Abstract
Legal systems in the Western world currently regard animals as property. This status implies that they are not subjects of rights. None of the recent legal measures aimed at protecting animals have conferred on them the legal status of person, which is arguably a necessary condition to benefit from the most fundamental individual rights. In this chapter, we argue that the type of control of animals that is based on property rights and domination is ethically unacceptable. We also argue that extending personhood and its corresponding rights to all sentient beings is the best way to ensure that they are not made to suffer unnecessarily and that they are protected from domination. While there may exist morally legitimate occurrences of human control over other animals, justice requires that we abolish all forms of their exploitation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The case of fictional persons, such as corporations, might represent an exception to that rule since these legal entities have the status of person as well as certain rights while also being the property of shareholders or other owners.
- 2.
G. L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 110.
- 3.
See S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 67. It is interesting to note that Sapontzis prefers to avoid stating that being a person is a necessary condition to have rights since, in his view, the two ideas are synonymous: “If animals can and should have moral rights, then they can and should be persons. Being persons is the same thing as having moral rights; therefore, being a person cannot be a necessary condition for having those rights, except in the trivial sense that being a bachelor is a necessary condition for being an unmarried male. Nor have we seen any reason so far for believing that being a person is a necessary condition for having moral rights” (70).
- 4.
D. N. Hoffman, “Personhood and Rights,” Polity 19, no. 1 (1986): 75.
- 5.
To learn more about the current legal status of great apes and the ongoing campaigns that aim to change this status, see C. Saucier-Bouffard, “The Legal Rights of Great Apes,” in The Global Guide to Animal Protection, ed. A. Linzey (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013).
- 6.
See A. Cochrane, “Ownership and Justice for Animals,” Utilitas 21, no. 4 (2009): 434–39.
- 7.
Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 14.
- 8.
H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 19–20.
- 9.
The authors wish to thank Frédéric Côté-Boudreau for having brought this point to their attention. For a more detailed account of the importance of avoiding ableist strategies in the animal rights movement, see S. Taylor, Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation (New York, The New Press, 2017).
- 10.
Although there is a dispute between the tenets of the will theory and those of the interest theory, the latter seems to better explain the function of at least the most fundamental of our human rights.
- 11.
Considering the fundamental Aristotelian principle of justice that states like cases should be treated alike, similar interests should be treated similarly. For instance, similar interests should be protected by similar rights.
- 12.
J. Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 163.
- 13.
See, among other publications, G. L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), and G. L. Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
- 14.
“A Declaration on Great Apes” was published in P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
- 15.
S. M. Wise, personal communication, October 31, 2013; “About Us,” Nonhuman Rights Project, accessed October 5, 2013, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/about-us-2/.
- 16.
This is explicitly stated in P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, “A Declaration on Great Apes,” in The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity, ed. P. Cavalieri and P. Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 5.
- 17.
G. L. Francione and A. Charlton, Eat Like You Care: An Examination of the Morality of Eating Animals (Logan: Exempla Press, 2013).
- 18.
Even though this definition could be criticized for being overly rationalistic or anthropocentric, autonomy is commonly conceived in this way. See G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 108; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 370; or J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 72.
- 19.
See I. Berlin, Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 166–217.
- 20.
For an introduction to the different concepts of liberty and the criticisms addressed to each of them, see F. Lovett, “Republicanism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, Spring 2013 ed., accessed October 5, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/republicanism.
- 21.
See P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Q. Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
- 22.
It should be noted that it might not be a sufficient condition, though. As Ian Shapiro observes, equality of status does not guarantee the absence of domination, even if it is certainly an essential component of the mechanism protecting each individual from it. See I. Shapiro, “On Non-Domination,” University of Toronto Law Journal 62 (2012): 320.
- 23.
Philip Pettit holds the view that it is not the actual interference that constitutes domination but the power to arbitrarily interfere with someone. See P. Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106, no. 3 (1996): 578.
- 24.
Alasdair Cochrane is diametrically opposed to this view. In his book Animal Rights without Liberation, he maintains that most nonhuman animals do not have an intrinsic interest in being free in this sense. From his perspective, the interest nonhumans have in being free is reducible to their interest in not being submitted to a painful treatment or in not being killed. See A. Cochrane, Animal Rights without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
- 25.
The imposition of rules of conduct can often be legitimate. As Ian Shapiro observes, “compliance is often compelled in armies, firms, sports teams, families, schools, and countless other institutions, but this is not domination unless it is deployed for an illegitimate purpose.” Shapiro, “On Non-Domination,” 310.
- 26.
Exploitation can be conceptualized as a feature of oppression. Even if some forms of domination might not involve exploitation, every instance of institutionalized exploitation (or institutionalized oppression) is based on domination. For an instructive analysis of the concept of oppression, see Chap. 2, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). For an application of this particular analysis to the case of nonhuman animals, see L. Gruen, “The Faces of Animal Oppression,” in Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young, ed. A. Ferguson and M. Nagel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161–72.
- 27.
Animals whom the authors consider “liminal” are those who depend on human societies without being tamed and without depending on specific human beings, such as rats, squirrels, raccoons, foxes, and some types of birds. See S. Donaldson and W. Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 63, among other pages.
- 28.
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s use of this notion of “dependent agency” in the case of nonhuman animals is mainly inspired by the disability studies literature. See Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 136.
- 29.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 60–61.
- 30.
It is important to note that, inspired by the work done in disability theories, Donaldson and Kymlicka clearly distinguish their view from the wardship or guardianship models, which they see as endorsing a problematic form of paternalism. Donaldson and Kymlicka might disagree with our interpretation of their approach as justifying a benevolent type of human control over nonhuman citizens. Indeed, they successfully argue that most sentient nonhumans would be capable of a genuine form of political participation, provided our institutions are adequately reformed, which would be preferable to humans making paternalistic decisions in their place. Instead of a paternalistic type of human control over other citizens, the authors suggest we consider a cooperative form of social and political relationships based on co-agency. See Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 59–61.
Bibliography
Berlin, I. Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Cavalieri, P. The Animal Question. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Cavalieri, P., and P. Singer. The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
Cochrane, A. Animal Rights without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
———. “Ownership and Justice for Animals.” Utilitas 21, no. 4 (2009): 434–39.
Donaldson, S., and W. Kymlicka. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Druce, C., and P. Lymbery. Outlawed in Europe: How America Is Falling Behind Europe in Farm Animal Welfare. Woodbury, CT: Archimedian Press, 2002.
Dworkin, G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Feinberg, J. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Francione, G. L. Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
———. Animals, Property, and the Law. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.
———. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.
Francione, G. L., and A. Charlton. Eat Like You Care: An Examination of the Morality of Eating Animals. Logan: Exempla Press, 2013.
Gruen, L. “The Faces of Animal Oppression.” In Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young, edited by A. Ferguson and M. Nagel, 161–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Hoffman, D. N. “Personhood and Rights.” Polity 19, no. 1 (1986): 74–96.
Lovett, F. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
———. “Republicanism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. N. Zalta, Spring 2013 ed. Accessed October 5, 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/republicanism.
Nonhuman Rights Project. “About Us.” Accessed October 5, 2013. http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/about-us-2/.
Pettit, P. “Freedom as Antipower.” Ethics 106, no. 3 (1996): 576–604.
———. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
Sapontzis, S. F. Morals, Reason, and Animals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.
Saucier-Bouffard, C. “The Legal Rights of Great Apes.” In The Global Guide to Animal Protection, edited by A. Linzey, 235–37. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013.
Shapiro, I. “On Non-Domination.” University of Toronto Law Journal 62 (2012): 293–335.
Shue, H. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Skinner, Q. Hobbes and Republican Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Sorenson, J. About Canada: Animal Rights. Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2010.
Taylor, S. Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation. New York: The New Press, 2017.
Weinstock, D., and C. Nadeau, eds. Republicanism: History, Theory and Practice. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
Wise, S. M. Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights. Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2002.
———. Rattling the Cage. Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2000.
Young, I. M. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the precious assistance of Christiane Bailey, Michael Cianci, Frédéric Côté-Boudreau, Sophie Gaillard, Hélène Laplante Dubois, Melissa Paulmier, and Timothy Slonosky.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Giroux, V., Saucier-Bouffard, C. (2018). Animal Justice as Non-Domination. In: Linzey, A., Linzey, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36671-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36671-9_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-36670-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-36671-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)