Pluralism About Self-knowledge

Abstract

The metaphysically robust constitutive account presented in the previous chapter cannot be extended to all mental states. When it comes to past self-ascriptions of commitments, it will have to be integrated with an evidential account resting on mnestic evidence. As to self-knowledge of sensations, basic emotions and perceptions, there appears to be room for a weaker kind of constitutive account, which abandons the metaphysical claim that self-ascriptions bring about the corresponding first-order mental states. Still, it is necessarily and a priori true that, given certain C-conditions, one is in one of these mental states iff one self-ascribes them. The key idea, here, is that these mental states are phenomenologically salient and have characteristic instinctive manifestations. Groundlessness, transparency and authority, then, are redeemed by showing how they are constitutively tied to what it means to be a subject capable of enjoying the relevant mental states. Finally, various cases of third-personal self-knowledge are reviewed. A variety of methods can be implemented with regard to them, like inference to the best explanation, as well as less theory-laden abductive explanations, inferential conceptual deployment, testimony and simulation. An aspect that sets third-personal self-knowledge apart from third-personal knowledge simpliciter is the fact that the relevant cues are often of a psychological nature and known in a first-personal way. Finally, it is emphasised how the characteristic notes of highly dispositional psychological concepts can make us realise (or sometimes contrive) some of our deep-seated character traits. All that testifies to the plurality of ways in which we do know the vast variety of mental states we in fact enjoy.