Abstract
In this chapter, attention is drawn to expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. These reject the idea that self-knowledge is a robust cognitive achievement and hold that psychological avowals are ways of giving immediate expression to one’s mind. In Wittgenstein, avowals are seen as profoundly different from third-personal mental ascriptions, in point both of truth-aptness and of meaning. This also entails that there is nothing as self-knowledge properly so regarded. What goes by that name, rather, are the ideas of groundlessness, transparency and authority, that in turn are a by-product of “grammar”—that is to say, of the rules governing the relevant language games. Next, Dorit Bar-On’s recent version of expressivism is discussed. In her view, avowals are linguistic acts with a truth-apt semantic content. Yet her further idea that avowals can indeed express a special kind of knowledge is criticised. Also, Bar-On’s idea that there can be genuinely false yet sincere and warranted avowals is shown wanting. Ultimately, it appears that expressivism as an all-encompassing theory about knowledge of all kinds of mental states we may enjoy is problematical.
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Notes
- 1.
Of course we can lie, but in that case the pretend verbal pain behavior, just like pretend bodily pain behavior, would still retain an expressive function.
- 2.
Pace Jacobsen 1996, which is more a development of Wittgenstein’s views to make them compatible with minimalism about truth than a reliable historical reconstruction.
- 3.
Contra what Jacobsen 1996 maintains.
- 4.
By strong contextualism, I have in mind what is nowadays called “semantic eliminativism”, a view maintained by Wittgenstein and, more recently, by Charles Travis. I do not mean anything having to do with forms of assessment sensitivity. Nor is the label “contextualism”, as used here, indebted to Kaplan’s notion of context and to Grice’s distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Crudely put, for Wittgenstein, the notion of context roughly coincides with that of language game and certainly is not exhausted by the triad subject-place-time or any suitable extension of it. Moreover, given his equation of meaning and use, there is no room for a sharp division between semantics and pragmatics.
- 5.
For an extended examination, see Coliva 2010, Chap. 2.
- 6.
Hanoch Ben-YAmi has kindly pointed out to me that the correct translation would be “incorrectly”, rather than “without right”. This would further support my reading of Wittgenstein and my criticism of epistemic interpretations.
- 7.
See, in particular, Wright 2004 and Williams 2004a, b.
- 8.
Another prominent version of neo-expressivism can be found in Finkelstein 2003.
- 9.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 288.
- 10.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 294.
- 11.
I think this point is not sufficiently appreciated by Boyle (2009), who criticises Bar-On’s proposal for not explaining the difference between merely parroting “I φ that P” (where φ has to be substituted with a propositional attitude verb) and actually representing oneself as φ-ing. Along Bar-On’s lines, see also Finkelstein 2003, Chap. 4.
- 12.
There will be more on how the mental state can play a rationalising role with respect to the self-ascription in the following.
- 13.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 317.
- 14.
See Bar-On 2004, pp. 417, 422–423.
- 15.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 315.
- 16.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 423.
- 17.
Bar-On 2004, p. 424.
- 18.
Bar-On 2004, p. 325.
- 19.
Bar-On 2004, p. 320.
- 20.
Bar-On 2004, p. 323.
- 21.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 335. This position is not very plausible. Suppose someone is being tortured and screams “I don’t want this”. It would be weird to say that this is not an avowal but a judgement based on introspection. Yet it would be equally weird to hold that it is based on some other positive mental state like wanting something other than what one is being inflicted.
- 22.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 301.
- 23.
Bar-On 2004, p. 344.
- 24.
For obvious reasons, Bar-On’s criticism targets Burge 1996 and does not consider Burge’s later views on self-knowledge.
- 25.
Bar-On 2004, p. 395.
- 26.
Ibid.
- 27.
Bar-On 2004, p. 396.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
See Bar-On 2004, p. 406.
Bibliography
Bar-On, D. (2004). Speaking my mind. Expression and self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boyle, M. (2009). Two kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77(1), 133–164.
Burge, T. (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 1–26.
Coliva, A. (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, certainty and common sense. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Finkelstein, D. (2003). Expression and the inner. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Jacobsen, R. (1996). Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression. Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 12–30.
Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78, 167–212.
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Coliva, A. (2016). Expressivism About Self-knowledge. In: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3_6
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