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The Rational Design of Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations

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Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics

Abstract

The rational design of international institutions has been a prominent research agenda in the field of international relations. The chapter builds on this tradition by exploring how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) design relationships with other IGOs. Using insights from organization theory on inter-organizational relations (IORs), it proposes to distinguish between the formalization, intensity, symmetry, and standardization of interactions between IGOs. The four dimensions allow for an analytical framework that is easy to operationalize. While the rational design literature shows great promise in analyzing the interaction between IGOs, it is important to account for the political nature of life in the international arena. The design of IORs in international relations is likely to be informal, intensive outside the formal settings, symmetrical and not very standardized.

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Acknowledgments

This chapter has a history. A first version was prepared for a workshop on Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations at Vesalius College, Brussels in January 2012. Another version was also presented at the ISA Conference in San Francisco, 3–6 April 2013 and the conference of the first European Workshops of International Studies (EWIS), 5–8 June 2013. The author would like to thank all participants at these events. Special thanks goes to Lisbeth Aggestam, Rafael Biermann, Tannelie Blom, Joachim Koops, Thomas Gehring, Duncan Snidal for their helpful comments and encouragements.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Program (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007–2013) under REA grant agreement n° [298081].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht, 6200 MD, The Netherlands

    Hylke Dijkstra

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  1. Hylke Dijkstra
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany

    Joachim A. Koops

  2. Vesalius College, Brussels, Belgium

    Rafael Biermann

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Dijkstra, H. (2017). The Rational Design of Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations. In: Koops, J., Biermann, R. (eds) Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36039-7_4

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