributed to the EU, less compliance, smaller budget) or call for the exit of burdensome others. A first empirical check of all member states and the UK, Greece, and the Netherlands provides corroboration for these propositions (4a and 4b). Despite the unsettling effect of Brexit, the EU’s immediate and complete disintegration is unlikely because of the lack of better exit options in the eyes of many other governments, parties, and voters.

Keywords

European disintegration Full exit Partial exit Brexit Grexit Nexit Disintegrative spiral 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Vollaard
    • 1
  1. 1.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands

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