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Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy pp 69–102Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Dissonant Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Common Sense in Philosophical Methodology

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell are widely regarded as two of the founding figures in analytic philosophy. In this paper, we describe a tension between the Moorean and the Russellian conceptions of analysis, leading to two quite distinct approaches to philosophical methodology. Moore represents what could be described as an epistemically conservative conception of analysis, which accords default legitimacy to common sense beliefs. Russell represents a conception of analysis where there is more room for revision and transformation of common sense beliefs. We claim that this tension is intensified in the Carnap-Strawson debate in the 1960s and continues to run through the history of analytic philosophy all the way up to present times. This explains (in part) the variety of approaches in current analytic philosophy.

The point of philosophy is to defy common sense (Michael Strevens , in Pyke 2011).

The answers to philosophical questions must never be surprising. In philosophy, you cannot discover anything (Wittgenstein, in Waismann 1979, 182).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Theoretical Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712, GL, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Leon Geerdink

Authors
  1. Catarina Dutilh Novaes
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  2. Leon Geerdink
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Correspondence to Leon Geerdink .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

    Sandra Lapointe

  2. Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

    Christopher Pincock

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Dutilh Novaes, C., Geerdink, L. (2017). The Dissonant Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Common Sense in Philosophical Methodology. In: Lapointe, S., Pincock, C. (eds) Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_3

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