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Policing Crises in Mainland China: The Shenzhen Landslide, Tianjin Explosion and Shanghai Stampede

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The Politics of Policing in Greater China

Part of the book series: Politics and Development of Contemporary China ((PDCC))

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Abstract

The three case studies in this chapter show that the mainland Chinese police, including the fire service, had varying responsibilities in the incidents concerned. In the Shenzhen landslide, the police response to the landslide was swift, but the main responsibility came from the Guangming district government, which contracted out the waste management task to Luwei Company that in turn signed a contract with the Yishenglong Company to deal with the construction waste in the industrial park. Public maladministration at the industrial park level had to shoulder the responsibility of the landslide, for the Guangming district administration should have monitored the process of handling waste management. The police role in the Shenzhen landslide appeared to be minimal. However, the degree of police responsibility in the Tianjin port explosion tended to be much higher as the fire service department failed to grasp the serious extent of the dangerous chemicals that were stored in the port area. Again, public maladministration at the level of Tianjin provincial government existed; the lack of supervision and coordination from the customs department and the supervision and safety bureau demonstrated the limited power of the local police. The degree of police responsibility was the greatest in the Shanghai stampede compared with the Shenzhen landslide and the Tianjin explosion. The lack of contingency planning, the absence of crowd control measures and the clumsy response of the police to the Shanghai stampede all illustrated the extent of police maladministration at the level of Shanghai and Huangpu governments. The three case studies displayed a common pattern: public maladministration persisted and brought about the tragedies. While police accountability varied in the three cases, the most serious incident that exposed police maladministration was the Shanghai stampede. Overall, the PRC police can be seen as being responsive to crises quite promptly at the provincial and local levels, but they must take preventive measures together with better coordination, communication and collaboration with other government departments with a view to avoiding other.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sing Tao Daily, December 27, 2015, p. A11.

  2. 2.

    Ming Pao, December 29, 2015, p. A13.

  3. 3.

    Hong Kong Cable TV News, December 21 and 22, 2015.

  4. 4.

    Xinhua, “Sudden Events Testing the Capability of Cities in dealing with Crises,” December 25, 2015, cited in Wen Wei Po, December 26, 2015, p. A12.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Wen Wei Po, December 27, 2015, p. A9.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Sing Tao Daily, December 27, 2015, p. A11.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Wen Wei Po, December 29, 2015, p. A14.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., December 29, 2015, p. A14.

  13. 13.

    Hong Kong Economic Times, December 29, 2015, p. A17.

  14. 14.

    Apple Daily, December 29, 2015, p. A17.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Hong Kong Economic Times, December 29, 2015, p. A17.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Ta Kung Pao, January 14, 2016, p. A20.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    Wen Wei Po, February 1, 2016, p. A18.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., January 20, 2016, p. A17.

  25. 25.

    Sing Pao, February 6, 2016, p. A16.

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., February 6, 2016, p. A15.

  29. 29.

    Wen Wei Po, February 6, 2016, p. A14.

  30. 30.

    Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 6, 2016, p. A14.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    The Sun, February 8, 2016, p. A19.

  33. 33.

    Hong Kong Cable TV news, August 15, 2015.

  34. 34.

    Tianjin Daily, August 15, 2015.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Cable TV news, August 16, 2015.

  38. 38.

    Ta Kung Pao, September 28, 2015, p. A7.

  39. 39.

    “35 killed, 42 injured in New Year stampede in Shanghai,” China Daily, January 1, 2015.

  40. 40.

    Xinhua news agency, January 1, 2015.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    “New Year celebrations cancelled in Shanghai after 36 die in riverfront stampede,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2015.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Ibid. For the 700 police officers who had been sent to the river bank, see Didi Tang, “Witnesses: Sequence of events led to Shanghai stampede,” Associated Press, January 1, 2015.

  45. 45.

    Jasmine Siu, “New Year countdown stampede claims 36,” The Standard, January 2, 2015, pp. 6–7.

  46. 46.

    Teddy Ng, “Youths who shouted warnings in Shanghai New Year stampede hailed as heroes,” South China Morning Post, January 2, 2015.

  47. 47.

    Daniel Ren and Teddy Ng, “Police admit misjudging crowd,” South China Morning Post, January 2, 2015, p. 1.

  48. 48.

    Wang Zhenghua, “Crowds mourn stampede victims,” China Daily, January 2, 2015, p. 1.

  49. 49.

    Adam Minter, “Shanghai’s Anxieties Result in Tragedy,” Bloomberg, January 1, 2015, in http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-01/Shanghais-anxieties-result-in-tragedy, access date: February 20, 2015. The article referred to Han as mayor, which was wrong as Han was a party secretary in Shanghai.

  50. 50.

    “Be aware of the cause of the Shanghai stampede,” China Daily, January 7, 2015.

  51. 51.

    “Chinese police interrogate dozens who dared criticize handling of Shanghai stampede,” Sunday Morning Post, January 4, 2015.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    “Dapuqiao Strengthens Safety Work in Crowded Areas,” January 7, 2015, in http://www.huangpuqu.sh.cn/shhpeng/infodetail/?infoid=9be5277a-42ae-4a8c-a843-f9832814153f&categoryNum=001001 , access date: March 2, 2016.

  54. 54.

    Ming Pao, May 3, 2015, p. A22.

  55. 55.

    “Shanghai stampede brings back memories of Hong Kong’s 1993 Lan Kwai Fong tragedy,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2015.

  56. 56.

    “Transcripts of the Press Conference on the 12.31 Stampede on the Bund,” February 3, 2015, in http://en.shio.gov.cn/presscon/2015/02/03/1153244.html, access date: February 15, 2015.

  57. 57.

    Ibid.

  58. 58.

    Adapted and modified from Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Adapted and modified from Ibid.

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Lo, S.SH. (2016). Policing Crises in Mainland China: The Shenzhen Landslide, Tianjin Explosion and Shanghai Stampede. In: The Politics of Policing in Greater China. Politics and Development of Contemporary China. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39070-7_9

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